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REAPPRAISING DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

An Analysis Based on the
Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980

REAPPRAISING DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980

by

Archie D. Barrett

Introduction by General David C. Jones

1983

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Figures and Tables

Foreword

The fundamental role of the Department of Defense (DOD) has been to "provide for the common defence," as described in the US Constitution. This responsibility requires self-evaluation to insure the best possible organization for carrying out this mission. The National Defense University is pleased to publish this analysis of Defense organization by one of its Senior Research Fellows, Colonel Archie D. Barrett, USAF (ret.). Colonel Barrett completes the effort begun by the major Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980, and takes the next logical step by assessing that study's recommendations for improving the overall Defense structure.

In integrating the Defense Organization Study's five major analyses into a coherent whole, Colonel Barrett develops a penetrating commentary on Defense organization. He questions the excessive influence that the military services exercise over the joint defense structure. He argues that no independent military entity exists either to advise the civilian leadership from a national perspective or to employ the unified forces in the field.

Colonel Barrett notes that, despite a series of studies recommending fundamental change in DOD structure, the Department has undergone no structural change since 1958. He discusses the political and bureaucratic sensitivities to proposals for change, and suggests that previous proposals have failed because of inattention to the political ramifications for DOD organizations and for the larger community in which DOD is a competing element.

This work thus serves two purposes. For the student of national security, it summarizes and analyzes more than two decades of studies calling for organizational change. For policymakers who are directly involved in organizational issues, it articulates distinct and comprehensive alternatives to "provide for the common defence."

JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
President, National
   Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Archie D. Barrett is a member of the Professional Staff, House Armed Services Committee. A retired Air Force officer, he was formerly a Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. Before joining the university, Dr. Barrett was the military staff assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Defense Organization Study (the Defense Department portion of the President's Reorganization Project). He has extensive experience in NATO general defense, nuclear, and logistics plans and policies; Air Staff long-range planning, concept and doctrine development; and flight operations, strategic and tactical. Dr. Barrett's publications include "Department of Defense Organization: Planning for Planning," a chapter in *Planning US Security* (1981). A graduate of the United States Military Academy, he earned a doctoral degree in Political Economy and Government from Harvard University.

Preface
(to whom this may concern)

This book was conceived as a needed complement to the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80), to integrate the material concerning the structure of the Department of Defense. The DOS 77-80, as chapter 1 explains, was in effect terminated before a final integrated report based on its component studies could be completed and submitted by the secretary of defense to the president. As this project took shape, it became apparent that a more valuable inquiry would realize the original purpose while casting its net more broadly. The DOS 77-80 could serve as a vehicle for analyzing the organizational problems of the Department of Defense and assessing alternative structural configurations available to the Department. Portions of the more comprehensive resulting analysis should be of use to scholars, government officials, members of Congress, students, teachers, as well as interested general readers.

Chapter 2 provides a framework for viewing Department of Defense organization which should be useful to students and their instructors. The chapter emphasizes the bureaucratic perspective of participants in the organizational milieu of the defense community. Such an approach may provide valuable insights to students who are too often subjected to the concept of organization as a hierarchical pyramid which can be depicted as an ordered set of rectangles on a chart.

Scholars of defense policy and organization will be interested in the presentation of a mass of otherwise unavailable data which reveals the positions of the military departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD agencies during the Carter years (and, for the most part, beyond) on organizational issues. Whether or not scholars agree with the analysis and conclusions, the book will have a beneficial effect if it contributes to rekindling an academic interest in Department of Defense organizational structure. Chapter 3, which presents the DOS 77-80 critique of the present organization, should convince scholars much work remains to be done.

Ultimately, however, this book is intended for those who are in a position to influence DOD organizational decisions. That audience includes the large numbers of military and civilian staff personnel and the powerful superiors they serve in the Pentagon, White House, and Congress. Their considerable talents are focused on reorganization issues more often than anyone who has not witnessed the dynamism of Department of Defense organizational evolution would expect. Ample opportunities for change exist. And those individuals can make it happen if they become convinced reorganization is warranted.

I hasten to add this book is not a polemic in favor of reorganization. As a result of several years of experience with Air Force organizational issues and a subsequent position on the executive secretariat of the DOS 77-80, I was aware of the existing organizational problems when I began to work on this project. But I also realized the case for structural reorganization is not made by merely cataloging Department of Defense weaknesses—that is, by focusing on what is wrong with the current organization. The Department of Defense is a massive enterprise with many of the attendant strengths and weaknesses of all large organizations. The case for change is manifest only when alternatives are elaborated which convince those who participate in the decision process that the present structure can be improved.

It was in attempting to clarify the weaknesses and assess the available alternatives that I became convinced that limited reorganization is warranted. After what I believe will be considered a balanced and objective analysis, which concludes by assessing several alternatives, the last chapter presents the case for limited reorganization. My hope is that this approach will assist the decisionmaking audience in selecting the best alternative for structuring the defense establishment to meet the challenges which face us.

Since the completion of this text in January 1982, significant events concerning reorganization of the joint military structure have occurred. In February 1982, General David C. Jones—in an unprecedented departure for an incumbent JCS Chairman—criticized the existing JCS organization before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). He was later joined in his criticisms by Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer, who proposed changes more

far-reaching than Jones'. After extensive hearings, the Investigative Subcommittee of the HASC reported a bill addressing some of the more serious JCS issues. Although it passed in the House, the "JCS Reorganization Act of 1982" died in the Senate at the end of the 97th Congress.

In April 1983, prodded by continuing criticisms of the JCS structure, the Reagan administration DOD proposed its own, very modest, reorganization plan. At this writing, as the House prepares to hold additional hearings on the administration proposal, the overall organization of the DOD remains unchanged. Thus the criticisms, alternatives, and recommendations in this volume remain relevant.

One more bit of housekeeping: a glossary appears immediately preceding the index. This book unavoidably employs many acronyms. To alleviate some of the bewilderment which would attend any attempt to cope with them by memory, I encourage the reader to consult the glossary as necessary.

This preface is addressed "to whom this may concern." In closing, it is my privilege to thank all of those who have already made this book a matter of their concern. I am grateful to a number of talented and busy people who took the time to read and critique all or part of the manuscript. These include General David Jones, who graciously consented to write the Introduction; Don Price, Morton Halperin, Richard Betts, Richard Daleski, Philip Kronenberg, Fred Kiley, Frank Margiotta, Benjamin Schemmer, John McLaurin, Betty Mears, and Mabel Jobe. Although I am responsible for what appears in these pages, including any errors or omissions, their efforts have contributed significantly to whatever merit readers find here. I am also deeply indebted to George Maerz, the principal editor, and Evelyn Lakes, who have been constant in their encouragement and unfailingly correct in their professional judgments. Finally, my most sincere thanks to those whose concern has been manifested in the sacrifice of family life for the sale of this effort—to Miriam, Julie, Cindy, and Don, Jr.

ARCHIE D. BARRETT
Springfield, Virginia 1983

Executive Summary

The searching and comprehensive Defense Organization
Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80) identifies major weaknesses in the
structure and functioning of the Department of Defense (DOD)
which compromise its mission and hence threaten the security of
the United States. Within the pages of its five separate reports and
the voluminous comments thereon by the military departments,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD organizations can also be
found the elements of several alternative organizational structures.
This book employs the DOS 77-80 as a vehicle for analyzing the
organizational problems of the Department of Defense and asses-
sing alternative structural configurations available to the
Department.

Background and methodological material in chapters 1 and 2 is
followed in chapter 3 with a discussion of the organizational weak-
nesses of the Department of Defense, many of which have been
identified by every major study conducted during the last quarter
century as well as by the DOS 77-80. Among the most significant
problems are:

• The inability of the service-dominated joint organizations
adequately to perform their primary functions: providing military
advice to civilian leaders from a national perspective and employing
combatant forces in the field. The impotence of the joint organiza-
tions stems from contradictions in the structure of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Joint Staff subservience to service interests, and insuffi-
cient influence of the unified and specified commanders.

• The weaknesses of the service secretaries, who do not pos-
sess the organizational wherewithal either to lead their departments
effectively or to participate significantly in top management of the
Department of Defense.

• The overwhelming influence of the four services. The defer-
ence accorded their positions on defense issues as a result of the
present organization is completely out of proportion to their legally
assigned and limited formal responsibilities—in essence, organiz-

ing, training, and equipping forces for the combatant commanders.

• The flawed management approach of the Office of the Secretary of Defense which slights the broad policy function by failing to define the linkages between national objectives and military planning; by failing to evaluate alternative approaches to military requirements; and by failing to ensure that decisions, once made, are implemented and the results assessed for needed adjustments.

Having identified what needs correcting in the Department of Defense, the volume turns to alternative realignments in each of the major elements. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 consolidate the recommendations of the various DOS 77-80 materials into alternative approaches to the organization of each major element, analyzing and assessing the alternatives, and finally arriving at conclusions. Chapter 4 treats the joint organization. It proposes that the JCS chairman, Joint Staff, and the unified and specified commanders (CINCs) be strengthened. Chapter 5 focuses on the military departments, with particular emphasis on the role of the service secretaries. It recommends merging service secretariats and service headquarters staffs in each department to strengthen the service secretaries, making them managers de facto. Chapter 6 examines the Secretary of Defense/Office of the Secretary of Defense approach to managing the Department. It advocates stronger central control in some cases to eliminate sacrosanct areas currently beyond the reach of civilian control. On the other hand, it proposes decentralizing operations as a general rule with top management maintaining overall control by strengthening legitimate, but weak, countervailing interests (the JCS chairman, CINCs, service secretaries) as an offset to the over-strong service interests.

Drawing on the foregoing material, the last two chapters advance four possible organizational configurations of the Department of Defense. The alternatives range from retaining the present structure to fundamental reordering of the Department. The recommended limited reorganization alternative features a combination of the proposals favored in the previous treatments of each element. The last chapter argues that the preferred limited reorganization alternative would (1) strengthen the joint structure as an independent institution and thereby finally establish an organizational apparatus capable of providing military advice to civilian authorities from

a unified, national perspective as a counterpoise to the interested advice of the services; (2) place the military departments more firmly under the control of the service secretaries and more clearly focus them on the responsibilities assigned by law; and (3) direct the secretary of defense's attention to higher level administration—designing, evaluating, and redesigning the allocation of decisions among the constituent organizations of the Department—as a necessary complement to the usual secretarial concern with the objectives and purposes of national defense and the means to achieve those ends.

Introduction

by General David C. Jones
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Although most history books glorify our military accomplishments, a closer examination reveals a disconcerting pattern: unpreparedness at the start of a war; initial failures; reorganizing while fighting; cranking up our industrial base; and ultimately prevailing by wearing down the enemy—by being bigger, not smarter.

Organizational problems have plagued our military establishment from the start. The development of the Army and the Navy was accompanied by the growth of semiautonomous, often intractable fiefdoms which continued to riddle those services right up to the start of World War II. The demands of the war provided the incentive to make major progress in integrating efforts within each service, but cross-service cooperation remained extremely difficult even under the pressures of a major conflict.

That we fell far short of an effective joint effort was reflected by President Truman in his December 1945 Message to Congress. While our theaters of war were organized on the principle of unity of command, noted Truman,

> we never had comparable unified direction in Washington. And even in the field our unity of operations was greatly impaired by differences in training, in doctrine, in communications systems and in supply and distribution systems that stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington . . . it is now time to take stock, to discard obsolete organizational forms.

President Truman's attempt to rectify the problem encountered a great deal of resistance and generated a great debate within Congress. The resulting National Security Act of 1947 created a National Defense Establishment and a secretary of defense, but the latter's authority was severely constrained and little was done to solve the fundamental organizational problems.

Although the secretary's authority was significantly increased by changes in 1949 and 1953, the individual services—including the newly independent Air Force—continued to dominate defense matters. This was borne out by President Eisenhower, who in a 1958 Message to Congress stated, "the truth is that most of the service rivalries that have troubled us in recent years have been made inevitable by the laws that govern our defense organization." The Symington Report commissioned by President-elect Kennedy in 1960 reinforced that conclusion and declared: "No different results can be expected as long as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retain their two-hatted character, with their positions preconditioned by the Service environment to which they must return after each session of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Despite efforts by secretaries of defense with greater authority to overcome such problems, they persisted throughout the 1960s. The 1970 Presidential Blue Ribbon Defense Panel found that in Washington "the diffusion of responsibility and accountability, the freedom to 'pass the buck' to the top on hard decisions, and the opportunity to use the extensive coordination process to advance parochial objectives, are circumstances to which many in the Department have adapted comfortably."

Many of the fundamental problems continued through yet another decade and persist to the present day. The 1978 Steadman Report concluded that "the JCS...committee structure is not effective for the exercise of military command or management authority." And just a year ago the 1982 Special Study Group concluded: "A certain amount of Service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the Services too much and the larger needs of the nation's defenses too little."

The House Armed Services Committee did a great service in 1982 by having one of its subcommittees conduct in-depth hearings on joint military organization. As a staff member of the subcommittee, Arch Barrett was instrumental in assuring that the issues were well illuminated. I was particularly impressed by the fact that all of the former secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense who testified called for major changes in the system.

Despite past and recent efforts by many experienced officials, institutional resistance to change remains enormous. If meaningful reform is to be accomplished, the public will have to become well informed and actively concerned about the issue. The likelihood of a successful initiative emerging from within the system is extremely low. As Admiral Mahan, the noted naval strategist, once wrote, a military service can not be expected to reorganize itself; pressure must be exerted from outside the organization.

Arch Barrett provides a unique service in illuminating defense organization issues by adding the weight of organizational theory to the evidence accumulated over the past 35 years. His identification of the allocation of decisions as the highest level of administrative responsibility rings very true on a practical as well as a theoretical plane.

This book should be studied by those interested in one of the most important issues facing our country today. Although the current threat to our security is great, there is little likelihood that we will have the time to regroup if we do not meet the threat effectively at the outset of any major conflict. We can no longer afford the degradation of our defense capabilities that comes with less than effective organization.

Arch Barrett's analysis supports the need for far-reaching actions, but because he is greatly concerned with political practicality, his recommendations are very modest. Politics, after all, is the art of the possible and perhaps Arch is right in his assessment of what is possible. Nevertheless, I dare to hope that our actions may yet match our rhetoric when we proclaim that national security must be above politics—partisan, bureaucratic, sectional, or any other kind. Arch Barrett has done a public service with this book by adding yet another significant piece of evidence on the need to reform our defense establishment and the difficulty of keeping politics out of national security.

DAVID C. JONES
General, USAF (Ret.)

Chapter 1

Should the Department of Defense Be Restructured?

What is the best way to organize the Department of Defense? That question concerned the architects of the National Security Act from the mid-1940s until its last major revision in 1958. This inquiry revisits the question in the context of the 1980s.

The most recent study of defense organization provides the rationale for retracing ground long ago traveled by some of the foremost national security thinkers of the post-World War II era. The Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80) suggests the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the military department secretaries are weak, ineffectual, and sterile institutions dominated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Significant Department of Defense decisions, the study intimates, derive from the interplay between the secretary of defense, whose control is tenuous at best, and each of the services, whose unflagging, skillful, and effective pursuit of their interests is deservedly legendary. How best to configure the major organizational elements of the defense establishment, it turns out, remains a valid, significant—and, to many, unanswered—question.

Treatments of organization usually address mission or purpose, structure and function, process, management, and personnel. All of those subjects find their way into the following pages from time to time. But the principal focus is on that aspect of organization which comes to the fore when considering reorganization, the overall structure of the Department of Defense (DOD).

During the two decades since the last major reorganization in 1958, DOD organizational efforts followed directions other than structural. They focused on consolidating the performance of

common functions in defense agencies and building and adjusting processes to regulate major activities, most notably the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) and the procedures for acquiring weapon systems and equipment. That activity continues apace.

Structural changes, on the other hand, have been relatively insignificant in recent times, as compared to the dozen years prior to 1958. During that period, Congress established the Department of Defense and refined its creation repeatedly. Successive reorganizations transformed the secretary of defense from a weak policy broker to a powerful department head, the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was established, unified and specified commands took shape, and service secretaries lost cabinet status.

Is reorganization needed? In addition to the DOS 77-80, a number of responsible commentaries over the last two decades have criticized the present structure and recommended changes. The first section of this chapter demonstrates this position cannot be lightly dismissed. Why has restructuring as an organizational technique for achieving improved performance subsided since 1958? The second section suggests intangible political and bureaucratic boundaries exist that limit viable reorganization proposals. Recommendations which breach the bounds have little chance of being accepted. Past studies, nevertheless, have consistently advanced proposals beyond the pale. Recognizing that this explanation of past inaction does not justify neglecting reorganization if the structure is flawed, the third section advances the recent Defense Organization Study of 1977-80 as a vehicle for exploring DOD reorganization alternatives. The fourth section provides necessary additional details on the DOS 77-80, and the last section outlines the remaining chapters.

FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION—A SIGNIFICANT DICHOTOMY

The slackening of structural changes has not occurred because the United States has reached the millenium in organizing its defense structure, if government studies and academic treatments in the years since 1958 are given any credence. Such works have consistently criticized the structure and recommended changes to the basic framework of defense organization. The Defense Organi-

zation Study of 1977-1980 continues that tradition. It contains a trenchant critique of the present organization.

The thesis of the critique is that the dominant organizations in the Department of Defense are the military services and the central management, the secretary of defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).* The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps exercise preponderant influence over the joint military structure—the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the unified and specified commands. Consequently, no authentic, independent joint military presence exists to advise civilian leaders from a national point of view and employ the unified forces of the United States in the field. The relationship between central management and the services is the anvil on which the major national security decisions involving the military instrument are hammered out in the Department of Defense.**

Major DOS 77-80 findings and criticisms elaborate this theme:

Joint Structure

The impotence of the service-dominated joint system compromises its performance in providing military advice to civilian leaders from a national point of view and employing US forces in the field.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are also the principal military officers of their respective services, find it impossible to rise above service concerns and render advice on issues from a national perspective. Instead, their advice is the result of bargaining in which each member attempts to safeguard service interests. Because bargaining often fails to produce compromises

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*Except in the case of direct quotations, documentation of the DOS 77-80 critique is omitted in this section. The material here summarizes the thoroughly documented, detailed survey in chapter 3.

**Readers who may be unfamiliar with some of the DOD officials and organizations discussed in this section are invited to peruse the first section of chapter 2, which briefly describes the present organization of the Department. Also, for quick reference, an explanation of the overwhelming helping of acronyms, an unavoidable part of the diet of anyone dealing with the Defense Department, has been included in the glossary.

acceptable to the services, the JCS avoids taking a position on a broad range of issues that shape the very core of the US defense posture.

Unified and Specified Commands

The commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) have neither the influence nor the clear-cut durable links with higher authority commensurate with their responsibilities as supreme military commanders of US forces in the field directly under the highest civilian authorities. In crucial decisions determining the composition and warfighting capabilities of theater forces, their subordinate component commanders overshadow the CINCs. The far-too-independent components have dual designations as major service commands. This latter identity is much more influential than the joint, or unified, nature of their assignment.

Service Secretaries

The civilian heads of the military departments have little influence, relatively. The service secretaries are not participants in top management of the Department of Defense and are not in a position to act as the actual leaders of their departments.

Services

The preeminence of the four services in the Department of Defense is completely disproportionate to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities—in essence, organizing, training, and equipping forces for subsequent employment by the joint commanders. Although service ascendancy does not mean the military is unresponsive to civilian control, it does mean the military input into decisionmaking, whether through service secretaries, the JCS, Joint Staff, CINCs, or components, is oriented toward service, vice national, interests. Although the two interests may coincide, that is by no means always the case.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

The management approach of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is flawed. OSD slights the broad policy function; it fails to define the linkages between national objectives and military planning, to evaluate alternative approaches to military requirements, and to ensure decisions, once made, are implemented and the results assessed for needed adjustments.

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Adopting a more effective management approach will require correcting a number of weaknesses: ineffectual joint military participation in OSD policy formulation; insufficient delegation to operating levels of the Department; imprecise delineation of authority between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments; weak OSD evaluation capability; inattention to output measures such as joint warfighting or readiness capabilities in resource allocation decisions; and absence of cohesion and teamwork among constituent elements of the Department.

Chapter 3 develops and analyzes in detail the study critique summarized above. The summary suffices to illustrate the basis of the critics' contention that the formal Defense Department organization sculpted by Congress bears little resemblance to the working model obtaining at present.

WHY RESTRUCTURING CEASED— A SLEEPING DOG DICHOTOMY

The DOS 77-80 critique implies that the time has come to consider modifying the present Department of Defense structure. Although a few actions have addressed the study concerns, none which would significantly alter the structure of the Department have been initiated, nor apparently are they in the offing.* Thus the latest study effort is in danger of suffering the same fate as earlier studies which substantially agreed with its critique. Why have structural weaknesses been unattended since 1958? Why has this facet of DOD organization been so unresponsive to the findings and recommendations of critics, while relative flexibility has been evident in adjusting processes, management techniques, and even personnel policies?

Absence of Political Sensitivity

One reason is that many proposals have been too far-reaching to attract committed and powerful proponents. Proposals run the

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*This statement holds true despite developments too recent to be included in the text, completed in early 1982. For example, the book does not discuss the movement for JCS reorganization that emerged in 1982 and the resulting 1983 Reagan administration/DOD recommendation to change the legislation governing the JCS. The 1983 DOD legislative proposal is so mild that it would not "significantly alter the structure of the Department."

gamut from recommending complete centralization to championing a return to decentralized service preeminence. Acceptance of any one of those proposals would result in changes as wrenching as any of the sweeping reorganizations of the past.

The Symington Report, for example, suggested eliminating the present military departments and placing the services, as separate organizational units, under the secretary of defense within a single Department of Defense. In addition, the report recommended replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a single officer who would act as the principal military advisor to the president and secretary of defense, preside over a military advisory council unaffiliated with the services, and direct the combatant commands.[1] The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel proposed completely regrouping the functions of DOD under three deputy secretaries of defense to whom service secretaries and a revamped military operations structure would be subordinate.[2] Paul Y. Hammond recommended conferring authority and responsibility for the military program of all of the services upon the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would head a formally established general staff.[3] Finally, John C. Ries' treatise favoring a return to decentralized organization suggested the possibility of consolidating the unified and specified commands into four mission-oriented services which would absorb the existing military departments.[4]

After the strident conflicts of the early post-World War II years, the erstwhile combatants had little energy and no enthusiasm for further battles along these lines. Furthermore, less provocation existed. The secretary of defense emerged with such sweeping authority he could hardly continue to claim to be too weak to run the Department. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps found they had successfully defended the separate identities and relative autonomy they sought. Finally, the external factors which had fanned the reorganization fires subsided with the election of President Kennedy. Parsimonious Truman and Eisenhower defense budgets, which gave rise to intense service competition and corresponding public reaction in support of greater unification, gave way to an expanding defense posture and subsequently to the plentiful Vietnam budgets. Nor did succeeding presidents share Eisenhower's penchant for personal involvement in Department of Defense reorganization. In these circumstances, despite the periodic proposals for major realignments, none of the powerful poten-

tial proponents demonstrated sufficient interest to make structural change a viable issue.

Thus the later years have confirmed what the early years demonstrated: structural reorganization of the Department of Defense is, first and foremost, a political process, involving the clash and adjustment of bureaucratic, legislative, and private interests. Restructuring is not, as many studies implicitly assume, an academic exercise in organizational optimization. Studies are simply too prone to advance far-reaching proposals while remaining insensitive to possible sources of support and opposition in the bureaucracy, White House, Congress, and public. If they are to influence the shape of public institutions such as the Department of Defense, organization studies and other literature of this genre must advance reorganization proposals developed with an informed appreciation of the likely boundaries of the politically possible.*

Resort to Alternative Organizational Approaches

A second reason for the absence of significant structural changes is the relative ease and apparent effectiveness of alternative organizational approaches. Since 1958, if not before, the authority of the secretary of defense to establish processes for deciding resource allocation, acquisition, and similar issues has been unchallenged. Organizational processes, after all, in one respect are merely rules defining who figures, and to what degree, in a decision. The power to establish a process is the power to slice through the structure of an organization, bypassing certain elements regardless of their position in the hierarchy, and including others, even though they may be formally subordinate. Thus processes can be used to avoid direct conflict and facilitate action by defining, and redefining when necessary, the rules of the game for making decisions.

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*The political nature of reorganization is a phenomenon repeatedly encountered and discussed in this book. In its reference to the "clash and adjustment of . . . interests," this paragraph conveys the intended meaning of "political" in what follows. Thus "politics" is not limited to the activities of elected officials; the processes which adjust and accommodate the inherent contradictions among the myriad interests present in a modern society are found throughout the governmental apparatus, and elsewhere as well.

Restructure the DOD?

And process changes are less dolorous for secretaries of defense than reorganizations. Although the formal authority of the secretary of defense to reorganize his department is comparable to his authority to create and modify processes, the *de facto* circumstances differ markedly. A secretary who proposes significant reorganization of the military departments or Joint Chiefs of Staff can be certain he will be strongly challenged both from within the Department of Defense and from powerful segments of the Congress and the general public. Faced with inevitable, unremitting opposition to significant restructuring, secretaries focus on modifying processes.

GENESIS

A Disquieting Situation

The foregoing explanation of why the structure of DOD has remained unresponsive to repeated criticisms is troubling. It does not touch on the merits of the case; that is, whether the criticisms of the structure of DOD are justified. It merely explains why the criticisms have had little impact. If anything, the continuing criticisms of the organization, coupled with recurring requirements to adjust management processes, constitute a *prima facie* case that realignments limited to process changes are inadequate. No matter how facile the processes, powerful organizations in the DOD structure may be able to find ways to exert inordinate influence on decisions. The equally unwelcome corollary is that other organizations, because of their subordinate hierarchical positions or some other factor, are too weak and dependent to contribute meaningfully, even though their perspectives are sought and needed for balance. Consequently, the explanation leaves those concerned with such matters with the uneasy feeling that serious deficiencies in defense organization may have developed over the years and, if true, something should be done to correct them.

A Truncated Study

This backdrop establishes the setting for this book. The Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 provided the proximate cause. In scope, the DOS 77-80 contains the most recent thinking on almost the entire range of organizational issues the Department of Defense will face for some time, perhaps through the 1980s. It provides the most recent critique of the structure of DOD, one

which is, in toto, a severe indictment. Unlike many earlier studies, however, the DOS 77-80 prescriptions for organizational change are not, on the whole, extreme to the point of being politically unrealistic. Moreover, as a result of its somewhat unique methodology, the DOS 77-80 identifies the sources of support and opposition for various proposals, as well as more generally acceptable alternatives in some cases.

Unfortunately, the DOS 77-80 treatment of DOD organizational structure is unlikely to receive the attention it merits as the most comprehensive examination of the Department of Defense in at least a decade. The study was thrust upon an unwilling Department of Defense by the Carter White House. As long as Carter administration interest remained high, the effort received attention at the highest DOD levels. When, in the latter stages of the administration, White House emphasis on reorganization gave way to other concerns, the Department of Defense effort quickly faded. By that time individual topical and issue-area studies containing scores of recommendations had been completed and organizations from throughout the Department and defense community at large had provided hundreds of formal comments. But the DOD effort stopped short of submitting a comprehensive, integrated report to the president based on the issue studies and comments.

Consequently, no general DOS 77-80 critique of DOD exists. And no consolidated set of proposals for meeting criticisms was submitted by the secretary of defense in a final report, as originally anticipated by the White House. Perhaps most important in the long run, scholars and other interested parties have no way to assess the voluminous study materials from an overall perspective.

The foreshortening of the DOS 77-80 effort did not materially affect the usefulness and value of its separately published topical or issue studies. Those analyses treat (1) processes, such as the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) and the acquisition procedures; and (2) specific functions, such as support, medical care, and training. But failure to combine the separate components into an integrated final report palpably limited the value of the DOS 77-80 findings and recommendations concerning DOD structure. Proposed modifications to the internal structure of any one of the major DOD components, or its relationship with other components, can only be properly evaluated in the context of their

implications for the entire organizational framework of the Department of Defense.

Purpose of This Inquiry

This book provides this overall perspective by integrating the various parts of the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 into (1) a general critique of DOD structure, (2) a consolidated set of proposals to alter the structure, and (3) an assessment of the proposals including their implications for the organization as a whole. In short, this book uses the DOS 77-80 to explore once again, but in the context of the 1980s, the question faced by those who first structured the Department of Defense in the years following World War II: What is the best way to configure the major organizational elements of the defense establishment?

The emphasis will be on elucidating the factors which influence Defense Department reorganization and exploring organizational alternatives. The heart of the book explores the present structure and the political and bureaucratic context within which DOD reorganization decisions are made, explains criticisms of the present organization, and assesses specific proposals for change. That foundation facilitates analysis of alternative DOD structures.

THE DATA BASE—THE DOS 77-80

Because this inquiry is based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980, additional details concerning its origin, structure, and methods are in order. During his election campaign, President Carter promised to reorganize the federal bureaucracy. On 20 September 1977, as part of his overall governmental reorganization effort, the president undertook to fulfill this campaign pledge with respect to the Department of Defense. In a memorandum to the secretary of defense, the president requested a searching organizational review.[5] Detailed issue papers accompanying the president's memorandum specified three major areas for emphasis. Subsequently, the secretary chartered three independent studies, directed by prominent citizens, to address the concerns expressed in the memorandum:

- The *Departmental Headquarters Study*, directed by Paul R. Ignatius, addresses the question of how the top management structure of the Department of Defense—the Office of

the Secretary of Defense and the military department
staffs—can become more effective and efficient in carrying
out the national security mission.[6]

- The *National Military Command Structure Study*, directed
  by Richard C. Steadman, reviews the national military
  command structure (NMCS) and evaluates alternatives for
  making it more effective and efficient in carrying out the
  national security mission. The study defines the national
  military command structure as the secretary of defense,
  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Chiefs of
  Staff (JCS), Joint Staff, and the unified and specified com-
  mands, as well as the pattern of relationships and all facets
  of interaction among these organizations. Specifically in-
  cluded in the latter is "how the Secretary of Defense pro-
  vides guidance and instruction to the JCS and the field and
  how they provide planning and military advice to him, the
  President, and the Congress."[7]

- The *Defense Resource Management Study*, directed by
  Donald B. Rice, contains five essentially independent stud-
  ies of areas specifically cited in the resource management
  issue paper transmitted by the president's memorandum.
  The component studies examine these topics:
  —The resource allocation decision process (PPBS)
  —The weapon system acquisition process
  —Logistics support of combat forces
  —The career mix of enlisted military personnel
  —The military health care system[8]

Later, two additional studies, based on other concerns cited
in the president's management issue paper, were initiated:

- The *Defense Agency Review*, directed by Theodore Anto-
  nelli, examines the roles, missions, and functions of the
  defense agencies to determine whether problems exist
  which might be resolved by organizational change.

- The *Combat Effective Training Management Study*, directed
  by Major General Donald E. Rosenblum, US Army, exam-
  ines military training conducted by the services and the
  management of training at all levels.[10]

The three principal study directors are civilians. The staff for each
of the studies, however, consisted of both military and civilian per-

sonnel drawn from throughout the Department of Defense. The study directors also engaged outside consultants for specific tasks.

The methods used in conducting each study varied. The most common technique was to interview key civilian and military personnel experienced in the areas of concern. Hundreds of such interviews were completed. In addition, the study groups reviewed past studies, researched legislation, regulations, books and other applicable documents, and prepared case studies.

Despite the "in-house" composition of the study groups, it would be erroneous to question the independence of their inquiries. A reading of the study reports (or the summaries of their critiques in chapter 3 of this book) should be sufficient to dispel suspicions on this score. Except for a few meetings of a steering committee headed by the deputy secretary of defense to review progress and exchange views, no official, and very little informal, interface occurred among the study groups. Each was aware of the concerns of the others and, because completion and publication dates differed, the earlier studies influenced the later ones in some respects. Nevertheless, the most accurate characterization, obvious from the most casual examination, is that the study effort consisted of five independent components, and was not an integrated, coordinated undertaking.

The DOS 77-80 effort consists of more than the five studies, however. After publication, the deputy secretary of defense circulated each of the principal studies and the Defense Agency Review throughout the defense community for comment. (The training study was published after the overall effort had ended.) Voluminous responses to the component study recommendations were received from the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the defense agencies, under and assistant secretaries of defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council staff. That material adds to the scope and depth of thinking on defense organization represented by the DOS 77-80 effort. The commentary also provides insights on the political feasibility of reorganization proposals based on the positions of powerful defense bureaucracies.

PROSPECTUS

This introductory chapter has cited the *structure* of the Department of Defense as the principal focus of this inquiry without explaining the term. Also, the chapter has advanced two premises which require further elaboration: (1) Limits to organizational proposals exist beyond which opposition becomes increasingly tenacious; as they become more far-reaching, at some point proposals reach the realm of political unreality, regardless of how logically appealing and theoretically satisfying they might be. (2) The organizations which would be affected by change, either directly or indirectly, in large part impose the bounds which separate viable organizational alternatives from unrealistic ones. The first step in assessing DOD organization is to explore those imprecise concepts and premises. Chapter 2 elaborates the structure or framework within which organizational changes in DOD take place. It examines the composition, authority, and responsibilities of the principal constituent organizational elements, their perspectives, and those of other actors who figure in defense reorganization decisions.

Chapter 3 turns to the DOS 77-80 critique of the present Department of Defense structure. The "study" provides no general critique; it is merely a collection of documents containing findings, problems, and issues in five component studies and numerous comments. Because an integrated picture does not exist, it is necessary to piece one together to arrive at the overview of how the studies perceive DOD. For comparison and contrast, as well as a degree of validation, the chapter also includes a brief summary of the critiques of previous studies.

Having placed the principal shortcomings of the present organization, according to the DOS 77-80, clearly in relief, the inquiry turns in chapters 4, 5, and 6 to an analysis of what can be done to improve the joint structure, the military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One viable alternative considered in each case is to maintain the status quo. Even though a critique may reveal flaws, it does not follow that changes which correct the flaws will result in a better organization. The cure may be worse than the malady. Consequently, the spectrum of alternatives examined extends from maintaining the status quo to the bounds of political feasibility—and beyond, in some cases.

Restructure the DOD?

Chapters 7 and 8 group the recommendations in packages of alternative DOD-wide structures; these alternatives roughly correspond to way stations along a spectrum from the present organization to the most far-reaching proposals found in the study materials. These chapters then explore the implications from an integrated perspective of choosing one or more of the alternative packages. Finally, chapter 8 selects and advocates one alternative as the most appropriate position along the spectrum based on the analysis of the previous chapters.

Chapter 2

The Framework of
Organizational Decisionmaking
in the Department of Defense

Reorganization decisions which significantly modify any of the major constituent organizational elements of the Department of Defense are extraordinarily complex. A broad spectrum of often conflicting interests are in a position to influence the outcome. To be realistic, assessments of recommendations for change must take cognizance of this plethora of interests. The starting point of an analysis of DOD reorganization, then, must be an examination of the framework within which proposals are considered.

An overarching component of this framework is the existing structure of the DOD itself. The Department is a functioning organization with a mission and basic structure which includes powerful constituent organizations. In the absence of external forces sufficient to override the existing DOD bureaucracy, the pattern of organizational change will continue, as in the past, to be an evolutionary development of the present structure to accommodate changing conditions. Consequently, examination of this structure provides insights into underlying organizational issues as well as the overall architecture which must be considered when changes are proposed. This chapter focuses primarily on the present DOD structure, its *de jure* and *de facto* configurations, the nature of its constituent organizations, and the manner in which it has developed over the years.

The institutional setting of DOD is also a crucial factor in organizational decisions. The Department is subject to the mandates of

both the Congress and the president. It interfaces with other governmental departments and agencies; private-sector business, interest, and citizen groups; the academic community; foreign ministries of defense; and international security organizations such as NATO. Each of these constituencies have legitimate interests which must be considered in organizational changes. This chapter also briefly discusses these components of the framework within which organization issues are decided.*

STRUCTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Basic Organization Model of DOD

The purpose of the Department of Defense is to *maintain* and *employ* the military instrument of national power under the direction of the president as commander-in-chief and the secretary of defense, and in response to the legislative mandates of the Congress. Considered in its most abstract form, the organizational model of DOD consists of four basic elements that are responsible for the two principal functions assigned in the mission, as depicted in figure 2-1.** Each element consists of one or more large organizations; for example, the four services are a part of the military department element. Also, the two functions depicted by the lines

---

*Within the context of all of these influences on reorganization, the organizational and management philosophy of the incumbent secretary of defense, who is ultimately responsible for the successful functioning of the Department, is of paramount importance. His judgment is a decisive factor in intradepartmental reforms, and a major consideration in the deliberations on DOD organization proposals decided in the White House and Congress. As opposed to the more or less stable influences discussed in this chapter, the approach of the secretary of defense to reorganization is dynamic, varying with each incumbent. Chapter 6 presents an interpretation of the approach recommended by the DOS 77-80 for future secretaries.

**Variations of this model will be used throughout the remainder of the text to illustrate several conceptions of DOD organization. The representation has been intentionally simplified to eliminate unnecessary details and facilitate conceptual manipulation of the symbols. However, what the symbols in the model represent is important; consequently, this section addresses these details at some length. The reader familiar with DOD organization may be forgiven for skipping to the next section after surveying the model presentation.

BASIC ORGANIZATION MODEL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (OSD)

MAINTAIN

EMPLOY

MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS

JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
(JCS)

JOINT STAFF

UNIFIED
AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDS

COMPONENT
COMMANDS

FIGURE 2-1: BASIC ORGANIZATION MODEL OF THE DEPARTMENT
Of DEFENSE

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connecting the elements subsume a large number of subsidiary functions. The *maintaining* functions include recruiting, training, research and development, procurement, administration, logistical support, maintenance and medical care. The principal responsibility for these functions extends from the secretary of defense and his office—the central management—to the *maintaining* arm, the military departments, and the component commands. The *employing* functions are performed consequent to providing military advice to civilian authorities and directing the operations of combat forces in peacetime and wartime. These functions include assessments of enemy threat and friendly warfighting capability; strategic, operational, and logistical planning; and command and control arrangements. Responsibility for these functions extends from the central management to the *employing* arm, which consists of the Joint Chiefs of Staff element and the unified and specified commands.

Secretary of Defense

The secretary of defense is responsible for all aspects of the Departmental mission; all of the functions of DOD and its component agencies are performed under his direction, authority, and control. Two supporting staffs assist him in performing the *maintaining* and *employing* functions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is his principal staff element. Although primarily concerned with assisting the secretary in the exercise of his *maintaining* functions, OSD is also intimately involved in significant *employing* functions. Designations of principal OSD civilian officials (figure 2-2) confirm the comprehensive concerns of OSD: policy; international security affairs; net assessment: research and engineering; command, control, communications, and intelligence; manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics; program analysis and evaluation; comptroller; health affairs; atomic energy; legislative affairs; and public affairs. Staffing of OSD is predominantly civilian, reflecting the constitutional commitment to civilian control of the military.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Below the secretary of defense, responsibilities for *maintaining* are separated from those for *employing* the military instrument. The secretary's principal *employing* staff is the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), composed of the chiefs of the four services and a chairman. (See figure 2-3.) The latter is a senior military officer who presides

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

Under Secretary of Defense
  Policy
  Research and Engineering

General Counsel

Assistant to the Secretary of
  Defense
    Atomic Energy
    Legislative Affairs

Assistant Secretary of Defense
  Command, Control, Communications,
    and Intelligence

Comptroller

Health Affairs

International Security Affairs

Manpower, Reserve Affairs,
  and Logistics

Program Analysis and
  Evaluation

Public Affairs

MAINTAIN

EMPLOY

MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS

JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
(JCS)

JOINT STAFF

UNIFIED
AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDS

COMPONENT
COMMANDS

FIGURE 2-2: ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, 1980

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Commandant, Marine Corps

JOINT STAFF

Director, Joint Staff
Directorates
 Operations
 Logistics
 Plans and Policy
 Command, Control and Communications Systems
 Administrative Services
Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency

EMPLOY

MAINTAIN

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

COMPONENT COMMANDS

FIGURE 2-3: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION, 1980

over JCS meetings, acts as the JCS spokesman, and supervises the Joint Staff on behalf of the JCS.

The major responsibilities assigned to the JCS can be grouped into four categories. First, and foremost, the JCS is the principal military adviser to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense charged with providing the professional military viewpoint for the effective formulation and conduct of national security policy. Second, the JCS assists the National Command Authorities (NCA)—the president and secretary of defense—in the exercise of command responsibilities. The JCS serves as the adviser and military staff in the chain of command, provides for the strategic direction of the armed forces, assigns logistics responsibilities, and establishes doctrine for unified operations and training. Third, the JCS prepares strategic and logistics plans which guide the development of the overall defense program and budget. Its advice contributes to decisions on the defense budget, resource and engineering priorities, and security assistance programs. Fourth, the JCS reviews plans, programs, and requirements (personnel, materiel, and logistics) of the unified and specified commands and the military departments to ensure their congruence with the basic joint plans.[1]

The Joint Staff supports the JCS in the exercise of its corporate responsibilities. It is primarily a uniformed staff composed of officers from the four services. Organized along conventional lines, its principal directorates are plans and policy, operations, logistics, and command, control and communications. The Joint Staff is technically limited by law to 400 military officers. However, the JCS has created a number of additional staff organizations to assist in specific areas, such as strategic arms limitation negotiations.[2] Although all of the JCS staff elements are officially designated the *Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, this book will refer to this collectivity, which in fact is the staff of the JCS, as the Joint Staff.

Military Departments

The organizational configuration for *maintaining* the military instrument is the military departments which are headed by service secretaries and contain four uniformed services responsible for providing forces for land, sea, and air warfare. Predominantly civilian secretariats led by several assistant secretaries support the

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service secretaries, as shown in figure 2-4. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are headed by service chiefs who report directly to their secretary and are supported by a large service headquarters staff. The service secretaries and their departments are responsible for al! *maintaining* functions; in effect, this means they are responsible for all actions incident to preparing forces for war and sustaining them during hostilities.

Characteristics of the Pentagon-Based Structure

Several characteristics of the organizations described thus far are important to questions concerning reorganization. First, they are all large. Table 2-1 indicates the smallest, the Air Force secretariat, numbered approximately 320 individuals on 30 September 1979; the largest, the Army headquarters staff, approximately 3,381. Organizational realignment issues in DOD are unparalleled with respect to the absolute numbers of people who may be affected and who are therefore interested in influencing the outcome.

Second, although all these organizations are large, great disparities in size are evident. The service headquarters staffs range from approximately three to nine times the size of the secretariats. The JCS/Joint Staff and secretary of defense/OSD complexes are in the middle—far larger than the service secretariats but only one-half the size, approximately, of any one of the service military headquarters staffs.

Third, the influence of the organizations varies significantly, even though each possesses sufficient resources to make its presence felt on issues of particular concern. In part, these differences reflect in the uneven sizes of the organizations. More fundamental are the allocations of responsibilities. For example, the comprehensive charter of the secretary of defense—direction, authority, and control—makes OSD a principal determinant on any issue it chooses to address. But the missions, resources, and capabilities of the services make them formidable also. On the other hand, the advisory function of the JCS, as well as its placement in the chain of command at the sufferance of the secretary of defense (see next section), lessens its relative position.

The final characteristic is the collocation of these organizations in the same building, the Pentagon. This dynamic dimension makes

MILITARY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

FIGURE 2-4: ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, 1980

STAFF STRENGTHS

PROJECTED FOR END FY 1979
(September 30, 1979)

Office of the Secretary of Defense	1568
Joint Staff	1273
Military Department Secretariats	
Army	378
Navy	852
Air Force	320
Service Headquarters Staffs	
Army	3381
Navy/Marine Corps	2228
Air Force	2930

Source: Budget data submitted to the Executive Secretary,
Defense Organization Study, Spring, 1979

**Table 2-1: Staff Strengths Projected for the
End of Fiscal Year 1979**

the phenomenon being examined unique. The DOD reorganization issues involve the possible internal and external realignment of a number of staff organizations, all large and several among the largest in the world, located in such close proximity that face-to-face contact between and among members of the organizations at any level requires no more than a 5-minute walk. An important implication of the proximity of these organizations is that they must be perceived as a closely knit system as well as a collection of separate entities. The dynamic interplay among the organizations fosters several systemic tendencies: a dilution of hierarchy in favor of bargaining; an advantage for those who oppose change and favor the status quo over proponents of new initiatives; and increased potential for the more aggressive, independent organizations to gain predominance over others.

Unified and Specified Commands

Radically contrasting with the contiguity of the other constituent elements of DOD organization is the wide dispersal of the final element, the combatant commands. (See figure 2-5.) All of the standing, ready military forces of the United States are under the operational direction of these seven commands responsible for *employing* the military instrument. They are designated *unified* commands when composed of significant forces from two or more services, *specified* commands when composed of forces from one service. The five unified commands have regional missions: European Command (EUCOM); Pacific Command (PACOM); Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); Atlantic Command (LANTCOM); and Readiness Command (REDCOM). The remaining, specified commands have functional missions: the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC).

The chain of command for direction of combat forces by law runs from the president as Commander-in-Chief to the secretary of defense to the unified and specified commanders, who exercise operational command over all forces assigned to them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the military staff to the secretary and, as a matter of policy, has been placed in the chain of command to assist in the operational direction of the combat forces. The military departments are not in the chain of command. As a result of these arrangements, the combatant commands are also correctly termed *joint* commands even though the two specified commands consist of forces from one service.

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED
COMMAND ORGANIZATION

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (OSD)

MAINTAIN

EMPLOY

MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS

JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
(JCS)

JOINT STAFF

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDS

European Command	Pacific Command	Southern Command	Atlantic Command	Readiness Command	Strategic Air Command	Military Airlift Command
(EUCOM)	(PACOM)	(SOUTHCOM)	(LANTCOM)	(REDCOM)	(SAC)	(MAC)

COMPONENT COMMANDS

US Army Europe	US Pacific Fleet		US Army Atlantic	US Army Forces
US Navy Europe	US Air Force Pacific		US Atlantic Fleet	US Air Force Forces
US Air Force Europe			US Air Force Atlantic	

FIGURE 2-5: ORGANIZATION OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS, 1980

Each unified command consists of a headquarters with an integrated staff composed of personnel from each of the services with units assigned to the command. The forces of the unified commands are not integrated, however. They are organized as service components; for example, US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), US Army, Europe (USAREUR).

The component command level once again combines the *maintaining* and *employing* responsibilities, which are divided below the secretary/OSD and assigned to the two organizational arms. The components *maintain* their forces through the service link and *employ* their forces under the operational command of the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (the CINCs), who receive their direction from the president and secretary of defense, acting through the JCS.

FLESHING OUT THE BASIC ORGANIZATION MODEL

Organizational Complexities

Viewing DOD in such basic terms as the model (figure 2-1) depicts incurs the risk of oversimplification. The model may convey the impression DOD is a rigidly structured pyramid which extends inexorably through succeeding levels of subordination from the secretary of defense at the apex to operating forces in the field. In fact, of course, that is by no means the case. The structure is riven with formal and informal reporting and advisory links, communications channels, and other internal avenues of access to influence in addition to the *maintaining* and *employing* arms shown in the model.

Several examples illustrate the variety of interactions among elements. By law, the JCS is the principal military advisor to the president and Congress as well as the secretary of defense, thus providing that body tremendous leverage outside the formal hierarchical structure. Each chief, qua chief-of-service, enjoys the same privileged access (termed "legal insubordination" by President Eisenhower with reference to a chief's communications with Congress). Similarly, service secretaries have legally safeguarded access to Congress.

The DOD Framework

The secretary of defense's own staff, OSD, has been regularly subjected to detailed legislative engineering. For example, Congress established the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, ASD(HA), over the objections of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. A specific legislative charter assigned the ASD(HA) "overall supervision of health affairs of the Department of Defense."[3] The continuing external interest in this position was demonstrated when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown attempted to reduce his span of control by directing that the ASD(HA) report to him through the assistant secretary of defense for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics. Intense congressional opposition caused Secretary Brown to compromise by creating a dual reporting channel which guaranteed direct access to the secretary by ASD(HA).

These examples demonstrate the organization of the Department of Defense is only partially, and very inexactly, hierarchical. It might, in fact, be characterized as "permissive" in its tolerance of deviations from the pyramidal structure. The abstract basic organizational model symbolizes, although it cannot portray, the scope of the responsibilities and activities of the constituent elements as well as the complicated interrelationships among them. But a sound analysis, while manipulating the abstract model in search of valid "macro" insights, must remain cognizant of the underlying realities governing the permissive structure.

Reorganization as a Political Process

The permissive DOD structure is in keeping with the proclivities of its constituent organizations. Although the division of responsibilities, reflecting legislation and departmental directives, appears clear-cut in the model, each of the organizations below the secretary of defense in fact exhibits a strong interest in both the *maintaining* and *employing* functions. Consequently, the organizations of each element may attempt to play a part in decisions respecting both of the principal functions. This phenomenon is particularly evident when an organization perceives the issues being decided as either potentially advantageous or threatening to its strength, vitality, and ability to perform its accustomed part of one or both functions.

Reorganization issues fall into this category, as an examination of the model indicates. Proposals which would expand or contract

the authority, power, or structure of one element almost invariably impact upon other elements. For example, some critics maintain the "top" of the structure—the secretary/OSD element—exercises excessive control, sometimes labeled "micro-management," over the *maintaining* function. They would reduce the central management role and, as a corollary, expand the role of the military departments. Others hold, in effect, the *maintaining* side of the model has immoderate influence on the *employing* arm as a result of service headquarters staff preponderance in the joint staffing process and service control over the component commands. Some study proposals would strengthen the JCS and combatant command elements, thereby redressing this purported imbalance. Setting aside the merits of the arguments for the present, it is apparent that each of the elements will have an interest in decisions concerning these reorganization proposals.

Equally apparent, the organizations in each element have the ability to translate their interest into influence on reorganization decisions. Several factors contribute to their effectiveness in advancing claims. Within very broad, and ill-defined, limits, the *constituent organizations* enjoy abundant freedom of action as a consequence of the structural configuration of the Department of Defense. The framework, as discussed above, is characterized by large organizations, differentiated in size and power, collocated, except for the combatant commands, in the Pentagon (facilitating interaction at all levels), and joined in a very permissive hierarchy. Moreover, the organizations are situated at the seat of government. Their freedom of action provides ample opportunities to seek and find powerful external proponents whose interests parallel their own.

Finally, the constituent organizations can advance strong arguments they are entitled to participate in the reorganization decision process. The DOD is, after all, a "going concern." It is performing its mission, albeit imperfectly, through the concerted efforts of the organizations which compose the constituent elements of the model. Each organization possesses position, stature, expertise, and experience. In sum, in the absence of an unlikely event which discredits part or all of the current structure and thereby presents the opportunity for some external entity to begin, like Moses, with a *tabula rasa*, the positions of the organizations of each element will play an important part in shaping reorganization decisions.

The DOD Framework

The foregoing discussion suggests reorganization in DOD is a highly political process involving the constituent elements of the organization, Congress, outside governmental agencies, and even private groups. As contended in chapter 1, reorganization proposals insensitive to ambient political conditions—that is, the perspectives of the constituent organizations which will figure in the reorganization decisions—are unlikely to find acceptance.

The discussion also explains why the more extreme organizational proposals advanced by reformers over the years did not receive serious consideration. If reorganization *issues* are political, involving the clash of interests among bureaucratic organizations, reorganization *decisions* must accommodate a coalition sufficiently powerful to hold sway over opponents. Constructing such a coalition, in other than extraordinary circumstances, rules out extreme proposals.

The Constituent DOD Organization—A Bureaucratic Perspective

What about the other side of the coin? What latitude for change in the Department of Defense exists if a number of organizations must reach consensus as a precondition? The comments from throughout the Department—the services, JCS, OSD offices, etc.— provide specific answers to this question with respect to the numerous individual recommendations of the five topical studies of the DOS 77-80. Later chapters explore these responses in depth. To be understood, however, they must be placed in a more general context which comprehends the nature of the constituent DOD organizations—the characteristics and interests which help to explain why they accept or reject particular study recommendations. Moreover, understanding the study criticisms of the present organization, summarized in chapter 3, also requires this broad perspective. Fortunately, recent organizational scholarship, particularly the work of Morton Halperin, has focused on the DOD constituent organizations which are the subject of this enquiry.[4] The remainder of this section employs the organizational literature to examine the nature of the bureaucratic organizations which figure in DOD reorganization decisions. (The next section briefly treats organizations external to DOD, primarily the White House and Congress.)

Characteristics of DOD Constituent Organizations. In the most general terms, an organization may be defined as a combination of people with a common set of values who work together by fulfilling different but complementary functions to achieve some purpose or objective; the participants also share a set of beliefs (an *ideology*) which relates their values and purposes to larger organizations within which they operate.[5] This definition, based on Carl Friedrich's concept of organization, suggests the major characteristics and interests relevant to this inquiry which students of defense organization have identified in one or more of the elements of the DOD model.

Each of the DOD elements contains organizations with separately identifiable *purposes* or *objectives* which may be general or specific.[6] The under secretary of defense for policy has a general charter to "perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe." On the other hand, the services are assigned a specific mission. The Navy "is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war. . . ."[7]

Several of the organizations with a specific mission also have large, expensive *capabilities* which are necessary to accomplish the mission. The capabilities, of course, are the combat forces and their supporting elements. Questions concerning capabilities—their size, composition, readiness, supportability, and modernization—reach the very essence, or *raison d'etre*, of the defense establishment and, as a corollary, largely define the dimensions of its internal conflicts. They involve the allocation of the limited DOD resources to the constituent elements which are in turn responsible for *maintaining* and *employing* the military instrument. Decisions must be made under the conditions of uncertainty which prevail in the national security arena, because such variables as the intent and capabilities of potential adversaries (the "threat") are unknown and unknowable (at least, in part). In these circumstances, the constituent elements of DOD with specific missions inevitably and understandably attempt to decrease the uncertainty by pressing for greater capabilities to ensure they can accomplish their mission. Under the condi-

tions of limited resources, all claims cannot be met. Thus, the tendency for intraorganizational conflict within DOD is built-in.*

The inherent difficulty of "operationalizing" national security objectives reinforces this tendency. These objectives of the "larger organization" in Friedrich's concept are often so general any number of alternative specific objectives or actions can be proffered by various proponents as the optimum way to pursue them. In discussing this point, Halperin explains the dilemma faced by the United States after the Soviet launching of Sputnik.

> Despite the general consensus that the United States needed to preserve its strategic deterrent and maintain its technological advantage over the Soviet Union after the Sputnik launching, President Eisenhower, Congressional leaders, and the heads of the military services all had very different notions of what course of action would achieve these objectives.[8]

The United States finally realized its objective when the Soviet Union agreed to remove offensive missiles from Cuba. That outcome was achieved in part through the imposition of a successful policy of blockading Cuba, a policy implemented only after days of exhaustive consideration of other options (eventually discarded) involving the Air Force, Army, and other agencies. More recently, in early 1980, the national objective of stabilizing conditions in the Middle East or, even more specifically, freeing the hostages in Iran and securing withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, confronted the Carter administration with almost insuperable problems in selecting operational objectives to achieve these goals.

The absence of a clear linkage "downward" between the general objectives of the large organization and those of the constituent organizations results in the reverse phenomenon. A characteristic of the elements of DOD organizations, particularly those with specific missions and large capabilities, is the *tendency to view their*

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*Conflict is a pervasive characteristic of large organizations, particularly in evidence in DOD; and, likewise, the tendency toward cooperation. Because this book employs the literature on organizations selectively where needed to assist understanding the DOS 77-80 findings, recommendations, and comments thereon, conflict and cooperation will receive more attention in chapters 6 and 7.

purposes and objectives as identical with national purposes and objectives. Friedrich points out in the definition that organizational ideology relates the values and purposes of the lesser to the larger organization. Halperin and Kanter find that, as a result of the absence of clear-cut, exclusive operational courses of action to achieve national objectives, each participant is "relatively free to give operational meaning" to the objectives.[9] The ambiguous linkage of objectives and means sometimes results in the participants of the lesser organization considering the relationship between their values and purposes and those of the larger organization as an identity. To paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. "what's good for the Air Force is good for the country"—*because* the Air Force provides capabilities to accomplish the objectives of national security.

It is only a short step from this reasoning to another characteristic: the often-noted phenomenon whereby members of an organization adopt, as *one of their principal purposes, the well-being and survival of the organization itself.* The organization is the institution which provides and promotes the values and purposes shared by the participants and *crucial as well to the larger organization.* Thus the lesser organization becomes an instrumental value which must be preserved.

Organizational Interests of DOD Constituent Elements. Based on several of the characteristics discussed above, Halperin identified the principal interests of organizations which participate in the national security policy process, among which the constituent elements of the Department of Defense are an important part. These interests are *influence, domain, essential role, independence, budget,* and *morale.*[10]

Influence. The most pervasive interest is to exert independent *influence.* An organization must have influence to further organizational purposes, ensure organizational well-being, and, in some cases, secure capabilities—all of which, in the opinion of organization participants, are worthy goals, by definition (or identity) in the national interest.

For organizations with only general purposes, such as the office of the under secretary of defense for policy (USD(P)) or the director of net assessment, influence is the principal operative

interest; it is pursued for its own sake as the manifestation of the *raison d'etre* of the organization.[11] If the USD(P) does not significantly influence policy formulation in DOD, then the question arises whether this position should continue to exist. The first under secretary for policy posed that issue precisely in framing his rationale for resigning after only a few months in office.[12]

Domain. All governmental organizations, from the most comprehensive to the most specialized, are concerned about their organizational turf, or *domain.* A complex society requires that functions be differentiated and assigned to separate organizations. But it is impossible to differentiate functions so precisely that disagreements over functional responsibilities do not arise between and among organizations. At the highest levels of government, these concerns with domain involve the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; in Congress, jurisdictional disputes among the committees; in OSD, disagreements over functional responsibilities; among the military services, disputes over roles and missions; and between the JSC and OSD, conflicts concerning where policy ends and operations begin.

Essence. The *essential* role or "essence" of an organization derives from the common set of values and purposes participants share. It is a normative conception held by the members—what the organization ought to be, how it ought to proceed, and what it ought to seek to achieve. The services, with their environmental orientations toward land, sea, and air warfare, are prime examples of organizations in which this interest is particularly powerful.

The US Navy has perceived its essential role as maintaining warships which guarantee freedom and control of the seas. The question of what kind of warships—aircraft carriers to project naval air power, other types of surface combatant ships, or submarines—has divided the Navy since World War II. Nevertheless, the unifying element, sea control, has been sufficiently strong to define the "Navy" for its members and exclude other conceptions of essence.

For example, the strategic nuclear mission of the Polaris submarine is far removed from sea control and was at first resisted by the Navy. When the Kennedy administration opted to accelerate the program, Navy leaders, fearing loss of resources for shipbuilding in

support of the sea control mission, argued Polaris was a *national,* not a *Navy* program! "By this was meant: the Polaris mission is not a traditional Navy mission and therefore should not be financed out of the Navy's share of the defense budget."[13]

Today, the strategic programs, having commanded large capabilities over a sustained period, are in some sense accommodated in the Navy. But the Navy conception of its essence remains clear-cut and focused on warships for control of the seas, as is evidenced in the following reported reaction to a Carter administration proposal:

> Navy leaders are cool toward the floating warehouses Carter envisions for the Rapid Deployment Force. They fear the cargo ships would take money from an already strained shipbuilding account and eventually require warships to protect them.[14]

The other services also have identifiable essential roles they seek to fulfill. The Army defines itself in terms of providing the capability for ground combat by organized, regular units. This concept accommodates such traditional combat arms specialties as infantry, artillery, and armor as well as the more recent air mobility capabilities. It discourages elite missions. For example, in response to strong Kennedy administration support, the Army greatly expanded the Special Forces (Green Berets) in an effort to develop a counterinsurgency capability. Later, when political conditions were propitious, the Army moved quickly to diminish the size and significance of the Green Berets. Also very much on the periphery are such capabilities as air defense and long-range missiles—and, in the 1940s, strategic bombardment.[15] In fact, lack of enthusiasm for the latter capability because of its challenge to the ground combat role accounts in some part for Army willingness to allow creation of a separate Air Force after World War II.[16]

The Air Force achieved its status as a separate service largely as a result of the efforts of pilots who agreed with the Army on this point. They were convinced their essential role, flying combat aircraft capable of defeating an enemy through strategic bombardment, was fundamentally different from, and incompatible with, the values of the remainder of the Army.[17] This conception of the Air Force essence remains strong, as evidenced by the monumental, but ultimately unsuccessful, struggle to acquire the B-1 bomber in the mid-1970s, the subsequent Air Force extension of the life of the

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B-52 bomber, later proposals to modify the F-111 bomber to increase its strategic bombing capability, and finally the reemergence of the B-1 as a top service priority with the advent of a new administration.

Nevertheless, the Air Force essential role is, and has been, in transition. At some point, combat in manned aircraft, rather than manned *strategic* bombers exclusively, more nearly reflected the essence envisioned by its members. More recently, as land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range transport, and space emerged as major sources of capabilities, the Air Force essence has gradually broadened to encompass all aspects of *aerospace* warfare.

Independence. Organizations are interested in maintaining or enhancing their *independence* in order to safeguard their essence and domain. The antiballistic missile (ABM) issue illustrates the intensity of the organizational interest in independence. In 1963 the JCS was divided on the ABM along predictable lines based on past experience. The Air Force and Navy supported Secretary McNamara's reluctance to encourage the Army program. By 1966 Secretary McNamara, supported by his civilian OSD analysts, had concluded the available ABM technology was insufficient to contribute significantly to national security. In the interim, however, the members of the JCS had concluded the secretary and his OSD staff represented a fundamental threat to their independent position as arbiters of the military value of weapons systems. In the case of the ABM, it appeared OSD was prepared to make and implement a major strategic weapons decision regardless of JCS advice.

> Faced with an extraordinary situation, the Joint Chiefs took extraordinary action. They entered into an alliance to overturn not only this particular decision but to reassert their own control over the assessment of the military worth of a weapon. The Air Force was ready to pay a high price—to endorse a $20 billion program under the jurisdiction of a rival service in an area in which it had a major interest.[18]

A more extreme form of the organizational interest in independence is characterized by Halperin and Kanter as the quest for *autonomy.* This interest is most apparent in organizations, like the services, which have resources and attempt to exert as much independent control over them as possible. As indicated in the example

above, interest in autonomy at times overshadows other interests. In *The Common Defense*, Samuel Huntington cited cases in which a service opts for a smaller budget with greater control of its disposition rather than a larger budget with the possible loss of some degree of control.[19] According to Halperin and Kanter,

> the military services opposed the Gaither Committee's report because they feared that, although implementing its recommendations might mean larger budgets for their organizations, it would change the decisionmaking process in a way which would reduce their ability to control their own operations.[20]

Other manifestations of the interest in independence or autonomy include: attempts to gain total operational control over personnel assigned to accomplish a mission; avoidance of operations involving the combined forces or resources of several organizations; reluctance to participate in operations controlled by foreign governments; and resistance to participation by outsiders in agency operations.[21]

Budget. Despite occasional instances in which concern with independence may prevail, all DOD organizations are interested in the size and composition of the *defense budget.* For staff organizations with general purposes, the budget is an indicator of the significance of their influence within their particular area of responsibility. For organizations requiring large capabilities to accomplish their mission, the size of their portion of the budget, and its relation to the budgets of other mission-oriented organizations, reflect in a concrete manner national priorities at a given moment.

> Defense budgets reflect the military capabilities that define the Pentagon's national security mission, the organizational objectives of the services, and the outcomes of the interactions among participants with different program priorities.[22]

Arnold Kanter substantiated the importance of the budget to members of the services in interviews with military officers. All knew the size of their service budget as well as its relationship to the total defense budget and the shares of the other services.[23]

Morale. If the well-being and survival of an organization can be rationalized as a legitimate purpose of the organization, as discussed above, it follows that maintaining the *morale* of the partici-

pants, qua members, is an important interest of the organization. The values and purposes they share must continue to be regarded by members in a favorable light; the objective they seek must continue to appear worthwhile—not only personally but in the context of beneficence to the larger organization. These considerations reinforce attempts by organizations to maintain the essence perceived by members, protect their domain, and enhance their capabilities. Furthermore, they explain, in the case of the military services, why compensation and promotion are important not only as personal rewards, but also as confirmation of the continuing validity of the organizational ideology which relates military service to national purpose. Any form of actual or perceived diminishment of status on the part of the larger organization (for example, "erosion" of benefits) is interpreted as weakening the ideological linkage and is resisted.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

As an analytical convenience, this survey of the factors which influence Defense Department organization has thus far treated the Department as a separate entity. The external environment the Department faces has been discussed only as an avenue for the constituent elements to gain influence by attracting extrinsic support for their positions. Although delving into external DOD relationships in great detail is beyond the scope, as well as the requirements, of this analysis, the most cursory examination reveals that organizational issues which confront the Department are not solely intradepartmental concerns. Figure 2-6 symbolizes the complex organizational setting of DOD. Organizations external to the Department possess characteristics and interests similar to those of the constituent elements as well as the requisite access and power to translate their interests into influence. Consequently, DOD reorganization decisions must be sensitive to demands and constraints which derive from its relations with other executive departments, the White House, Congress, and, at times, many other groups and interests.

Legislative and Executive Civilian Control

The constitutional commitment to civilian control of the military and the American pluralistic political tradition of dividing powers and creating overlapping responsibilities among the branches

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION SETTING

FIGURE 2-6: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

of government profoundly influence all aspects of defense organization. Civilian control is a responsibility shared by the president and Congress; each branch is assigned constitutional powers to effect civilian supremacy. The result is a multifaceted approach which sometimes leads to differences on defense organization.

The executive branch tends to favor a concept of civilian control which emphasizes the president as commander-in-chief served by a strong secretary of defense with a legislative mandate granting him authority over and responsibility for the Department of Defense.[24]

The Congress, on the other hand, exercises its responsibilities for civilian control through its governance of the disposition of resources and its access to appointive officials, many with legislative charters, who are interspersed at several levels below the secretary of defense.[25] In addition to service secretaries, these positions include under and assistant secretaries of defense and assistant service secretaries as well as high-ranking military officers. Congress has jealously guarded its right to receive the advice of these officials directly. This concept of civilian control, then, ensures that the Congress, in determining the allocation of resources for national defense, can consult with politically responsible officials at levels which range from broad policy formulation and implementation to detailed scrutiny of specific activities. Congress has consistently defended its prerogatives to assure civilian control in this manner in pursuance of its mandate to provide for the armed forces.

As a result of the shared powers with respect to national security, the organizations of the Department of Defense must accommodate both the executive and the legislative branches. This imperative inevitably bounds the universe of feasible organizational changes because of the differing perspectives of the two branches. Realistic organizational initiatives must take cognizance of the constraints imposed by the differing perspectives of both branches.

Integrating the Instruments of National Power

The fact that the military instrument is only one of a number of instruments of national power which must be integrated in pursuing national objectives also significantly influences Department of Defense organizational decisions. The military instrument is essen-

tially the capability to wage war. But prudent exploitation of the military instrument seeks the realization of national objectives without the necessity of resorting to hostilities. Deterrence of war, the fundamental US defense objective, attempts to benefit from a strong military instrument without actually employing it.[26] This concept of deterrence as the preeminent national military objective provides the justification for a very active peacetime military role in support of a broad range of foreign policy activities which, directly or indirectly, contribute to forestalling war as well as achieving other objectives. The military is employed as a complement to the other instruments of national power in the exercise of diplomacy, the conduct of international economic affairs, and the cultivation of socio-political interrelationships.

Consequently, other executive branch agencies as well as the White House evidence keen interest in the manner in which DOD participates in the formulation and implementation of national policies which orchestrate all facets of national security affairs. This interest extends to the organizational arrangements within DOD which link the military to national policy, institutionalize its responsibility to civilian authority, and ensure national objectives are accurately reflected in military plans and budgets. Proposed DOD organizational changes, because they may affect the development of national security policy and its implementation, will be carefully scrutinized by other members of the national security community.

Selective Interests

DOD organization decisions may be of concern to many other persons and organizations. The intensity of their interest depends upon the subject of the decision. Portions of the general public, for example, are vitally concerned with base realignments and closings; educational institutions with research and development policies and procedures; business with acquisition processes; allied governments and international security organizations with the unified and specified command structure, mobilization responsibilities, and foreign military sales.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The *dramatis personae* of defense reorganization activities have now been introduced. Succeeding chapters examine their

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approach to current reorganization proposals. First, however, it is instructive to review the principal changes in DOD organization which have resulted from the interaction of the various players over the years. Several trends in the evolution of the constituent elements of the model are relevant to current issues.

Secretary of Defense and OSD

The most widely recognized development in post World War II defense organization has been the centralization of authority in the secretary of defense. From a position in 1947 in which the services retained all powers not specifically delegated elsewhere, the secretary of defense has acquired complete responsibility for the management of the Department of Defense. His initially small, immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has expanded in size, legal authority, and expertise to provide the capability to discharge his responsibilities. As a result, the secretary is in fact as well as title the predominant defense official.

Commentary on centralization has at times tended to overshadow the more fundamental process which in large part explains this phenomenon, the trend toward integration of defense functions. Succeeding reorganizations in 1949, 1953, and 1958 contained measures intended to secure the integration of service claims into unified, fiscally constrained, acquisition and budget proposals; eliminate overlap in research and development; consolidate the performance of similar functions; and provide a stronger framework for the internal resolution of differences which would in turn facilitate an integrated DOD approach to national security issues. Functional integration has inevitably resulted in greater centralization of power in the secretary of defense and his staff.

National Military Command Structure

Organizational changes with respect to the national military command structure (NMCS) have had three major purposes. First, reforms have repeatedly attempted to transform the Joint Chiefs of Staff into a more "national" advisory body as opposed to the perceived orientation of each chief to his particular service. Creation in 1949 of a nonvoting but prestigious chairman divorced from any service was followed in 1953 with several modifications designed to strengthen his role. Second, several changes in the chain of com-

mand have streamlined the linkage between the president as commander-in-chief and the operational forces he commands. Service secretaries were explicitly included in the chain of command and the JCS was excluded in 1953; in 1958, service secretaries were excluded and the chain was redefined to extend from the president to the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. (However, a later DOD directive provided that the secretary will transmit orders through the JCS.) Third, *employing* arm responsibilities for combat forces have been increased. In addition to removing service secretaries from the chain of command, the 1958 reorganization assigned planning responsibilities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operational responsibilities to the unified and specified commands.

Military Departments

The effect of past reorganizations has been to diminish legally assigned responsibilities of the military departments, channeling their activities into the *maintaining* areas—providing manpower, weapon systems, and support for the combat forces assigned to the unified and specified commands. Many of the increased powers of the secretary of defense and NMCS outlined above correspondingly diminished the responsibilities of the services. The military departments lost "Executive Department" status in 1949; in addition, service secretaries were eliminated from National Security Council membership and lost their right of direct appeal to the president and his budget authorities in what is now the Office of Management and Budget. In 1958, the service secretaries were removed from the chain of operational command; their planning and operational responsibilities were reassigned to the JCS and unified and specified commanders, respectively. In addition, the secretary of defense was authorized to reassign supply and service functions, assign combat forces, and designate which service would develop new weapon systems. Subsequently, in the 1960s, the initiation of the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) resulted in a significant diminution of military department control over budgetary matters. Also, the movement toward creating defense agencies to perform common functions began. Over the years, the agencies have assumed responsibilities formerly assigned to the military departments in a number of areas including logistics, communications, intelligence, and mapping.

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These changes are not manifestations of any plan, either implicit or explicit, gradually to weaken the military departments and eventually eliminate them. Rather, they evidence the intention to concentrate the military departments on the *maintaining* function. The departments retain major management responsibilities which Congress has carefully elaborated in law. They include training, operations, administration, support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness, and effectiveness of their services. The military departments, by law, are responsible for the administration of forces assigned to the combatant commands. In practice, this means the military departments have continuing support responsibility for all US forces. Finally, Congress regularly calls upon service secretaries and other military department officials to explain matters under their purview. Testimony from these hearings indicates Congress holds the military departments responsible for the resources with which they are entrusted.

The Legislative Model

The changes in the legal morphology of DOD over the years can be interpreted as an attempt, perhaps unwitting, by Congress to realize through an evolutionary legislative process a concept of defense organization portrayed in the legislative model, figure 2-7. The pluses and minuses of the reassignments of responsibilities add up to a clearly discernible effort to focus the constituent organizations on each side of the model on their own legally assigned responsibilities

As compared to the "neutral" basic organization model of figure 2-1, the *employing* arm in the legislative model is stronger and more independent. The JCS and combatant command elements are much closer together, concerned primarily with unified *employing* of forces, or US military "ouput." As a consequence, the component commands are further removed from, and more tenuously linked to, their parent services through the support channel. The more pronounced differentiation between the organizational arms focuses the military departments on *maintaining* or "input" functions—recruiting, training, and supporting forces. The service chiefs in the legislative model have the capacity to accomplish the intellectual hurdle required by their "dual-hat" responsibilities. When meeting as the corporate body of the JCS, they assume the appropriate *employing* arm perspective, adopting a joint or unified, "national"

LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION MODEL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FIGURE 2-7: LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION MODEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE BASED ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947,
AS AMENDED

outlook. Reconciliation between output demands and input constraints occurs at three levels—in the integration of *maintaining* and *employing* functions required to conduct military operations in the unified and specified commands; in the duality of the service chief-JCS role; and in the relationships of the elements subordinate to the secretary of defense/OSD. However, the politically responsible secretary makes the ultimate decisions relating input to output.

The designation of this model as the legislative model is not meant to imply a narrow congressional idealization of DOD organization. Rather, the model reflects the structural configuration of DOD which emerges from the legal provisions on which the Department of Defense is presently established. These provisions, of course, resulted from a legislative process which included the participation of secretaries of defense, the military departments, and the JCS as well as several presidents and congresses.

As will become apparent in the next chapter, the criticisms of DOD organization, taken as a whole, suggest the legislative model does not accurately depict the structural relationships which actually obtain. Furthermore, the recommendations supported by the studies to correct DOD deficiencies, which are analyzed in later chapters, can be interpreted in many cases as attempts to move DOD closer to the legislative model.

Chapter 3

Critique of DOD Structural Organization—The Indictment

In the broadest sense, to criticize is to consider the merits and demerits of something and judge accordingly. Although this book, taken as a whole, attempts to hew to this broad definition, this chapter takes a narrower, more negative tack. It concentrates on what is wrong with the structural organization of the Department of Defense according to the five topical studies which comprise the heart of the Defense Organization Study effort of 1977–1980. The purpose of an organization study is to identify problems and propose solutions. As this chapter documents, the DOS 77–80 accomplished its purpose with respect to identifying perceived weaknesses. The collective study critique, considering its scope, depth, and magnitude, may be characterized without exaggeration as an indictment of the organization of the Department of Defense.

Nevertheless, two of the three major studies specifically register a *favorable* synoptic assessment of DOD. The National Military Command Structure (NMCS) Study states that the "system has been generally adequate to meet our national security needs in peacetime, crisis, and wartime." The study expresses concern about the capability to meet the challenges of the future.[1] The Departmental Headquarters (DH) Study stresses that "the Department is well managed" and recommends "against any drastic reorganization." It favors a change in management emphasis, rather than major realignments, to prepare the Department to meet the exigencies which, as in the NMCS Study, it foresees in the future.[2]

The protestations of the studies aside, their individual findings, synthesized into an integrated critique, censure the present structure. Furthermore, although no one of their recommendations may

be "drastic," the cumulative effect of accepting a number of them would significantly alter the manner in which the national defense is managed. Thus, examining the study findings individually *and* as an integrated whole is necessary to understand their implications fully.

The next five sections of this chapter summarize the critique of each of the five topical studies in turn.* This empirical foundation then provides a basis for developing an integrated critique. The final section compares the critique with those of a number of other defense organization studies conducted during the past decade.

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE (NMCS) STUDY CRITIQUE

A Joint Organization with Inherent Contradictions

The NMCS Study elaborates the major functions assigned to *the* constituent elements of the Department of Defense as the starting point for its analysis. Briefly, its concept is as follows. Military departments organize, train, and equip service forces but have no role in their operational employment, a function of the unified and specified commanders. The latter are directly responsible to the president and secretary of defense. As a matter of policy, the secretary of defense exercises his command authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The primary JCS function, however, is to act as the "principal military advisers to the Secretary, the National Security Council (NSC), the President, and also the Congress." The president has charged the JCS with proＶ ding the "military viewpoint" in the councils of government engaged in the formulation of national security policy.[3] Thus the NMCS Study conceives of the services as *providers* and *maintainers* of military forces, and the joint organizations as the *users* or *employers* as well as the principal military advisers.

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*Endnotes are used extensively to document the study sources in the next five sections. In the event, however, that attributions are not readily apparent in the text, the reader should remain alert that the text throughout these sections reflects the views expressed in the studies, not the author's conclusions.

Although this "system has been generally adequate to meet our national security needs," the study concludes that "some fundamental shortcomings may make it incapable of dealing adequately with our future needs."[4] The problems today are attributable in part to the built-in organizational contradiction, *embodied in the* National Security Act of 1947, on which the joint system is based. The structure is a compromise between the "requirement for unified direction of the armed forces and for military advice rising above individual service interests, on the one hand, and the desire of our military services...to preserve their historic autonomy, on the other."[5] *Focusing on the tensions inherent in the compromise,* the study argues that the desire of the services for autonomy in many cases undermines the ability of the present organization to fulfill the national requirement for genuine *joint* military advice and *unified* military action, to the detriment of the national defense effort.[6]

Joint Military Advice Inadequate

Avoidance of Significant Issues, Particularly Those Involving Resource Allocations. The most apparent, as well as most important, organizational contradiction is found in the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a member of the JCS, a service chief is charged with providing military advice that transcends service positions; this responsibility officially takes precedence over his other duties as the military leader and manager of his service.[7] Nevertheless, when the dual responsibilities are incompatible, a chief's position may become untenable if he does not support service over joint interests.

> A Chief's responsibility to manage and lead his Service conflicts directly with his agreement in the joint forum to recommendations which are inconsistent with programs desired by his own Service. A Chief cannot, for example, be expected to argue for additional carriers, divisions, or air wings when constructing a Service budget and then agree in a joint forum that they should be deleted in favor of other Services. In doing so he would not only be unreasonably inconsistent but would risk losing leadership of his Service as well.[8]

Thus, tensions inherent in the dual roles of the chiefs tend to undermine the performance of the joint system and favor service interests.

Critique of Defense Organization

As a result, the organization charged with providing national military advice is unable to address effectively a number of important issues. Potential conflict among the services inhibits JCS consideration and resolution of issues involving basic strategy, service roles and missions, unified command organization, joint doctrine, and JCS decisionmaking procedures and documents.[9] Although those inadequacies are significant, the most serious limitations involve the allocation of resources. The chiefs find it difficult to reach common ground on budget levels, force structure, and procurement of new weapons systems, except "to agree that they should be increased without consideration of resource constraints."[10]

The NMCS Study focuses at length on the implications of the inability of the JCS to play an effective resource allocation role. Major budget decisions which determine the future size, structure, and armament of the defense establishment should be predicated on an understanding of unified and specified command capabilities and the choices available for improving them, according to the study. And those choices should include modernization, force structure changes, and even roles and missions modifications. But such joint warfare considerations have little influence at present on resource allocation decisions. Because each component command in a unified command prepares its own evaluation, combat readiness reports from the field focus on unit, not joint, capabilities. Obviously, component readiness reports cannot and do not explore the full spectrum of choices available for improving the warfighting capability of the overall unified command.

More fundamentally, even if the JCS were provided the necessary supporting readiness data, the tensions inherent in the chiefs' dual roles would preclude consolidating combatant command requirements into constrained resource recommendations and arranging them in an order of priority. In fact, the JCS definition of readiness ensures concentration on individual service unit, as opposed to joint, capabilities. Thus the definition assists the JCS to avoid constrained resource allocation issues linked to joint readiness reporting.[11]

Consequently, resource allocation decisions are made in arenas which do not include the JCS, and the framework for decisionmaking involves service, not joint, perspectives. "Tradeoffs and alternatives are developed through dialogue and debate between OSD and

the Services." The JCS plays "virtually no role in this allocation process." Although acknowledging the JCS does estimate risks associated with various program levels, the NMCS Study states this assessment is "not a substitute for joint military advice on the preparation of constrained force structure options."[12] The service *Program Objective Memoranda*, submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are the source of constrained resource recommendations. Assessments of service, not joint, warfighting capability provide the basis for these documents. "The continuing refinement of the DOD program and budget subsequently involves the joint process only on selected major issues, rather than on alternatives, trade-offs, or a total program approach." The ultimate result is that "the Secretary [of Defense] lacks joint military advice on resource allocation issues, except to the extent that it is provided informally by the CJCS [Chairman, JCS]." The study concludes that "these gaps represent serious limitations. . . ."[13]

Substandard Presentation. The National Military Command Structure Study also criticizes the JCS approach and manner of presentation in rendering military advice. The JCS avoids contentious issues, such as those noted earlier, as long as possible, and then proceeds at a slow pace. The critique characterizes the JCS approach as conservative, reactive rather than innovative, consistently favoring the status quo with little opportunity for challenges to established positions, and given to providing only what is specifically requested. Moreover, when the JCS finally takes formal positions, the papers are almost uniformly given low marks by their consumers. Formal papers have been subjected to "such extensive negotiation that they have been reduced to the lowest level of assent." They are ponderous and lack continuity and incisiveness as a result of line-by-line editing by multiple authors.[14]

Joint Staff Weak and Dependent

The JCS is also responsible for serious Joint Staff inadequacies which contribute to, and virtually assure, unsatisfactory joint performance. The Joint Staff, constituted to support the JCS, is governed by procedures established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and manned according to service personnel policies. The resulting system makes creditable performance difficult. The procedures

> are designed. . . to assure as extensive consultation between
> the Joint Staff and the four Service Staffs as the urgency of the
> action permits. Consultation can occur in committees at one to
> five levels from the action officers...to the Chiefs them-
> selves. . . . It is the norm for each level to be involved in the
> preparation and/or review of a significant joint paper and, as
> well, for coordination among the various elements of each of
> the five involved staffs, which may be extensive on major plans
> or policy papers.[15]

The formal position papers, subject to extensive negotiations at
multiple levels, assume the unwieldy characteristics described
above. More importantly, the close integration of the joint and
service staff processes effectively prevents emergence of an inde-
pendent Joint Staff perspective.[16]

The study also contends that a disparity in talent between the
service staffs and the Joint Staff compounds the problem of satis-
factory Joint Staff performance. The services have consistently
avoided assigning their "most highly qualified officers" to the Joint
Staff despite the urging of several secretaries of defense and a 1958
secretarial directive. "While the Joint Staff officers are generally
capable, the very top officers of the Services more frequently are on
the Service staffs."[17]

CINC Influence and Chain of Command Inadequate

The NMCS Study finds the commanders-in-chief of the unified
and specified commands (the CINCs) lack sufficient power, influ-
ence, and organizational ties within the national military command
structure. As substantiation, the study reviews the assigned respon-
sibilities of the CINCs and emphasizes their position as "key fig-
ures" in the command structure. They command all US combat
forces and are assigned "large geographic and/or functional repon-
sibilities for which they are held fully accountable." They are
"responsible for assuring the forces under them are capable of
protecting US interests in a combat situation if required, on a
moment's notice."[18] However, although the assigned forces are
unquestionably responsive to their operational command, the
CINCs have limited power to influence the structure or readiness of
those forces. Their "views have no formal articulation in the budg-
etary decisions at either the Service or the Secretarial level."[19] The

CINCs' situation, as a result, is untenable. Delegated vast responsibilities and power to direct forces in wartime, they have insufficient authority and influence in peacetime to ensure their warfighting capabilities are commensurate with their mission.

The study ascribes the CINCs' peacetime impotence to two deficiencies in the present system. The "fundamental difficulty inherent in the organizational structure" is service influence over the CINCs' forces. The services not only train and equip the forces assigned to the component commands under each CINC, they also control the flow of resources to those commands. Thus the services "have the major influence on both the structure and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible."[20] Although each CINC articulates resource requirements to the JCS to some extent, "it is left to the individual Service Chiefs to consider that portion of the CINC's recommendations which directly pertains to their particular service."[21]

The second deficiency involves the readiness assessment system. Because it is centered in the components and routed through service channels, readiness reporting and evaluation assumes the unit-related characteristics previously discussed. Correcting deficiencies is predominantly a service responsibility, the CINCs and JCS playing only a minimal role, even though such actions relate primarily to combat forces and are particularly important to the CINCs.[22] Development of a joint readiness perspective linked to the resource allocation process is not possible in the present system.

The implication of these findings is that the CINCs are in the unenviable position of having to face any contingency which may arise with forces whose size, structure, equipment, support, and readiness have been largely determined elsewhere by the individual services acting independently. On a simplistic level, an analogous predicament would be that of a football coach expected to win every game with the players handed to him by management, but who has no voice in the drafting or trading of players to correct weaknesses.

The CINCs' influence as well as their ability to respond to the secretary of defense and president also are diminished by the absence of a single military superior in Washington. Even if they somehow developed and submitted joint readiness assessments, addressing command deficiencies from a unified perspective and

exploring alternatives for improving joint warfighting capabilities, what mechanism would ensure that the views of these far-flung, otherwise occupied commanders received due consideration in the decisionmaking process? They have no spokesman in Washington. Nor do the CINCs have a focal point for supervising their activities— a "military boss" to act as the secretary of defense's agent in managing them.

Existing practices are unsatisfactory. The present *formal* arrangement in which the JCS as a body is responsible for these functions is not acceptable. "A committee structure is not effective for the exercise of military command or management authority."[23] Likewise, the present *informal* arrangement, in which the chairman of the JCS in part acts as the CINCs' spokesman and supervisor, has significant weaknesses. The chairman "is naturally inhibited by not having a clear formal mandate."[24] In short, the chain of command needs to be streamlined. Providing a single individual formally assigned to act as the CINCs' supervisor and spokesman, advocating their joint viewpoint, would increase their influence in Pentagon decisionmaking arenas and enhance their responsiveness to the secretary and the president.[25]

Insufficient Policy Direction, Weak Policy Oversight, and Insensitive Management by OSD

Although the NMCS Study criticisms of OSD are not as severe as those concerning the JCS and combatant commands, the study nevertheless highlights deficiencies in the performance of the most basic OSD functions—policy formulation and evaluation (or "direction"), policy oversight, and management. Taking the position that policy direction is the primary responsibility of OSD, the study infers civilian leadership has not provided clear, definitive policy guidance needed for military planning. In its absence, military staffs must formulate their own policy assumptions as a starting point for planning. That practice results in programs prepared on the "basis of policy goals determined by the programmer himself, but often not made explicit for senior decisionmakers to accept or reject." The policymaking function in effect moves from civilian to military authorities, a result neither intended nor desired by either party. Consequently, "a serious effort must be made to provide policy guidance which defines the national security objectives we expect our military forces to be able to attain."[26]

The Office of the Secretary of Defense should also provide more effective policy oversight of military plans, according to the study. The JCS prefers that access to high-level plans be limited to the secretary and deputy secretary of defense who are in the operational chain of command and thereby have a "need to know." This procedure, however, places too great a burden on these officials for assuring "that there is sufficient continuing policy guidance in these areas." The secretary and selected key assistants should review the principal military plans annually "to assure that their political assumptions are consistent with national security policy."[27]

Finally, coupled with the preceding calls for stronger exercise of civilian authority is an admonishment to civilian officials in OSD to be more circumspect in their approach to managing the military. Although the study finds the unquestioned acceptance of the concept of civilian control, the manner in which it is exercised at times causes consternation on the part of the military. Many "believe that OSD's increasing involvement over the last 30 years in details of implementation... represents an intrusion into details beyond that needed for the legitimate exercise of policy direction."[28] As a result of this general perception, the study cautions OSD to limit its "how" directives in operational matters. But the study also reminds commanders that "military actions have political implications" and indicates command arrangements should be flexible enough in crisis situations to allow close direction from Washington of the employment of forces.[29]

Miscellaneous Criticisms

The National Military Command Structure Study critique briefly addresses a number of other significant areas. The following are relevant to this inquiry.

- A special study should examine component command personnel and functions to identify redundancies and recommend which are necessary and which should be eliminated, particularly in the area of logistics.[30]

- Commanders of the unified and specified commands should not be chosen strictly according to service affiliation. They should be selected on a best qualified basis with consideration given to mission and forces assigned.[31]

- The Readiness Command (REDCOM), a unified command, should be expanded, not disestablished as previously suggested. REDCOM should be assigned greater responsibilities and accorded more influence in the areas of joint training, joint doctrine, joint exercises, and joint capability for wartime transportation management.[32]

- The Unified Command Plan (UCP), which assigns unified and specified command worldwide functions and responsibilities, should be reviewed on a periodic basis by both the JCS and the secretary of defense.[33]

- Studies conducted separately by OSD, the JCS, and the services as a basis for policy, strategy, and force planning recommendations should be integrated more closely. As a result of differing models, assumptions, approaches, and computer applications, the study results often do not agree. "These studies would be more useful to the secretary of defense and the JCS if some proceeded from a common focus, while insuring that dissenting views are expressed."[34] In addition, the JCS analytical capability, which has been greatly reduced, should be revitalized to participate more fully in the revamped study program.[35]

THE DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS (DH) STUDY CRITIQUE

The Basic Issue and Current Problems

The basic defense organization issue, as formulated by the Departmental Headquarters Study, is how to assert strong central control of the Department of Defense and, at the same time, delegate sufficient responsibility and authority to the military departments for efficient policy implementation and operations. Establishing a better balance between centralization and decentralization, although a continuing concern, is assuming added urgency as the secretary of defense's expanding involvement in overall national policy increases the need to reduce his management burden.[36]

Several organizational and management flaws make it difficult to free the secretary to concentrate on policy formulation, evaluation, and implementation, according to the study. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) tends toward overly detailed manage-

ment of the military departments. Imprecise delineation of responsibilities between OSD and the military departments results in confusion, conflict, and inaction. A particularly unfortunate example is the failure or inability to articulate readily understandable and enforceable distinctions between policy direction and operating responsibility. Managers in DOD fail to appreciate and elicit an adequate sense of teamwork and cooperation. Finally, excessive authority and review layers impede performance.[37]

The Departmental Headquarters Study concludes that, although some organizational realignment is necessary, the principal need is for a change in emphasis in managing the Department of Defense. The present departmental headquarters framework should remain essentially intact. The Department is too big to be centrally managed by OSD without the assistance of operating subdivisions. Delegation and decentralization are necessary. But a return to semi-autonomous military departments pursuing independent, often conflicting, objectives is clearly not desirable. The need for a strong central authority which relates national security policy to the allocation of resources and acts as an integrative and coordinative agent among the services is widely recognized and agreed upon.[38] In summary, time has eroded the once-dominant issues involving extreme organizational realignments. Realistic alternatives today do not include either circumscribing the secretary of defense and his staff and thereby returning to service dominance, or strengthening the secretary by eliminating military departments and unifying the services under his direction.

But if no fundamental changes to the present organization are required, how should the problems be solved? The DH Study suggests service secretaries are the answer.

Service Secretaries' Potential Not Realized

The Department would benefit from a change in emphasis which makes fuller use of service secretaries, according to the study. It proposes their *de jure* responsibilities, authority, and position be realized *de facto* by making the service secretaries full partners in the top management of the Department with commensurate accountability for the performance of their respective organizations. Thus strengthening the position of the service secretaries would help to resolve a number of the present organizational and

management problems. By assigning service secretaries additional responsibilities, the secretary of defense would be less encumbered by management details and more free to concentrate on the broader aspects of national security. The service secretaries and their service chiefs would assume a more prominent role in assisting the secretary of defense in formulating defense policy; and the latter, in turn, could expect more effective policy implementation as a result of the involvement of the service principals. The outcome would be a more cohesive management effort, characterized by greater teamwork and cooperation.[39]

Increasing the military department role in policy formulation as well as execution would also tend to diminish the centralization problem. Although the DH Study acknowledges that OSD over-management is in part a problem of military perception, like the NMCS Study it emphasizes the importance of counteracting the perception as well as dealing with the actual dimensions of the problem. The proposed participatory approach to defense management would alleviate both aspects of the issue, the study suggests. A more clearly defined division of responsibilities between OSD and the services would result from the concentration of the defense secretary's staff on assisting him on broad policy matters, and the military departments on resource management and policy implementation.[40]

Too Many Staff Layers in DOD

The DH Study addresses at length the often-repeated charge that the Defense Department is hampered by too many levels of authority. Critics question the need for three management layers and accompanying staff support: the secretary of defense and his OSD staff, the three military department secretaries and their secretariats; the chiefs of staff and their respective Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps military headquarters staffs. The DH Study reviews previous reports such as those of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1969, the General Accounting Office Report of 1976, and the Defense Manpower Commission Report of 1976. The DH Study concurs with their collective conclusion that layering is a serious organizational flaw resulting in excessive, time-consuming, redundant review levels. At times it also submerges differences of opinion and thereby denies the secretary of defense and president a choice among viable options.[41]

That conclusion presents a dilemma. A key question the study set out to answer is whether service secretaries should be eliminated and the trend toward centralization continued, the services then becoming appendages of OSD. As discussed above, the study arrives at the opposite conclusion: service secretaries should be strengthened.[42] But if reduced layering receives priority over other concerns, the service secretary occupies the management level which logically will be eliminated. Disestablishment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not a credible alternative; the study supports continuation of a strong central management. Moreover, a military service could hardly continue to function without a central headquarters composed of its ranking officers and supporting staff. To reduce layering, then, the service secretary level must be modified.

The DH Study does not acknowledge the apparent inconsistency (perhaps because it is not recognized in these terms) of criticizing DOD for not making full use of service secretaries and, at the same time, for excessive layering which would logically lead to their elimination. Instead, it proposes an ingenious (though not completely original) solution discussed in a later section. The significant point at this juncture is that the study considers staff layering an important problem requiring correction despite its support for service secretaries.

OSD Organizational and Management Weaknesses

Although it concludes OSD mismanages by failing to delegate sufficient responsibility to the military departments and becoming unduly involved in day-to-day operating details, the DH Study also finds OSD often does not perform its legitimate central management functions forcefully enough. The DH Study concurs with other DOS 77–80 studies on the need for improved policy guidance, policy oversight, and readiness evaluation. Arrangements for integrating political and military considerations at high policymaking levels and ensuring military plans reflect this synthesis need strengthening. The readiness reporting system should be revised. Absence of uniformity across the service subverts the intended purpose of reporting procedures to provide decisionmakers an accurate picture of the status of operational units at any given time. Furthermore, the scope of the present system should be expanded; readiness reports are not designed to provide important data which

would assist in resource allocation decisions. Relevant to this point, no OSD official is specifically responsible for readiness evaluation. Officials in ODS concerned with program evaluation, manpower, and logistics would benefit from a system allowing marginal analysis of the increases in readiness which can be expected from incremental increases in resources [43]

The broad perspective of OSD should also be asserted more forcefully in the other major areas of resource allocation decision-making, the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS), and the acquisition process. Decisions made in the program stage of the PPBS are regularly revisited at the instance of dissatisfied interests in the budget review, a disruptive and wasteful practice. Continual changes compromise programs and force personnel to spend valuable time on repeated revisions at the expense of focusing more rewarding attention on acquisition, planning, program management, and mission reviews. In defense acquisition, central management fails to force adequate comparisons of the capabilities of proposed and competing systems to accomplish a given mission at early stages of the process of deciding on new weapons and equipment.[44]

Finally, the DH Study questions the capability of the organizational structure of OSD to support accomplishment of its extensive responsibilities. Unlike the service staffs, the OSD staff should not be reduced.[45] The unfulfilled potential of the position of under secretary for policy should be realized. His responsibilities should be clarified and expanded to ensure more precise policy guidance and oversight, and to forge an OSD-JCS link which would improve articulation of national policy by OSD and enhance the channels of access of the military voice into civilian policymaking.[46] The independence and integrity of the program analysis and evaluation function should be safeguarded. To increase the ability to cope with the overwhelming management tasks, the responsibilities for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics should be divided between two assistant secretaries.[47]

Miscellaneous Criticisms

Following are a number of other issues raised by the DH Study.

- Military headquarters staffs should be reduced by delegating responsibilities to subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area.[48]

- Executive personnel matters should receive greater emphasis. More attention should be given to selecting outstanding persons for presidential appointments and encouraging longer tenure. Also. flexibility in assigning key civil service personnel should be increased.[49]

- More effort is needed to reduce support costs, including manpower expenditures.[50]

- Further examination should be given to the suggestion that military advice provided by the JCS might be improved if service coordination of JCS papers were not required.[51]

THE DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (DRM) STUDY CRITIQUE

The Defense Resource Management Study examines five specific functions or management processes performed by DOD. Unlike the other studies, its central concern is not organizational structure. But process, function, and structure are inextricably tied together as illustrated by the central importance of the resource allocation process and the functions of service secretaries to the respective NMCS and DH Study analyses. Consequently. it is not surprising that the DRM Study, although concentrating on the technical processes governing five disparate resource management areas, finds flaws in the overall organization of DOD which require correction to improve resource management.

Paradoxical OSD Management: Too Overbearing and Too Weak

The DRM Study echoes and elaborates themes found in the other studies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense overmanages the services in areas the latter are capable of handling with general policy direction. At the same time, perhaps because of excessive attention to operational details. OSD fails to exert the effective overall leadership in crucial areas it is uniquely situated to provide.

Critique of Defense Organization

The study cites two instances of "micromanagement." First, OSD guidance documents are overly detailed and voluminous. They concentrate on the specifics of service programs as opposed to strategies, objectives, and capabilities. Second, the increase in scope and number of acquisition program reviews, from three to as many as twelve, in effect centralizes a process originally intended to keep OSD informed and ultimately in control while decentralizing day-to-day management in the services.[52]

Despite those criticisms, the DRM Study, like the other DOS 77-80 studies, is less concerned with micromanagement than areas in which OSD needs to provide stronger, more integrative management leadership. Policy requires particular emphasis. Inadequate planning hampers sound policy formulation; OSD seldom conducts needed strategy reviews which assess the impact of long-term political, economic, and technological trends on defense issues. Policy evaluation suffers from a lack of quality analysis which could credibly challenge current practices and systems and evaluate tradeoffs. The OSD resource analysis capability needs to be expanded. It should provide the Department an institutional ability to develop knowledge, in depth, of resource requirements and trends. This resource information should be based on assessments which (1) link strategy, force, and mission options with their associated costs, and (2) relate imputed resource needs to national economic indicators of resource availability. Inadequate feedback mechanisms frustrate policy oversight. Reporting systems focus on manpower, equipment, or units, and do not accurately reflect the composite defense capabilities of the commands they represent. Better feedback methods are needed to monitor the effect of past program changes on defense capabilities and suggest the direction of further changes.[53]

These policy inadequacies evidence a need for stronger OSD leadership in areas which concern the entire defense effort. The DRM Study also emphasizes, as discussed below, the need for more vigorous OSD oversight of the services in managing similar or common functions which sometimes overlap or conflict.

Excessive Service Independence in Key Areas of Resource Management

What is the appropriate relationship between OSD and the services in the performance of resource management functions? That question pervades the DRM Study enquiries. This section summarizes the study findings with respect to acquisition, medical care, logistics, and personnel management. Almost invariably, the study finds service propensities need to be offset or mediated more forcefully by the insistent assertion of the broader perspective vested in OSD or, in some instances, the joint military system.

Acquisition. Maintaining modern equipment inventories which counter the potential threat is an overriding military concern. To achieve this objective, according to the DRM Study, services tend to favor some courses of action which are not necessarily prudent public policy: accelerating the introduction of a new weapon system even though more rapid production will adversely affect reliability, operability, and costs; expending resources on systems closest to completion and slighting less mature, but possibly more promising, projects; and limiting the consideration of emerging alternatives which might rival systems under development.[54]

The institutional setting for acquisition program managers reinforces those tendencies. Success for program managers is defined in terms of satisfying milestone goals on time and within budget for their particular projects. Those objectives, although seemingly logical, are not tolerant of conceivably preferable alternatives. Given, for example, a technological breakthrough which enhances a rival approach, alternatives which should be considered for a project include adjusting technical or performance goals, and program redirection, slowdown, or possibly cancellation.[55]

The study proposes that OSD focus on offsetting service acquisition tendencies detrimental to the overall defense effort rather than concentrating on multiple detailed reviews of service performance in managing each program, as at present. OSD should ensure that sufficient testing is accomplished before moving into production, alternatives are considered throughout the development process, and adequate funding is available for the program, if approved.[56]

Health Care. Similar findings and conclusions concerning the OSD-service relationship are found in the DRM Study examination of military health care. The study pointedly suggests that "stronger leadership and more aggressive management by the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) are clearly warranted."[57] The services employ fundamentally different approaches, methods, and planning factors in arriving at projected requirements. The study cites several examples to illustrate the striking differences which result. The Air Force wounded-in-action rate, several weeks into the wartime scenario used for planning, exceeds that of Army divisional troops. At another point, the Air Force lists a requirement for fewer theater beds than the Army but for twice as many physicians. The number of anesthesiologists per physician, which would be expected to be roughly equivalent across services, varies radically as follows: Navy, 1 to 2; Army, 1 to 9; Air Force, 1 to 19. As a result of many inconsistencies such as these, the DRM Study concludes an accurate assessment of service medical requirements and capabilities is impossible. It does, however, determine serious shortfalls exist which demand immediate attention.[58]

The services also tend to plan on the basis of providing all of their needs from their own resources. This autonomous approach ignores other alternatives, as illustrated by the study findings concerning the widely-held view, generated by the services, that the defense effort suffers from an acute shortage of military physicians. Disregarding the planning inconsistencies noted above and using service estimates, combined active duty and reserve physician strengths exceed requirements after D-day in all overseas theaters. A physician shortage becomes apparent only when continental US military requirements to treat returning wounded are added. But the continental requirements stated by the services assume all military patients will be treated by military physicians. Although a very plausible, even likely, option in such extreme circumstances, the services do not consider using other government and civilian facilities in their plans. Failure to incorporate this alternative calls into question the claim of an acute military physician shortage, according to the study.[59]

The DRM Study also finds the service medical corps define and pursue their mission in terms which conflict in some respects with

the law and congressional intent. The conventional view, accepted by the services and reflected in service regulations, is that the medical mission is readiness. That is, military medicine, in essence, involves supporting preparedness by maintaining the health of the active duty force in peacetime, and treating casualties in the event of hostilities. But Congress has added a second mission, a health benefit, requiring that eligible individuals be provided health care as a consequence of military service. The latter mission is particularly important as an incentive in the era of an all-volunteer force and at a time when most other major employers provide health-care benefits.

Although the benefit mission is assigned to DOD in Title 10 of the US Code, and the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs is delegated responsibility for its accomplishment, the mission is not reflected explicitly in the regulations of any service. Consequently, the benefit mission continues to be treated as a derivative of the readiness mission: given the resources to accomplish the latter, the former can be accomplished. That approach has produced an erosion of the military health care benefit in absolute terms as well as relative to the medical plans of other large, competing employers. The results, according to the DRM Study, are widespread dissatisfaction on the part of military personnel and their families, and the resultant problems regarding retention, morale, and *esprit de corps*.[60]

Logistics Support and Personnel. The DRM Study reviews of logistics support and personnel procedures reveal other insights concerning the relationship of the services and OSD. In the case of logistics, the study analysis of future battlefield conditions suggests that other alternatives may be preferable to the present support structure. The alternative which the study proposes for DOD consideration would consolidate logistics functions. The proposal would relieve combat units of as much of their present logistics capabilities as possible, thus enhancing their maneuverability and flexibility. Logistics support would be concentrated at intermediate levels in a theater, a possibility also suggested by the NMCS Study. The theater commander would assume control of support activities with authority to reallocate resources among combat units. Clearly, the DRM Study alternative challenges present service practices and is unlikely to receive significant attention at that level. Consequently, the study calls on OSD to evaluate modern battlefield requirements and, if appropriate, to challenge the logistics support concepts of the services.[61]

With respect to personnel, most analyses recommend increasing the average experience level of enlisted personnel as a means of increasing productivity. That proposal implies the proportion of career personnel, those who are beyond their first enlistment, should be increased relative to those in their *first* enlisted *term*. The services at present manage the "first term/career mix." But their primary objectives are to ensure viable career paths and fill requisite supervisor requirements. They do not explicitly consider trade-offs on the basis of experience as a means of increasing productivity. This omission, at least in part, results from undeveloped methodology and insufficient data on career field productivity. The issue clearly is of interest to each service but transcends them all. Also, it requires a common approach to data gathering and methodology; consequently, the DRM Study recommends that OSD assume responsibility.[62]

Insufficient JCS Influence on DOD Decisionmaking

Although the treatment of the JCS is brief, the DRM Study emphatically supports the NMCS Study findings. It agrees that consumers have generally considered military advice provided in formal joint documents for use in planning and resource allocation irrelevant. The principal reason for substandard quality is JCS inability to address alternatives involving resource allocation effectively. The weaknesses of the Joint Staff procedures, as well as the impossibility of annually assessing national military strategy and force structure, compound the problem. Changes are needed which provide for realistic participation by the joint elements, the JCS, *and the unified and specified commands*, in the planning, programming, and budgeting system.[63]

The JCS also shares responsibility, with OSD, for taking action to rectify the serious medical readiness deficiencies, according to the DRM Study. Immediate OSD and JCS attention is required to improve the consistency of service planning factors, develop realistic plans, policies, and procedures, and allocate adequate resources to ensure medical readiness.[64]

THE COMBAT EFFECTIVE TRAINING MANAGEMENT (CETM) STUDY CRITIQUE

Training was one of the resource management concerns voiced by the president's 20 September 1977 memorandum requesting an

organizational review of DOD. Rather than incorporate this subject in the DRM Study, the president chartered a separate group to conduct a comprehensive review. The resulting Combat Effective Training Management (CETM) Study presents findings parallel to the other studies concerning the appropriate relationship between OSD and the services. This is noteworthy because the training function is not institutionalized, as are medical care and logistics, through elaborate service linkages to high-level OSD officials.

The CETM Study emphasizes the critical importance of training to the armed forces and its concomitant tax on defense resources. Training

> provides the catalyst which bonds together a force structure capable of meeting the threat with sound strategic and tactical doctrine. It produces military units which are capable of effectively implementing that doctrine in support of the national defense policy.[65]

Although "an effective training system will not insure a combat effective force," if such things as maintenance and logistics support are deficient, "an ineffective training system will invariably insure degradation of combat effectiveness."[66] Resources allocated to training reflect DOD recognition of its significance in fielding military forces in a technical age: scores of training facilities; almost one-fifth of all personnel; an estimated $9 billion per year *not including* presently incalculable, but "huge," unit training costs. The training function consumes between 10 and 14 percent of the entire defense budget.

Despite its importance in terms of combat readiness, resource utilization, and total size, the CETM Study indicates management of the training function is essentially disaggregated. Historically, training has been a principal responsibility of the services; each focuses on its own program. With its small, relatively low-ranking, five-person training directorate, OSD has focused efforts "outwards towards OMB and Congress" and has not become involved in the internal management of training.[67] The principal interface among the service training organizations is the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO). It is chartered "to ascertain the similarity of service occupational skills, review training objectives and course content, and make recommendations to the services on the consolidation of training where it will be cost effective to do so."[68]

But participation in ITRO is *voluntary,* OSD is not a member, and the services are not required to follow its recommendations.

> With the exception of the Marine Corps (which utilizes other schools for approximately thirty percent of their Specialized Skill Training) the services generally resist joint service training. Interviews and Information Request responses indicate that the other service commanders approve of joint service training in principle. They are reluctant to fully accept it for fear of losing control over course content and standards, and the inability to impose service particular indoctrination and discipline on trainees.[69]

Clearly, no overall DOD training management structure exists. Training is truly decentralized in the Department.

This absence of some form of coherent, integrated approach to training as a Department-wide responsibility is precisely the issue, according to the CETM Study. The absence of management relationships which would allow DOD training to be treated as a system is the principal criticism levied by the study. Although some of the major problems discerned by the study group can be solved by the services internally, others cannot.

> There are many training operations problems which are not solvable within the individual services with their current management organization. They may be too complex for the services to solve, they may cross service lines and require the combined efforts of two or more services to solve, or they may be caused by external influences outside the ability of the services to control.[70]

Problems which fit this description include:

- Needed assistance in the implementation of common procedures for Instructional Systems Development, a program which facilitates uniform approaches among the services to common problems which they face, such as recruit training and specialized skill training.[71]

- Requirement for more perceptive, knowledgeable, and skillful justification of training programs before the Office of Management and Budget and Congress based on an overall appreciation of issues such as the following: the tradeoffs

involved in training in institutions and training in units; the role of research and development in devising modern, highly technical training devices and programs; the value of the Instructional Systems Development program.[72]

- Need for comprehensive oversight to safeguard the integrity of the training function through such measures as reviews of imposed and directed training, audits of training programs, assessment of the trend toward exporting training from service schools to units, assessment of the adequacy of training facilities and base support.[73]

- Revision of present programming and budget procedures in DOD to consolidate training items and treat the training function as a total system.[74]

- Development of systems to relate training costs to readiness.[75]

As a result of problems such as the above, the CETM Study emphasizes "the need for a total systems approach to training management" within each service and within DOD as a whole. After surveying the present training organization, the study concludes the "present manning level within OSD is inadequate to perform the current functions," much less additional responsibilities. Furthermore, none of the services is structured to manage training as a total system.[76] The CETM Study critique concludes with a concise enunciation of the implications of the present disjointed approach:

> There is no organization within OSD or the services which can perform all five of the classical functions of management for the training system as a whole. There is no single spokesman who can state the service's position on training management issues.*
>
> There is adequate interface and coordination between OSD and the services on training issues. Within the services there is inadequate interface and coordination among the various components of the total training system.

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*The classical management functions, according to the CETM Study, are planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling. (See pages 3–20 of the study.)

The process for funding training is inadequate. Training funds are derived from several different appropriations and not managed as a total system within the PPBS. The services do not have a valid methodology for assessing unit training costs.

Definitive measures to evaluate combat effectiveness of units need to be developed and incorporated into a feedback system capable of providing decisionmakers at the service, JCS, and OSD levels responsive and relevant information on current unit status.

Noncombat related requirements are frequently mandated in schools and units at the expense of combat essential training. There is no mechanism available to validate these requirements, assess the impact on combat effective training, and to identify resource requirements.

Exported training* adversely impacts on unit training. As a result, operational units must emphasize individual training in lieu of collective and team training. During mobilization, exported training could seriously impair the combat effectiveness of operational units.[77]

THE DEFENSE AGENCY (DA) REVIEW CRITIQUE

In FY 1978, the eighty-eight thousand civilian and military personnel who comprise the defense agencies spent or directly controlled approximately $15 billion of a total DOD budget of $105 billion, a sum comparable to one-half of a military department budget.[78] Because of their size, importance, and unique organization, an independent study group reviewed the defense agencies as a part of the resource management portion of the DOS 77-80.

Chapter 2 discussed the trend toward centralization and integration of functions in DOD. Since the last major revision to the National Security Act in 1958, DOD has employed two organizational devices to sustain and reinforce this trend. First, the secretary/OSD element has asserted stronger control over resource allocation through the planning, programming, and budgeting system

---

*"Exported training" must be conducted by the operational units because, to diminish politically sensitive, school-related training costs, it is no longer conducted at training centers.

(PPBS) and the acquisition process. Second, defense agencies or similar single manager organizations have assumed direction of consolidated supply and service activities.

The number, size, and scope of defense agencies have grown continuously. Eleven have been established, as shown in figure 3-1, and others may be in prospect. The agencies appear on the *maintaining* side of the organization model as a result of their support orientation. In terms of the types of functions the agencies perform, they can be grouped into three categories:

- Support of the operating forces

  Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
  Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
  Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
  Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
 National Security Agency (NSA)

- Staff support

  Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)
  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
  Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

- Audit and investigation

  Defense Audit Service (DAS)
  Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
  Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)[79]

The Defense Agency (DA) Review attributes the continuing proliferation of defense agencies to the "expectation of improved econc iy, effectiveness, and efficiency in the Defense Department and the inability of the Military Services to agree on common procedures."[80] Whether or not the expectation has been realized, the DA Review emphasizes that one result of creating the several agencies has been to change significantly the system of providing support and services for the armed forces. The study expresses concern that the implications of the change need to be better understood. But unlike the other DOS 77-80 studies, the DA Review was limited by its charter to an exploratory inquiry, focusing primarily on whether

DEFENSE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP TO
BASIC ORGANIZATION MODEL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

MAINTAIN

MAINTAIN

MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS

DEFENSE
AGENCIES

CHIEFS OF STAFF
U.S.

JOINT STAFF

UNIFIED
AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDS

COMPONENT
COMMANDS

DEFENSE AGENCIES, 1980

Defense Advanced Research
  Projects Agency (DARPA)
Defense Audit Service (DAS)
Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
Defense Contract Audit
  Agency (DCAA)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
Defense Security Assistance
  Agency (DSAA)
National Security Agency (NSA)

━━━━━ comprehensive relationships supervisory, chain of command
  service, supply, support, administrative, communications, etc

•••••••• limited relationships supply, support, service

**FIGURE 3-1: DEFENSE AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE BASIC ORGANIZATION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

a large-scale, broadly based assessment of this organizational form is needed. Nevertheless, the study elucidates some of the implications of the burgeoning of defense agencies in discussing problems *inherent in the current organizational structure.*

DOD Control and Supervision Inadequate

The agencies were created to eliminate the duplication which occurs when four separate services perform the same function. A defense agency consolidates the performance of a common function previously performed by more than one service. The Defense Logistics Agency, for example, replaced four independent wholesale supply organizations. Similarly, separate agencies for mapping, intelligence (two), and communications consolidate former service responsibilities. However, the cost of resolving the duplication problem at the service level in these areas has been an extension of the span of control at the OSD level. The agencies are independent and not considered subordinate to any one service or other client. All eleven are directly responsible to the secretary of defense level of the Department.[81] In fact, until 1977, the defense agency heads typically reported *directly* to the secretary, as Secretary Brown noted in his first *Annual Report.* He promptly placed ten of the agencies under the direction of an under or assistant secretary "to strengthen the Department and to reduce my own span of control."[82]

Although reducing his personal span of control was prudent, Secretary Brown's action avoided the underlying problem of supervising a number of specialized agencies at the OSD level. Some maintain this accretion of "line" responsibilities has the unfortunate effect of converting the Office of the Secretary of Defense gradually from a staff to an operational organization. Whether this argument has merit or not, adding the responsibility for supervising a defense agency substantially increases the management load of already overburdened under and assistant secretaries. They, "like the Secretary himself, have broad and demanding responsibilities for policy that do not permit them to devote much time to the supervision of a defense agency."[83] As a result, supervision is lacking and the agencies are relatively independent. "Our study supports the views of those who believe that there is ambiguity and diffusion in the oversight over, and accountability for, most Agencies."[84]

Critique of Defense Organization

This relative OSD indifference extends to the part played by defense agencies in the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). Agency participation in the first two phases is "minimal" and OSD review of agency budget proposals is relatively superficial.[85] The study sides with those who maintain adequate competition for resources does not exist "since there are no adversary proceedings in the PPBS for the Agencies similar to those between PA&E [program analysis and evaluation] and the Services."[86]

The DA Review concludes the semi-autonomous *de facto* position of defense agencies is philosophically undesirable and, in addition, has more concrete adverse effects. Philosophically, the existing approach violates the theory of checks and balances.

> Every organizational entity, however worthy its purposes, has its own interests, which it will advance if unchecked, and which may not necessarily further the interests of the larger whole of which it is a part. Human enterprises require some overwatching authority.[87]

In practice, the absence of challenge to agency budgets possibly distorts resources allocated to their functions. In addition, their autonomy contributes to their insensitivity to clients.[88]

Insufficient Responsiveness of the Defense Agencies Supporting the Operating Forces

Supporting the combatant forces in wartime is the ultimate mission of five defense agencies. Yet the DA Review finds "shortcomings in the readiness and responsiveness of the present system for support of the operating forces in the event of war or crisis." The agencies are deficient in planning for contingencies, conducting combat related tests and exercises, discerning vulnerabilities which could possibly cripple their operations in war or crisis, developing an adequate system for allocating wartime priorities among clients, and establishing or participating in coordinating mechanisms between the operating forces and the supporting agencies.[89]

The study attributes this inattention to preparedness to flaws in the organizational structure similar to those which the NMCS Study discloses. "The basic difficulty. . . lies in the divisions between mis-

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS – 1963 – A

sion responsibility and authority over resource allocation." Input-output relationships are defective. The users have insufficient influence over the plans, policies, and priorities which determine the substance and timing of defense agency support.[90] True, defense agencies typically receive "guidance and direction from various elements of OSD, the JCS, and non-DOD organizations as well." But guidance from so many sources is often inconsistent and conflicting. This ambiguity, coupled with their supervisory and budgetary independence, allows each agency "to select which guidance it chooses, if any."[91] As a result, "the imbalance between the operational responsibility of the U & S Commanders [the CINCs] and their authority in the allocation of resources," emphasized in the NMCS Study, is particularly acute with respect to the provision of support and services by the defense agencies.

> The CINC has only a limited voice in the resource allocation process (PPBS) for Agency activities which are important to his capacity to accomplish his operational mission. These include the design and installation of communications equipment, the collection and production of various types of intelligence, and the production of maps and charts. Quarterly readiness reports from the U & S Commanders, recently instituted by Secretary Brown, provide a useful dialogue in areas of research and development, force structure, resource allocation, and readiness. However, the existing budgetary process for Defense Agencies which provides critical communications, intelligence, MC&G [mapping, charting, and geodesy], and logistic support to the Unified and Specified Commands does not provide any formal consideration of the CINC's priorities in the decision process on the Agency budgets.[92]

Questionable Improvement in Effectiveness, Economy, and Efficiency

The legislative criterion for creating a defense agency is that "effectiveness, economy, or efficiency" will be improved. According to law, the secretary of defense makes this determination.[93] Does an assessment of defense agency performance demonstrate they have improved effectiveness, economy, and efficiency? The DA Review concludes this question cannot be answered unless a much more comprehensive and sophisticated study is undertaken. No simple and agreed objective measure of performance, such as profit and loss provides for the private sector, exists. An indiscrimi-

nate comparison of resources allocated to a function before and after creation of an agency disregards, among other things, technological change, differing standards of performance, and nonquantifiable qualitative factors.[94]

Despite the absence of a direct answer to the question of improved efficiency, the study conveys a sense of disquiet. The Department may not be "getting the degree of efficiency that it can or ought to expect" because the chain of command discrepancies "may not provide intensive management which can raise the sights of the Agencies." Wartime effectiveness appears to suffer for the same reason. And economy may be undermined as a result of the relative lack of competition enjoyed by the agencies in the PPBS.[95]

INTEGRATED DOS 77–80 CRITIQUE OF DOD ORGANIZATION

If the basic "neutral" organization model discussed in chapter 2 (figure 2-1) is rearranged to reflect the findings and criticisms of the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS-80) the depiction of current DOD organization in figure 3-2 emerges. This critique model is based on all of the studies and cannot be attributed to any one; it is an interpretation which results from integrating their work and rearranging the basic model to illustrate the composite result.

The critique model indicates the dominating organizations in the Department of Defense are the central management (the secretary and OSD) and the services. The latter exercise preponderant influence over the joint structure. As a result, the relationship between secretary/OSD and the services is the anvil on which the major decisions concerning both *maintaining* and *employing* functions are hammered out in DOD.

The service secretaries have little influence, relatively. They are not participants in top management and, considering the numerous recommendations the DH Study found necessary to propose to enhance their position and prestige, they have insufficient influence at present to provide effective leadership of their departments. Consequently, the service secretaries occupy an intervening layer of management between the secretary of defense and the services which is subject to challenge in the absence of more meaningful contributions.

**ORGANIZATION MODEL
OF INTEGRATED DOS 77-80 CRITIQUE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**THE PRESENT STRUCTURE
AS PORTRAYED BY CRITICS**

FIGURE 3-2: INTEGRATED DOS 77-80 CRITIQUE MODEL
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The joint organizations are far too weak. Their impotence compromises the two primary functions of the joint system, military advice and employment of forces in the field. Military advice, the principal function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), is flawed by the inability of the chiefs, also imbued with service responsibilities, to address a broad range of contentious issues as a corporate body. The JCS acts as a forum for arriving at conjoint service positions through negotiations in which each service seeks to maximize its position through bargaining at multiple levels.

By this reading, however, the JCS fails to approximate fulfilling its *raison d'etre* for two reasons. First, the JCS bargaining approach produces military advice fundamentally different from what was intended by the authors of the National Security Act—and, more important, of less value to the president and secretary of defense. The framers of the act sought an organization to produce military advice derived from the deliberations of a corporate body of the highest military leaders considering issues from a national perspective detached from, but cognizant of, service interests. Second, because bargaining is unable to produce compromises acceptable to the services in contentious areas, the JCS finesses a broad range of issues that shape the very core of the US defense posture. These issues include the allocation of resources, basic strategy, roles and missions of the services, joint doctrine, and the functions, responsibilities, and geographic assignments of unified and specified commands.

The Joint Staff assists the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the bargaining process. Its procedures, fashioned by the JCS, establish rules of the game for consultation that maximize service influence and preclude an independent Joint Staff voice. Its analytical capability has been systematically weakened. Furthermore, the services control its personnel structure and have no interest in developing a Joint Staff whose talent rivals service staffs.

The commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) have neither the influence nor the clear-cut, durable links with higher authority commensurate with their responsibilities as theater commanders of US forces in the field. In crucial decisions detern 'ning the composition and warfighting capability of theater forces, subordinate component commanders and, by extension, the services, overshadow the CINCs. No overarching

joint readiness assessment system exists to analyze the prepared-
ness of each unified theater force and subsequently relate this
assessment through joint channels to resource allocation decisions
intended to correct the deficiencies. Instead, readiness evaluations
are conducted by the component commands, controlled by the
services, and linked to service budget proposals. In contrast, the
CINCs have no spokesman in Washington to represent their collec-
tive views. Consequently, the joint influence on resource allocation
decisions that ultimately determine the structure and readiness of
forces is almost nil or irrelevant, despite the obvious fundamental
importance of these decisions to the basic joint function, *employing*
US forces. Finally, the CINCs' chain of command from and to the
secretary of defense is rendered potentially indecisive by its routing
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee, as opposed to a
single military official acting as the secretary of defense's agent in
supervising the CINCs.

By inference, the component commands are too independent
of the unified commanders. These commands have dual designa-
tions as major service commands. This latter identity is far more
influential than the joint or unified nature of their assignment. The
services train and equip as well as control "the flow of men, money,
and materiel to the CINCs' components. The services (and the
components) thus have the major influence on both the structure
and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible."[96]
The configuration of each component in a theater as a self-
sufficient fighting force with a full range of support possibly results
in costly redundancies in areas such as supply, maintenance,
administration, and discipline. Consolidating some functions de-
serves serious consideration, particularly in the logistics areas
where control by the theater commander could possibly increase
warfighting capability as well as save dollars.

The preeminence of the four services in the DOD organiza-
tional structure is completely out of proportion to their legally
assigned and limited formal responsibilities for the *maintaining*
function—in essence, organizing, training, and equipping forces.
The interests of the services in maintaining organizational inde-
pendence and ensuring their capability to accomplish service mis-
sions provide continuing incentives to influence as many decisions
affecting them as possible. In effect, the services have co-opted the
joint structure through the dual roles of the service chiefs, over-

weening influence on the Joint Staff, *participation in CINC selec-*
tion, and predominant control over the component commands. As a
result, the underlying framework for making and implementing
decisions in the Department of Defense, whether on *maintaining* or
employing issues, is dialogue between the secretary of defense/
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services.

This finding does not mean the military is unresponsive. On the
contrary, the adherence of the services to civilian control is beyond
question. It does mean that the military input into decisionmaking,
whether through service secretaries, the JCS, Joint Staff, CINCs, or
components, is predominantly service-oriented. On a broad range
of contentious issues, military advice from a national perspective is
unavailable to civilian decisionmakers who are forced to provide
this perspective themselves, whether or not they are qualified to do so.

Given that the basic DOD relationship is between the secretary/
OSD and the services, with the unfortunate absence of a truly joint
military voice, are other aspects of the relationship in balance?
Definitely not. In each of the functional resource management areas
examined, the studies suggest the services are allowed too much
latitude. In the acquisition process the tendency of each service to
favor alternative capabilities that will enhance its organization and
to rush into production with inadequate test and evaluation is not
sufficiently offset by a broader OSD perspective. In the area of
health care, excessive service autonomy results in slighting a pri-
mary mission assigned by Congress, and inconsistent planning that
makes it impossible to ascertain medical readiness needs despite
convincing evidence of serious shortfalls. Although some evidence
suggests service logistics concepts may be outdated and should be
challenged, progress in this direction is unlikely in the absence of
OSD action. The services are unable to address many training
problems effectively. More vigorous OSD involvement is needed,
even though this would diminish traditional service autonomy in
training. A similar situation exists in the area of personnel manage-
ment with respect to developing a uniform methodology and DOD-
wide data bank as prerequisites to optimizing the mix of expe-
rienced and inexperienced personnel in various career fields.

Despite these management shortcomings in specific functional
areas, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is endowed with suffi-
cient authority, responsibilities, control mechanisms, and talent to

make it a formidable counterpoise to the services. The secretary of defense ultimately controls defense policy, strategy, resource allocation, and manpower decisions within the Department. Although the studies which compose the DOS 77-80 fault the Office of the Secretary of Defense for failing to provide stronger leadership in several areas, they do not call for expanding OSD power. In fact, offsetting the foregoing criticisms to some extent are charges of OSD overmanagement in the acquisition review process, overly detailed program guidance, and imprudent step-by-step direction of complex military operations during crises.

The underlying theme of the studies relative to the Office of the Secretary of Defense is that a change in management approach is needed. The Office of the Secretary slights the broad policy function; it fails to define the linkages between national objectives and military planning, to evaluate alternative approaches to military requirements, and to ensure that decisions, once made, are implemented and their results assessed for needed adjustments. Effecting the needed change to a management approach in which broad policy is the central focus will require correction of a number of weaknesses: ineffectual military participation in OSD policy formulation; insufficient delegation to operating levels of the Department; imprecise delineation of authority between OSD and the military departments; weak OSD evaluation capability; inattention to output measures such as joint warfighting or readiness capabilities in resource allocation decisions; and absence of cohesion and teamwork among constituent elements of the Department.

COMPARING THE INTEGRATED CRITIQUE WITH PAST STUDIES

A number of other studies which address various aspects of defense organization were conducted within the decade preceding the DOS 77-80 effort. Their findings are sufficiently recent to serve as one gauge of the validity of the integrated critique. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 summarize the major organization problems emphasized by these past studies.

Although a modicum of consensus with regard to assessments of problems and their causes might be reasonably expected of studies of DOD organization conducted in the same decade, the degree of congruity revealed by the tables is surprising, if not

Table 3-1: Comparison of Defense Organization Study, 1977-1980 Criticisms of the Joint Structure with Those of Other Recent Studies

| | RECENT STUDIES WITH SIMILAR CRITICISMS | | |
| | *Com. on Org.* | | |
DOS 77-80 CRITICISMS	Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1970)[1]	of Gov't for Conduct of Foreign Policy (1975)[2]	OSD Internal Review (1975-1976)[3]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is not responsive to the needs of the president and secretary of defense for military advice from a national perspective based on requirements for the unified employment of the armed forces. The JCS suffers from a built-in organizational contradiction between the service ties of each chief and his joint military advisory responsibilities which precludes a consistently national outlook.	X	X	X
The present joint command structure may not be adequate for direction and control during crises.	X	X	X
The quality of military advice provided by the JCS is inadequate. Recipients consider it only marginally useful.	X	X	X
The JCS avoids providing advice on many significant issues.	X	X	
The JCS is a committee and should not be responsible for exercising operational responsibilities. Instead, a senior military official under the secretary of defense should be appointed.	X	X	
Joint Staff performance should be improved. It is too dependent on the services as a result of complex and stringent coordination of procedures and personnel policies which discourage individual initiative.	X	X	

Table 3-1: Comparison of Defense Organization Study, 1977–1980 Criticisms of the Joint Structure with Those of Other Recent Studies (Cont.)

| | RECENT STUDIES WITH SIMILAR CRITICISMS | | |
| | Com. on Org. | | |
DOS 77–80 CRITICISMS	Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1970)[1]	of Gov't for Conduct of Foreign Policy (1975)[2]	OSD Internal Review (1975–1976)[3]
Unified commanders are too weak. They have insufficient influence on determining the structure of the forces they will employ in war. There is no effective means of bringing their assessments of operational requirements to bear on decisions in Washington concerning weapons procurement and planning, programming, and budgeting. Their command authority is diluted because component commanders are strongly influenced by parent services.	X		
Component commands are too strong and independent vis-a-vis the unified commands. Their independence and power undermines unified employment of US forces.	X		

Sources

1. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, *Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970).

2. *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. June, 1975).

3. Based on a Department of Defense (DOD) document summarizing the comments and criticisms voiced by the principal military and civilian officials in interviews conducted in 1975 by a senior Office of the Secretary of Defense official as part of an internal review of DOD headquarters organization.

**Table 3-2. Comparison of Defense Organization Study, 1977–1980 Criticisms
of the Departmental Headquarters Organizations
with Those of Recent Studies**

DOS 77–80 CRITICISM	RECENT STUDIES WITH SIMILAR CRITICISMS				
	Blue Ribbon Panel (1970)[1]	Commis-sion on Gov't Pro-curement (1973)[2]	General Account-ing Office Report (1976)[3]	OSD Internal Review (1975)[4]	Defense Manpower Commis-sion (1976)[5]
Decisionmaking authority is overly centralized at the secretary of defense level. Micro-management by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) results in failure to delegate detailed management activities.	X	X	X	X	
The secretary of defense/OSD level needs to place greater stress on long-range planning and policy formulation guid-ance and oversight. Concentra-tion on those areas should replace the emphasis on detailed management.	X		X	X	
Service secretaries' potential is not realized. They should be given more authority and responsibility, and held accountable.			X	X	
Three management layers— secretary of defense, service secretary, and military head-quarters staff—are not neces-sary to perform a number of functions satisfactorily. Two would be sufficient.	X		X		X
Excessive layering results in unnecessary authority and review levels, overlap, duplica-tion, extra paperwork, delays, and otherwise diminished performance.	X	X		X	X
Imprecise lines of authority, re-sponsibility, and accountability re-sult in fragmented management.	X	X		X	X

Table 3-2. Comparison of Defense Organization Study, 1977-1980 Criticisms of the Departmental Headquarters Organizations with Those of Recent Studies (Cont.)

DOS 77–80 CRITICISM	RECENT STUDIES WITH SIMILAR CRITICISMS				
	Blue Ribbon Panel (1970)[1]	Commis-sion on Gov't Pro-curement (1973)[2]	General Account-ing Office Report (1976)[3]	OSD Internal Review (1)[4]	Defense Manpower Commis-sion (1976)[5]
Differences of opinion are sub-merged, thus depriving the president and secretary of defense of the opportunity to consider all alternatives prior to making a decision.	X				

Sources

1. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, *Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970).

2. Based on an internal Department of Defense analysis of the report of the Commission on Government Procurement, 1973.

3. US, General Accounting Office, *Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: Comptroller General of the United States, FPCD–76–35, 20 April 1976).

4. Based on a Department of Defense (DOD) document summarizing the comments and criticisms voiced 'by the principal military and civilian officials in interviews conducted in 1975 by a senior Office of the Secretary of Defense official as part of an internal review of DOD headquarters organization.

5. Defense Manpower Commission, *Report to the President and Congress*, April 1976.

remarkable. The several study groups varied markedly in composition, sponsorship, and objectives. Their methods were just as diverse and in the aggregate included thousands of interviews, hundreds of case studies, and a variety of other techniques. Yet the diagnoses are remarkably similar.

The recent studies agree on the major organizational issues facing the Department of Defense. They are troubled by the inability to achieve a balance between centralized control and decentralized operations. They question the utility of service secretaries and their staffs as presently configured, given the centralization-decentralization dilemma and the problem of layering. They affirm the relative impotence of the joint side of the structure; its consequence, insubstantial military advice and a fragile chain of command; and its underlying cause, pervasive service influence.

The decision process which results from this unwieldly organizational structure is variously characterized as complex, confusing, cumbersome, and fragmented. Inadequate delegation involves top management in operating details and obviates its ability to concentrate on comprehensive planning, broad policy formulation and implementation, and program evaluation. At times differences of opinion in subordinate review layers result in submerging important alternatives, thus depriving key officials, including the president and secretary of defense, of the opportunity to consider all viable options.

At the risk of belaboring the point, the following excerpt from the report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970 demonstrates the correlation of recent study criticisms of the Department of Defense with the findings of significant studies since the Department was established:

> The changes made in defense organization since 1947, whether by reorganization plan or by statutory amendment, were all designed primarily to remedy the same or unrelated problems to those which most plague the Department of Defense today. Unquestionably, the phrases in the reports of the Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security Organization, the Eberstadt Task Force, the Rockefeller Committee of 1953, the President's message to the Congress in 1958, and many other studies made externally and internally to the Department have the familiar ring of applicability to contemporary conditions.[9]

Clearly, the organizational analyses reveal striking agreement on the nature of DOD weaknesses. Why? Have the critiques been independently derived or merely accepted by each new inquiry? One explanation of this phenomenon, of course, is that each succeeding study has reference to the others and has been influenced thereby. Responsiveness to previous findings undoubtedly occurs to some extent. A study group would be irresponsible to ignore past work relevant to its charter. But to dismiss the similar findings on these grounds would be even more irresponsible. This reasoning would, in effect, assume an absence of independent inquiry and analysis, an unsupportable premise considering the disparate nature of the study groups. Merely reviewing their prescriptions for curing the maladies discerned in the diagnoses quickly confirms their independence. The proposed remedies are as heterogeneous as the diagnoses are similar. The consensus among recent studies concerning DOD organizational problems in fact represents a broadly based indictment.

PLACING THE INTEGRATED CRITIQUE IN PERSPECTIVE

Given the agreement of so many separate and independent analyses over an extended period on the structural flaws of DOD organization, why have the Department, Congress, or the White House taken no significant corrective actions?

Officials might respond, of course, by dismissing the assessments of all external study groups out of hand with the contention that, regardless of their methods, these groups are unable to fathom the underlying dimensions of the organization and its structure. However, this argument is unlikely to be convincing in an era when the feasibility of organizational engineering is a basic premise of business school courses throughout the nation, as well as myriad treatises on management. The untold numbers of businesses annually responding to the reorganization advice of outside consultants are further evidence of the validity of organizational engineering.

A more convincing response to the question concerning inaction would begin by agreeing with the conclusion that the Department of Defense suffers from organizational deficiencies which mar its performance. Furthermore, the respondent would acknowledge broad consensus on the nature of these deficiencies has existed for years; yet they have not been corrected.

But even though these admissions appear to constitute a compelling argument for structural change in DOD, this is not *necessarily* the case. The principal studies which comprise the DOS 77-80 make the point DOD performs relatively well for a large organization, despite its problems. And many of the deficiencies cited, such as overly centralized decisionmaking, micromanagement, staff layering, and duplication, are similar to criticisms levied against large organizations in general, whether governmental or private. Furthermore, although the *employing*, or joint organizations, do not perform as envisioned by architects of defense organization, the present interplay between the services and the secretary/OSD does ensure accomplishment of both *maintaining* and *employing* functions.

Finally, the studies which preceded the DOS 77-80, despite the consistency of their critiques, have been singularly unsuccessful in advancing convincing proposals for alternative organizational structures which could better perform the substantial functions assigned to the various constituent elements of the present Department of Defense. Their recommendations, in general, have been so far-reaching that they were beyond the limits of serious consideration in the political arenas which decide defense organization issues. The fundamental question concerning structural change in DOD, then, must be phrased thus: Does the Department of Defense, as presently configured, minimize deficiencies present in its organizational structure while performing its mission, or are there convincing alternatives which would be more suitable?

The next chapter begins to marshall the answer to this question which emerges from synthesizing the materials contained in the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980.

Chapter 4

The Employing Arm—
Making the Joint Structure *Joint*

Chapters 4 through 6 analyze the recommendations for altering the structure of Department of Defense contained in the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980. Each of the five topical studies recommends ways to correct the deficiencies it found. In addition, the comments from throughout the defense community on the studies often contain proposals intended to complement or replace the study recommendations.[1] The comments provide other evaluative material, sometimes disputing the critique, more often challenging the study recommendations as unsuited to the stated objectives or because they involve unintended and unwanted side effects. This introductory section explains the procedures used in sifting and winnowing recommendations and other relevant materials addressing DOD organizational problems from this profusion of sources.

The remainder of this chapter and the two following contain the substance of the analysis. These chapters explain various proposals and examine their feasibility and utility; the degree of internal DOD support they attract; and whether, and how, they should be included in one or more of the comprehensive DOD organizational models derived from the DOS 77-80 and analyzed in chapters 7 and 8.

The basic organization model (figure 2-1) suggests the division of the material into three chapters. Essentially, the model consists of two arms, *employing* and *maintaining,* joined together by the secretary of defense's comprehensive responsibility to exercise direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense. This chapter examines the *employing* arm or joint structure;

chapter 5, the *maintaining* arm, principally the service secretaries; and chapter 6, the secretary of defense and OSD.

A NOTE ON PROCEDURE

Alternatives

The integrated critique (figure 3-2), reexamined as a statement of *the problem,* provides the framework for organizing and evaluating the multifarious study materials. The critique facilitates identifying broad issue areas and grouping sets of recommendations with a common purpose within these issue areas. For example, one set consists of recommendations designed to overcome service secretary weaknesses through reorganization. Another set of recommendations includes those whose general purpose is to respond to the criticisms but avoid structural realignments of the present service secretary organizations.

These sets of recommendations are designated "alternatives" in the analyses of the *employing* and *maintaining* arms. Although not always mutually exclusive, the alternatives provide an opportunity to decide among several courses of action or approaches.* The recommendations of the studies concerning a particular deficiency

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*An alternative is often understood to offer a mutually exclusive choice. That is, in a choice between alternatives *a* and *b,* if *a* is chosen, then *b* is excluded. In this volume, however, an alternative merely provides "a choice between two or among more than two things." (*Webster's New World Dictionary,* 1970, p. 40.) Here, in a choice between alternatives *a* and *b, b* might consist of *a* plus *c;* thus, choosing alternative *b* would include, not exclude, choosing alternative *a.* For example, a cautious policymaker might choose to take *a* steps to correct a deficiency, but refuse to accept stronger measures. Another policymaker, either less cautious or more convinced of the seriousness of the deficiency, might be willing to take *a* steps plus *c* steps. In this case *a* is one alternative, *a* plus *c* (i.e., *b*) another.

The use of *alternative* may be misunderstood in another context in this book, also. The alternatives in chapters 4 and 5 are "micro" alternatives. They provide choices among ways to organize the constituent elements of DOD. In chapters 7 and 8, the alternatives provide choices among ways to organize the entire Department of Defense. The latter, "macro" alternatives, typically consist of several micro alternatives for organizing the *maintaining* and *employing* arms.

can roughly be considered one alternative. The comments on the studies from the defense community, taken as a whole, provide different proposals which can be consolidated into other broad alternatives. These range from (1) retaining the status quo; to (2) evolutionary change responding to specifically identified deficiencies; to (3) altering the structure in the direction, but not to the degree, proposed by the study recommendations. Finally, because sufficient time has elapsed since the publication of the individual DOS 77-80 studies for DOD to react to their findings and recommendations, Departmental actions to date in a particular area (or the absence thereof) can be characterized as an alternative (albeit still evolving, in some cases).

Following this procedure of constructing alternatives, this and the following chapter present and explain a range of options in a format which permits comparison and evaluation.

As will become clear in chapter 6, the analysis of central management (the secretary of defense and OSD) cannot follow the relatively straightforward procedure of assessing the sets of recommendations as alternatives. Consensus reigns among the studies and the defense community (i.e., alternatives are not at issue) on the appropriate relationships between central management and the other elements of the Department. Unfortunately, the premises on which they agree are contradictory. Consequently, chapter 6 focuses on deriving a coherent concept of the position of central management in DOD and a consistent approach for the secretary/ OSD to employ in directing the Department.

Assessment

Evaluation of the sets of recommendations occurs throughout the three chapters. Where several alternatives address a particular issue, focused *preliminary assessments* follow the explanation of the alternatives. Moreover, *organizational perspectives* at the end of each chapter address the implications of the various alternatives for the DOD element being examined. Comprehensive assessment, of course, cannot be completed until the sets of recommendations are arranged in alternative organizations for the entire Department. Only then can we appraise the implications of any set of proposals for the structure of the Department as a whole. This overall structural analysis is the subject of chapters 7 and 8 which arrange the

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concepts found in the study materials along a spectrum graduated from no change in the present structure to the most far-reaching configurations discussed, although not recommended, in the DOS 77-80 effort.

Nevertheless, preliminary assessments can accomplish a great deal of winnowing and sifting. A principal question in such an assessment is whether a recommendation is likely to achieve the intended result; that is, whether the reasoning which supports the proposal is valid and the proposal is *workable.* Even in those rare instances characterized by general agreement on (1) what is wrong with the structure and (2) how it should be reconfigured, consensus may be lacking on the *means* of correcting the deficiency and realizing the desired structure. For example, one set of Departmental Headquarters Study recommendations proposes eliminating a substantial portion of the service staff supporting the secretary in spite of the repeatedly emphasized objective of strengthening the position. Although the DH Study advances arguments in support of this alternative, a number of comments from the defense community understandably take umbrage, contending the alternative would have an effect diametrically opposite to that intended. The preliminary assessment of DH Study alternatives in chapter 5 attempts to resolve this issue.

A second question in evaluating proposals follows from the first: Assuming that an alternative will achieve its intended result, will its benefits be commensurate with its *costs?* Several comments emphasize unanticipated costs may be incurred if study proposals are adopted. These include actual resource expenditures and intangible levies such as adding time-consuming responsibilities to already over-burdened senior officials and increasing the divisions among the elements of DOD with corresponding decreases in teamwork and cooperation.

In some instances the *political feasibility* of an alternative can also be assessed in a preliminary analysis. If a proposal is controversial, inspiring intense opposition from powerful organizations both within the Department and externally, it may be beyond the realm of the possible regardless of its merits. In any case, considering the sources of opposition and support as well as the organizational interests involved must be a part of any informed process of deciding upon a course of action. Many of these factors are identifi-

able in a preliminary analysis, thus narrowing the issues for the comprehensive assessments of chapters 7 and 8.

MAJOR EMPLOYING ARM ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES

The recommendations for improving the *employing* or joint side of the defense organization model fall into three general categories: (1) proposals to improve the quality of military advice by altering the responsibilities and/or procedures of the Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS), chairman of the JCS (CJCS), Joint Staff, and unified and specified commanders (CINCs); (2) proposals designed to establish stronger, more effective linkages between the joint elements responsible for military advice and the other parts of the Department of Defense—the internal policy and planning structures of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the defense agencies, and the services; and (3) proposals for streamlining the command and control structure. The DOS 77-80 materials and subsequent DOD actions yield several alternative approaches to rectifying the problems discerned in each of these issue areas. To provide an overview of the ensuing discussion, the alternatives are summarized below; the remainder of this chapter examines them in turn.

Issue: Improving the Quality of Military Advice

Alternative structures for providing military advice (MA):

MA1. Composite studies recommendation: Increase the responsibilities of the chairman, JCS, and the CINCs in providing military advice on resource allocation issues.

MA2. JCS/services counter: Increase the resource allocation advisory responsibilities of the corporate body of the JCS.

MA3. DOD approach:* Increase opportunities for military advice to influence resource allocation decisions without altering the joint structure.

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*The "DOD approach" alternative recounts what action, if any, the Department has taken in response to the DOS 77-80 findings and recommendations in a given issue area.

MA4. NMCS Study option (considered but not recommended by the study): Replace the JCS with a body of National Military Advisers.

Alternative approaches to improving the Joint Staff (JS):

JS1. NMC^ Study recommendation: Foster Joint Staff independence in exercising its responsibilities as the supporting staff of the JCS by lessening the influence of service staffs on its positions, increasing joint control over personnel selection, and adopting other procedural changes.

JS2. JCS/services counter: Achieve the study objective of improving Joint Staff performance without altering the requirement for service coordination on Joint Staff positions or sanctioning joint intervention in service personnel procedures.

JS3. An OSD official's proposal concerning Joint Staff personnel: Adopt a referral system.

Issue: Strengthening the relationship between the employment structure and other DOD elements.

Alternative structures for integrating (1) joint military advice:

I1. Composite studies recommendation: Make the under secretary of defense for policy principally responsible for OSD-joint military interface on policy matters; strengthen the joint military voice in service and defense agency decisionmaking.

I2. An OSD official's proposal: Maintain the status quo.

I3. JCS/services approach: Accept the objectives and recommendations of the studies in principle but (1) employ the JCS staff structure, not the chairman, to establish joint interface with OSD; and (2) increase OSD oversight of military planning, but far less than recommended by the studies.

I4. DOD approach: Strengthen the internal OSD policy structure but avoid secretary-of-defense-directed changes in JCS structure and procedures.

Issue: Streamlining command and control

Alternative command and control (CC) structures:

CC1. Composite studies recommendation: Streamline the chain of command by designating the chairman the secretary's agent in supervising the activities of the CINCs; increasing the authority of the CINCs, making them more independent of the services and more powerful vis-a-vis their components; and adopting other measures favoring joint military approaches.

CC2. JCS/services counter: Improve the relationship of *both* the chairman and the JCS with the CINCs; reject changes in CINC status and other proposals for structural changes.

CC3. A composite option based on several OSD officials' responses: Increase command and control responsibilities of the chairman, but possibly without changing his formal status; consolidate unified command support under a single-manager service; accept the other alternative CC1 proposals.

CC4. DOD approach: Maintain the status quo.

MILITARY ADVICE

The broad spectrum of defense-related activities and issues requiring military advice encompasses such disparate subjects as military operations; long-range and contingency planning; logistics support; materiel and personnel requirements; research and engineering priorities; command, control, and communications; mobilization; national policy and strategy; treaties; international affairs; and resource allocation. The most fundamental flaw in the joint structure with respect to military advice, according to the studies, is that a portion of the spectrum cannot be effectively addressed because of contradictions inherent in the current organization. The National Military Command Structure (NMCS) Study proposes that the present structure continue to address those areas where its performance is satisfactory. But it recommends that a supplementary structure, consisting of the chairman of the JCS, CINCs, and supporting staff for the chairman, be given responsibility for military advice in the most critical of the areas the present joint organization is unable to address effectively, resource allocation. The

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Departmental Headquarters (DH), Defense Resources Management (DRM) and Defense Agency (DA) Studies implicitly accept this NMCS Study proposal and make recommendations which elaborate the concept.

Alternative Structures for Providing Military Advice (MA)

> Alternative MA1.   Composite studies recommendation: Increase the responsibilities of the chairman, JCS, and the CINCs in providing military advice on resource allocation issues.

The NMCS Study fastens on the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the key to improving military advice. Although the JCS as a whole is unable to address many contentious issues as a result of the dual loyalties of its members, the chairman does not suffer from this limitation. He is in a unique position to provide national military advice because he is the only officer with no present or future service responsibilities. According to the study, the performance of individuals who have served as chairman demonstrate their ability to subordinate service interests and advise the president and secretary of defense, as well as Congress, from a national perspective.[2] Consequently, the position of chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, already ensconced at precisely the point of greatest structural concern and possessing the needed organizational characteristics, provides the potential for ameliorating many of the problems discerned by the studies.

Although the chairman currently acts as an adviser to the secretary of defense, he does so on a personal and informal basis. His formal role is limited to acting as the spokesman of the JCS. The chairman lacks the staff, official recognition, and formal channels necessary to develop and articulate an independent position effectively. Furthermore, any outward manifestation of independence by the chairman is legitimately subject to remonstrance from the remaining members of the JCS. Consequently, the NMCS Study recommends that the chairman's role as a military adviser be expanded and formalized.[3]

The study does not propose, however, to make the chairman's charter coextensive with that of the JCS. Although the study at one point suggests that the chairman provide advice "on those issues

the JCS as a body are unable to address effectively," its formal recommendation opts for a more restricted formulation. The chairman would provide "military advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget issues."[4]

The chairman's enhanced role in resource allocation matters, although independent, is to be institutional rather than personal. He is conceived as the central figure in a structure which would include a dedicated supporting staff; the unified and specified commanders; formal membership on the highest DOD bodies that decide resource allocation; responsibility for assessing the major program proposals of the services and defense agencies from a joint perspective; and management of the annual studies, analysis, and war gaming program.

The CINCs would participate through a revised readiness evaluation and reporting system allowing them to assess the overall warfighting capability of the forces under their command from a unified perspective. An integral part of the new system would be their recommendations for improving readiness after considering the available alternatives—for example, modernization, changes in force structure, and changes in roles and missions.[5]

The chairman, assisted by his staff and employing the resources available to him as manager of the studies and analysis program, would analyze the CINCs' readiness assessments and recommendations, integrate their proposals, establish priorities, and develop fiscally constrained resource recommendations. Subsequently, he would ensure these synthesized views of the CINCs were addressed in the resource allocation process through his role as adviser to the secretary of defense and membership on the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) and the Defense Resources Board (the latter a Defense Resource Management Study recommendation) which supervises the DOD programming and budgeting process.[6]

Other DOS 77-80 studies agree with institutionalizing the chairman-CINC linkage as a source of military advice on resource allocation matters. Moreover, they recommend complementary measures designed to enhance advocacy of the joint perspective vis-a-vis other elements of the organizational structure. The Defense Resource Management (DRM) Study recommends the

chairman independently prioritize all service program proposals exceeding a certain minimum level.[7] This would result in a direct comparison of the chairman's joint integrated resource priorities (developed from the CINCs' readiness assessments) with those of the services. The Defense Agency Review proposes similar authority for the chairman with respect to the "programs and budgets of the Agencies supporting the operating forces."[8]

Although these proposals could be initiated without substantially modifying the JCS structure, an advantage, the relationship between the chairman and the other members of the JCS would become much more complex—and possibly discordant. The JCS would continue to act as military staff to the secretary of defense, its charter encompassing all areas of military advice, including resource allocation.[9] The chairman would continue to act as the JCS spokesman. He would also be expected to consult with the JCS in recommending his separate resource allocations. Nevertheless, with respect to his resource advisory role, the NMCS Study emphasizes the chairman "clearly would act from his own national perspective and not on behalf of the individual Services or the other Chiefs."[10] Thus his additional responsibilities and independence would undoubtedly increase the likelihood of friction between the chairman and other JCS members.

The NMCS Study suggests, however, the realignment of responsibilities would also provide incentives for the service chiefs to work cooperatively with the strengthened chairman.[11] The DRM Study also anticipates the new dynamics might influence the JCS as a whole to take a more national view. It favors providing opportunities for effective participation in the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) by the chairman, "and by the full JCS to the extent he can bring them along."[12] In any case, the NMCS Study correctly concludes that a crucial factor in determining the dynamics between the chairman and the rest of the JCS would be the emphasis the secretary of defense placed on his independent advice.[13]

> Alternative MA2. JCS/services counter to institutionalizing the chairman's independent military advisory role: Increase the resource allocation advisory responsibilities of the corporate body of the JCS.

Comments on the studies by defense organizations reflect almost unanimous agreement on the proposals to increase the role of the chairman, JCS in resource allocation planning and decisions. The Navy response indicates that the chairman "could perform a very useful role in supporting CINC resource allocation issues."[14] The OSD deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration response states that formalizing the chairman's resource allocation role "is an idea whose time has come."[15] The JCS agrees that the chairman "should actively participate in major programming and budgeting deliberations."[16] The rationale for supporting greater CJCS involvement parallels that provided in the studies—increased military influence "in the high level decisions that affect the readiness and fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces," in the words of the Army response.[17]

The consensus disintegrates, however, over the key issue in the study proposal, whether to vest the chairman with an independent voice, institutionalized with supporting staff and direct CINC support. Whereas the OSD comments agree with the study recommendations, the JCS and services emphasize the chairman would continue to act as spokesman for the JCS in his expanded role.

JCS: "The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should actively participate in major programming and budget deliberations."[18]

"The Chairman, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, should have an expanded role in resource allocation and planning decisions."[19]

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands, should have an expanded role in assessing the adequacy of the programs and budgets of [defense] agencies supporting the operating forces."[20]

Army: "The Chairman should, however, also be supported in this role by the JCS."*[21]

Navy: "Increased Service and JCS input to the Chariman on broad issues of warfighting capability would be useful to strengthen the Chairman's position in relating the impact of resource allocation to the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs."[22]

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> *Air Force:* "Such a designation [of the chairman] could sustain and strengthen his role as spokesman for the JCS as a corporate body and as the primary source of national military advice."[*][23]

The essence of the JCS/services position is that the structure should remain unchanged but the JCS should place greater emphasis on resource allocation issues and the chairman should be more active in reflecting the JCS position. These responses ignore the NMCS Study contention that the JCS is inherently unable, because of the dual responsibilities of the service chiefs, to address constrained resource allocation issues; and implicitly, the JCS/service responses assume the opposite.

The JCS and service responses to the other recommendations on improved military advice also follow the pattern of agreeing with increased CJCS involvement on behalf of the JCS while carefully avoiding measures which would lead to greater chairman and CINC independence. The JCS agrees to study whether the chairman requires additional staff "to represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making broad programming and budgeting judgments."[24] But the Navy foreshadows the eventual outcome with its insistence the chairman can perform the advisory function with existing Joint Staff and service support. "Any role which would . . . require an expansion of the Joint Staff . . . would be counterproductive to sound management, and direct the Chairman's time and attention away from other, more critical responsibilities."[25]

The JCS and services oppose CJCS participation on high level resource allocation decisionmaking bodies such as the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), opting instead for membership of a JCS representative. Overlooking, or disregarding,

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*The Army and Air Force positions on this issue are not definitive. The Army "concurs in principle" and the Air Force "concurs" with the proposal to give the chairman a formal role in resource allocation decisions. But the succeeding comments explaining these positions cloud the issue by linking the chairman with the remainder of the JCS in performing his resource allocation advisory functions, a connection specifically rejected by the NMCS Study formulation. Because the Army and Air Force participated in formulating the JCS position, which is explicit (above), the author believes the text accurately reflects their position.

the fact their argument ostensibly substantiates the NMCS Study rationale for placing the chairman on the DSARC, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps object that his membership would constitute an inappropriate intrusion by the chairman into decisions concerning individual service programs. They also claim his participation at this level would tend to diminish the chairman's influence in higher circles. The chairman's participation in acquisition decisions, they suggest, should be at the secretary of defense level, not below.[26] As an alternative, the JCS supports joint membership on the DSARC. But it recommends the joint member be a representative of the JCS, not the chairman.[27] Similarly, the JCS response opposes membership of the chairman on the Defense Resources Board (DRB) as impractical and inappropriate; instead, it proposes inclusion of a "senior flag-general officer representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[28]

Consistent with these positions, the services and JCS offer scant support for significant changes in the role of the CINCs. In contrast to the NMCS Study view that a CINC should have a strong voice in decisions concerning the composition and readiness of forces under his command, the Navy response states "the essential role of the CINC is to be prepared to fight with the forces on hand. A larger role, to include participation in force requirements, could divert the CINC's attention from this task." Instead, the Navy suggests "component commanders could submit requirements through the CINCs as well as the Secretarial chain."[29]

Although the JCS acknowledges the CINCs "must be active participants in determining the requirements for forces under their command," it maintains this is already being achieved with improvements underway or contemplated. These include quarterly reports to the secretary of defense, annual research and development objectives documents, and periodic submission of priority lists. CINC staffs are not capable of proceeding beyond these broad analyses into the development of "balanced total force program advice, particularly in the time-sensitive programming/budgeting arena." Rather than support augmentation of CINC staffs, the JCS concludes "the primary determinant of force requirements should continue to be exercised through Service component commanders assigned to the unified command."[30]

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That position explicitly supports continuing the situation the NMCS Study identifies as "the fundamental difficulty inherent in the organizational structure" of the unified and specified commands. The services and components constitute "the major influence on both the structure and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible" as a result of their control of "the flow of men, money, and material" to the combatant commands.[31]

> Alternative MA3. DOD approach: Increase opportunities for military advice to influence resource allocation decisions without altering the joint structural relationships.

Defense Department actions in response to the study recommendations concerning military advice suggest agreement on the need for a more substantial joint military voice in resource allocation decisions; however, DOD responses are tempered by reluctance to tamper significantly with the existing structure. The chairman has been made a member of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) despite the misgivings expressed in the service and JCS responses. In addition, DOD has taken a number of other actions, discussed in the next section, to improve the linkage between the policymaking elements of OSD and the joint military side of the DOD structure.

On the other hand, the chairman's writ remains limited to acting as the spokesman for the JCS. The Defense Department has not acted to formalize and institutionalize the chairman as an independent source of military advice with a dedicated staff, CINC support, and responsibilities for assessing the resource program proposals of the combatant commands, services, and defense agencies. Nor have any actions been taken which would alter the structural relationships of the CINCs vis-a-vis the component commands, services, and JCS. In summary, the Department has moved to increase the opportunities for military advice to influence resource allocation decisions without altering the structure which determines the substance of military advice.

> Alternative MA4. NMCS Study option (considered but not recommended by the study): Replace the JCS with a body of National Military Advisers.

The NMCS Study advances the most far-reaching modification of the *employing* arm discussed in the DOS 77-80. Should its more moderate recommendations for strengthening the chairman and the Joint Staff not result in sufficient improvement in joint military advice, the study suggests more drastic measures:

> Solutions of a more fundamental nature directed at resolving the inherent tensions in the current organization, such as separating the joint advice and command functions from those of Service administration, would become necessary. This might be acccmplished by establishing a body of National Military Advisers entirely independent of Service responsibilities, although this would be a drastic and controversial change.[32]

The structure of the Department of Defense with a body of National Military Advisers (NMA) would appear very similar to the basic organization model of figure 2-1, with the NMA replacing the JCS. In fact, however, the structure would be fundamentally different. The strongest link between the *maintaining* and *employing* sides of the model, the dual responsibilities of the service chiefs, would no longer exist. The service chiefs would be limited to responsibility for service functions—organizing, equipping, and training the forces assigned to the combatant commands. The NMA would be responsible for all present JCS functions. Although composed of senior officers chosen from the services, its members would sever service ties upon being elected. In that respect, their position would be analogous to that of the chairman at present; they would be expected to provide military advice from a national perspective.

The NMCS Study advances the NMA option for consideration as a possible future action, not as a recommendation. The study maintains establishing the NMA would overcome many of the problems deriving from the service chiefs' inability as JCS members to contradict service positions. But it also notes many disadvantages: intense service and JCS opposition and resistance; the possibility of discouraging joint cooperation and reopening old interservice conflicts; and the necessity of revising the National Security Act with attendant, possibly hostile, congressional hearings and investigations. In light of these factors, the study concludes the NMA option should be considered only if the less drastic alternatives of institutionalizing the chairman and strengthening the Joint Staff prove insufficient.[33]

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Alternative Approaches to Improving the Joint Staff (JS)

Alternative JS1. NMCS Study recommendation: Foster Joint Staff independence in exercising its responsibilities as the supporting staff of the JCS by lessening the influence of service staffs on its positions, increasing joint control over personnel selection, and adopting other procedural changes.

The NMCS Study depicts the Joint Staff as a virtual captive of the service staffs in developing the staff papers which serve as the basis for JCS decisions. Only a minimum of substantive content survives the process of editorial negotiation and compromise necessary to achieve "agreed language" among the services and Joint Staff. The resulting formal JCS position papers, particularly those which address issues of potential conflict among the services, are almost universally given "low marks" and often considered "irrelevant" by DOD and White House officials who are the intended recipients of the military advice. The study suggests the quality of military advice emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff would improve if Joint Staff *dependence on service staffs diminished* and the *employing* side of the DOD structure possessed more authority to secure talented personnel capable of developing independent joint positions.[34]

The NMCS Study recommends replacing the procedures requiring service coordination on Joint Staff papers with others based on "the principle of editorial integrity for Joint Staff/JCS papers."Although the services would be consulted, the Joint Staff would become "alone responsible" for authoring JCS papers.[35] Initial high level guidance on issues would be provided by the JCS to aid the Joint Staff in developing positions, thus obviating the necessity for protracted negotiations at the more parochial subordinate service staff levels. The study does not, however, suggest suppressing service views. It would have them included as alternatives, or identified as dissenting positions for consideration by the JCS and, subsequently, the secretary of defense and other consumers. Thus the range of options on issues for consideration by senior decision-makers would be expanded and a clearly discernible joint military view delineated.[36]

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The NMCS Study also recommends changing personnel procedures to ensure manning the Joint Staff "with the best qualified officers available." The study insists this objective can be reached only if the existing requirement for "joint duty" as a prerequisite for selection to flag rank is defined more narrowly to require that the best officers serve on the Joint Staff, and is enforced.* In light of the proclivity of the services to place their best officers on the service staffs, the study recommends that enforcement authority in the form of powerful personnel policy weapons be placed in the hands of an officer with a joint perspective, the chairman of the JCS. He would be given the authority to obtain assignment of any officer to the Joint Staff and, in addition to determine exceptions to the joint duty requirement for promotion.[37]

> Alternative JS2.   JCS/services counter to making the joint staff more independent: Achieve the study objective of improving Joint Staff performance *without* altering the requirement for service coordination or sanctioning intervention by the chairman in service personnel procedures.

None of the defense community comments on the studies takes issue with the criticism of Joint Staff performance in preparing the JCS position papers which constitute, upon approval, formal military advice. The OSD respondents further agree with the recommendations which would tend to make the Joint Staff more independent. But the JCS and services disagree with changing the "fundamentally sound" current system of Joint Staff/service cooperative authorship.[38] The services insist their coordination is necessary and should continue. The Air Force argues "it is imperative . . . that the joint product reflect the expertise and advocacy which resides within the Services, which only a collaborative effort can provide."[39] The Marine Corps favors maintaining the "checks and balance inherent in current procedures."[40] The JCS suggests the

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*Under current regulations prescribed in DOD Directive 1320.5, 26 July 1978, "Assignment to Joint Tours of Duty," an officer can fulfill the requirement for joint duty experience by completing an assignment "with a Joint, Combined, Allied, Unified command or staff, a Defense Agency, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense."

solution to improving "the quality and utility of JCS papers" lies in partial adoption of the study recommendations concerning procedural change. It proposes increasing the initial high-level guidance provided the Joint Staff and including a discussion of alternatives in formal JCS position papers.[41] Thus the services and JCS opt for adjusting the present structure internally and oppose modifying the present symbiotic relationship between the Joint Staff and the services.

The reaction of the military respondents to the NMCS Study personnel recommendations is even more vigorous and antipathetic. The services and JCS insist the current Joint Staff system is satisfactory. The services assert they nominate highly qualified officers selected after screening their total manpower assets. This system is preferable, they argue, to giving the chairman authority to obtain the assignment of any officer he chooses. With his limited resources the chairman would be forced to select from the small number of officers known to him, thus incurring the risk of inequities, oversight, and charges of favoritism. Furthermore, in exercising this authority the chairman would inevitably disrupt established career progression patterns, a result contrary to the best interests of the services and individuals concerned.[42]

With respect to the qualifications of the officers nominated for Joint Staff duty, the services indicate their policy is to select candidates from among their most qualified officers. They disagree, however, with the more stringent NMCS Study recommendation that they commit their "most outstanding and highly qualified" officers to the Joint Staff. The Navy suggests the Joint Staff should receive its fair share in competition with other agencies having legitimate needs for the most outstanding officers. The JCS seconds these views. It indicates consideration must be given to the needs of the services and individuals as well as the Joint Staff.[43]

These arguments also provide the basis for opposition to more stringent requirements for joint duty as a prerequisite for promotion. If, as the services claim, their personnel systems adequately manage the task of providing qualified officers for joint assignments, no further changes are necessary. Furthermore, granting the chairman authority over exceptions would be tantamount to giving him a veto authority over promotions to general/flag rank, an unwarranted outside intervention. Exceptions should continue to

be decided by service secretaries who play an integral part in the service promotion process.[44]

Alternative JS3.   Deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration option concerning Joint Staff personnel procedures: Adopt a Joint Staff personnel referral system.

An option providing a middle ground between the NMCS Study recommendations and the service and JCS comments concerning Joint Staff personnel is found in the response of the deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration. Like the other OSD comments, this response recognizes the need to improve the Joint Staff product. And it agrees achieving this objective requires outstanding personnel. But it opposes disruption of the service personnel systems.

Instead, the deputy assistant secretary for administration suggests creating a referral system. The services would nominate a number of well-qualified candidates for each Joint Staff vacancy. The chairman would then make the final selection. In addition, the chairman would have right of first refusal "of all service selectees for joint assignments."[45]

A referral system along these lines would avoid interference with service personnel programs, leaving selection of officers for joint duty in their hands. At the same time, the joint system would have more choice in selecting its personnel than at present. Considering the adamant opposition to the NMCS Study personnel proposals, this option appears to be a more acceptable approach to the study objectives.

Preliminary Assessment of Military Advice Alternatives

Examining the positions concerning military advice strikingly demonstrates the unerring ability of the services and JCS to decipher threats to their organizational interests* in the recommendations and act to protect their *domain, independence,* and *influ-*

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*The organizational interests, as discussed in chapter 2, are influence, domain, essence, independence/autonomy, budget, and morale.

ence. Against the proposals most damaging to their interests, they register outright opposition; against the more moderate, but never theless threatening, they advance counterproposals which would avoid or limit encroachment on organizational interests.

The National Military Advisers alternative, which would alter the present structure most fundamentally by replacing the JCS with a body independent of the services, would be difficult to adopt at present. It is the only specific item singled out for comment in the one-page memorandum which transmits over 40 pages of JCS comments to the secreatary of defense.[46] This alternative would limit the *influence* of the services over joint matters, decrease their range of *independent* action, and circumscribe their broad *domain* which now extends to both sides of the DOD organizational structure. Despite the fact that the NMCS Study does not recommend this alternative, the gravity of the threat elicits a specific JCS rejection. Furthermore, because the NMA concept would result in major changes, intense service and JCS opposition would be joined by powerful elements in the Congress and among military-oriented private interests. These considerations confirm the prudence of the NMCS Study in offering this proposal as merely a possible future alternative if other actions are insufficient. Irrespective of its merits or defects, it is not politically feasible at present.

The services and Joint Chiefs of Staff also reject outright the NMCS Study Joint Staff personnel recommendations. At stake is the organizational interest of each service in maintaining *independence* or *autonomy* in controlling the personnel who together constitute the organization. Also threatened is the interest in controlling one aspect of organizational *morale*, the management of career patterns. Regardless of their interests, however, the substantial service and JCS objections to the study proposals suggest giving preference to the referral system designed to meet the study objectives without interposing the chairman into four separate service personnel systems. A more restrictive definition of joint duty could easily be included as part of the revised personnel procedure. However, the sheer number of officers the services must qualify for flag rank as well as the legitimate requirements of other organizations such as OSD militate against a definition of joint duty limited to a Joint Staff personnel is found in the response of the deputy assistant oeficiencies can have little effect on improving performance if the Joint Staff remains a captive of service influence.

That issue brings the basic question concerning military advice posed by the DOS 77-80 more clearly into focus. Which is the best way to enhance the quality of the military advice provided to the secretary of defense and the president improving the performance of the DOD structure or altering that structure? The issue, based on the studies *and* the comments, is not whether military advice needs to be improved. The JCS, services, and OSD responses all agree with the studies that the performance of the JCS and the Joint Staff should be improved. The issue is whether or not *structural* change is needed. The studies recommend moderate structural change—institutionalizing the chairman (dedicated staff, ties with CINCs) and making the Joint Staff more independent. The services and JCS, recognizing the threat to their organizational interests, favor improved performance without altering the present structure.

The choice among these alternatives is ultimately judgmental and of such import that only a secretary of defense, possessed of the authority and responsibility to organize his department, can decide. In evaluating them he would need to understand their implications for the overall organization of the Department, an issue examined in the analysis of alternative DOD-wide structures in chapters 7 and 8. At this juncture, however, several factors important to an informed assessment are apparent. Consensus is lacking, except on the statement of the problem—inadequate military advice. Both alternatives are workable, in some sense, and politically feasible. Opting to change the structure would be the more difficult course—and more costly in terms of political capital. It would arouse bureaucratic opposition within DOD which would possibly spill over to Congress. But a determined secretary of defense would prevail. His sweeping authority, grounded in legislation, incontrovertibly extends to soliciting military advice from whomever he wishes (including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), requesting changes in Joint Staff procedures, and effecting the other recommendations.[47]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EMPLOYING STRUCTURE AND OTHER DOD ELEMENTS

To be of any value, military advice must receive attention when issues are being decided. It must gain access to have impact.* In addition to faulting the quality of joint military advice, the studies criticize the DOD decisionmaking structures and processes for failing to provide adequate access to the joint military viewpoint. Their recommendations to improve integration of the *employing* arm into policy forums can be grouped into two categories: (1) strengthening the ties between OSD and the joint military side of the structure; and (2) establishing relationships which increase the responsiveness of the *maintaining* side of the Department to the *employing* side.

Alternative Structures for Integrating Joint Military Advice

Alternative I1.   Composite studies recommendation: Make the under secretary of defense for policy principally responsible for OSD-joint military interface on policy matters—planning, policy formulation, implementation, evaluation, and oversight; strengthen the joint military voice in policy formulation and resource decisions of the services and defense agencies.

Joint Military Links to OSD. The recommendations concerning the connection between OSD and the joint military structure are designed to improve defense policy development and implementation. Although these activities are the principal responsibility of OSD, the military should be intimately involved in all of them according to the studies.[49] Optimal OSD-joint military relationships should have a dual character. On the one hand, they should ensure

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*David Truman's insight concerning the prerequisite for interest group influence is no less appropriate in the context of DOD relationships: "Power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, . . . without access to one or more key points of decision in the government. Access, therefore, becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups."[48]

military advice is relevant and has an opportunity to exert influence. This requires that it be developed within a framework cognizant of national objectives and policies and that it have access to decision-making arenas, thus guaranteeing it will be considered when issues are decided. On the other hand, the relationships should provide for civilian oversight of military plans and operational activities to ensure they are consistent with national policy and to provide the necessary feedback for policy evaluation and adjustment.[50]

The four studies which address joint military integration all imply or overtly recommend that the focal point for these strengthened relationships between OSD and the military *employing* elements should be the under secretary of defense for policy (USD(P)). Secretary of Defense Brown, who created the position in 1977, stated that the USD(P) "will be my principal adviser and staff assistant for all matters concerned with political-military affairs, arms limitation negotiations, and the integration of departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives."[51] At the time the studies were being conducted the manner in which the USD(P) would fulfill these responsibilities was still being developed. Consequently, the studies provide recommendations designed to elaborate the charter of the USD(P).

The studies conclude the intra-Department policy responsibilities of the USD(P) should be expanded. They propose the USD(P) be made responsible for the planning, formulation, and articulation of defense policy, and that he play a major role in policy implementation, oversight, and evaluation. In addition, the USD(P) should become responsible for integrating policy between OSD and the joint military elements, a coordinative function characterized by continuous dialogue permeating all aspects of the policy process. This role would facilitate the "realistic participation" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commanders, and the under secretary for policy in the preliminary planning phase of the planning, programming, and budgeting system recommended by the Defense Resource Management (DRM) Study.[52]

The studies recommend specific mechanisms to effect this broad charter. The Departmental Headquarters (DH) Study recommends that the USD(P) develop a concise Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) which would govern the program-oriented and voluminous Consolidated Guidance prepared elsewhere in OSD. The DPG

would also provide the JCS and Joint Staff with "specific national security policy guidance, which sets the objectives our forces should be capable of attaining," recommended by the NMCS Study.[53] A new planning office under the USD(P) would concentrate on long-range and contingency planning related to the formulation of defense policy guidance.[54] In addition, in the conception of the National Military Command Structure (NMCS) Study, the USD(P) would coordinate the annual DOD study, analysis, and gaming program which often provides the basis for key policy proposals.[55] Also relevant are other proposals, examined in chapter 7, which would consolidate the major policy-related offices under the USD(P).

The proposals concerning the Defense Policy Guidance, the planning office, and chairman, JCS membership on the Defense Resources Board and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, discussed earlier, are the principal mechanisms advanced by the studies to integrate the joint military voice into planning and policy formulation. Together they are intended to ensure the relevance of military advice and establish vehicles for increasing its influence. The DH Study specifically recommends that the planning office be "formally linked" to the chairman and that the DPG be developed "working in close coordination" with him. The study suggests these recommendations "should enhance the military voice by an organizational connection not now existing and bring military planning into concert with political perspectives."[56]

Other Measures. Additional measures are recommended to effect policy oversight of military plans and operations, thereby ensuring they are consistent with presidential and secretarial guidance and providing the feedback necessary for informed policy evaluation and adjustment. The NMCS Study recommends the secretary of defense, his deputy, and key assistants regularly review current JCS and Joint Staff military plans "for contingencies/crisis, conventional wars, and tactical and strategic nuclear war." The USD(P) would "act for the secretary in monitoring" these plans.[57] In addition, the study recommends the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which defines the organizational structure and responsibilities of the unified and specified commands, be reviewed by the secretary of defense and JCS at least every two years.[58] The UCP "is designed to reflect perceived military and political 'realities' at a particular moment in time." Considering the rapid changes in these "realities"

the plan requires secretarial as well as JCS attention formally and periodically.[59] Finally, as previously discussed, both the NMCS and DH Studies recommend changes in the readiness reporting system which would facilitate OSD policy evaluation and adjustment. These changes include: overall assessments of theater readiness; CINC views on corrective actions; and, systems which would facilitate OSD policy evaluation and adjustment by providing overall assessments of theater readiness, CINC views on corrective actions, and chairman, JCS prioritization of theater proposals.*[60]

In summary, strong links between OSD and the joint military elements would be fashioned by elaborating the role of the USD(P) and linking his planning and policy functions with the chairman. These relationships would ensure military advice is relevant and military plans and operations are consistent with national plans and objectives. They would also provide better access for military advice into policy planning and formulation. Access in the specific resource allocation areas of programming, budgeting, and acquisition would be provided by the chairman's membership on the Defense Resources Board and the Defense System Acquisition Review Council.

Joint Military Relationships with Support Organizations

The relationships between the *employing* side of the Department and the *maintaining* side are also the subject of several recommendations intended to increase the responsiveness of the "input" or support elements of DOD to the combatant commands

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*Another study prepared at the president's request under the auspices of the President's Reorganization Project recommends similar actions to increase guidance and oversight of military planning. The National Security Policy Integratic Study, which examines executive branch organization and processes for dealing with "issues requiring interagency or Presidential consideration," includes the following recommendations:

> Strengthen current efforts, focused on the office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy, to provide better political/foreign policy guidance to military planners, and to review completed military plans.

> Review the adequacy of current military planning responsibilities for politically sensitive areas, especially the Middle East."

responsible for "ouput." Two powerful recommendations which
would significantly enhance the joint military voice vis-a-vis the
services have already been covered. First, the proposal to establish
a readiness reporting system through the chairman-CINC axis
would mandate an independent joint military position, possibly
conflicting with service readiness assessm..nts and constrained
resource recommendations. The second proposal—that the chair-
man independently recommend priorities to the secretary of
defense on service program and budget initiatives above a min-
imum level—would lead to a novel development in US military
affairs: conflicts between the resource allocation recommendations
of the services and the institutionalized chairman—CINCs would be
explicitly identified and the service proposals would be challenged
by the joint military alternative.[62]

The Defense Agency Review is even more thorough in recom-
mending ways to introduce military combat considerations into the
policy deliberations and actions of the defense agencies supporting
the operating forces. It recommends the under secretary for policy,
in coordination with the JCS, provide policy guidance specifically
tailored for the defense agencies which ensures their sensitivity to
national interests, potential threats, and resource constraints.
Moreover, it proposes that the chairman

> provide recommendations to the Secretary on the programs
> and budgets of the Agencies supporting the operating forces, in
> parallel with those of the Services proposed by the Steadman
> [NMCS] Report. [In addition.] insure appropriate staffing for
> this purpose.[63]

To guarantee the responsiveness of support policies to output
requirements, policy councils for each agency, consisting of repre-
sentatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the services, would be established. The JCS and
appropriate unified and specified commanders would review
agency charters and plans to ensure they are current, adequate for
crisis conditions, and consistent with joint war planning. Finally, the
agencies would be required to institute periodic readiness tests and
participate more extensively in JCS and operating forces exercises.[64]

Alternative I2.   Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program
Analysis and Evaluation (ASD(PA&E))
status quo option: Reject the USD(P)
charter proposals related to the ASD(PA&E)—
authorship of the DPG, studies and analysis
coordination, absorption of PA&E.

In general, the study recommendations dealing with improving
the integration of the joint military voice with OSD and the *maintain-
ing* arm receive a favorable response throughout the Depa..ment of
Defense. Only the assistant secretary of defense for program analy-
sis and evaluation (ASD(PA&E)) and Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) voiced outright opposition. And their objections are limited
to the recommendations which affect their organizations. The ASD
(PA&E) objects to losing independence with respect to the studies
and analysis program and the PA&E-authored Consolidated Guid-
ance (which would be subject to the Defense Policy Guidance).[..]
The Defense Logistics Agency opposes, as unnecessary "layering,"
the imposition of a policy council composed largely of outside
officials to chart its course.[66] The JCS and services strongly support
the study *objectives* and many of the specific proposals but, as
discussed under Alternative I3 below, offer a different approach on
key recommendations consistent with their position on military
advice. Finally, Department actions, discussed in Alternative I4.
demonstrate the studies struck a responsive chord in OSD.

The reasons advanced by PA&E in opposition to change
deserve examination, however, before turning to more positive
alternatives. The organizational interests of this office suggest
PA&E would oppose the study proposals. Subordinating one of its
principal products, the Consolidated Guidance (CG), to the Defense
Policy Guidance (DPG) and requiring under secretary for policy
coordination of its studies and analysis would undermine PA&E
influence. Although the ASD(PA&E) acknowledges his opposition
may be interpreted in terms of organizational interests, he offers
other arguments as his motivation.* Those addressing the DPG
proposals are of particular interest.[..]

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*The assistant secretary of defense for program analysis and evalua-
tions (ASD (PA&E)) who authored the response discussed in this section
was Mr. Russell Murray.

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The assistant secretary for PA&E faults the conception of the decisionmaking process which prompted the Defense Policy Guidance recommendation. The studies accept the conventional view of the decisionmaking process as a "linear, sequential, one-time-through-from-the-top-to-the-bottom" exercise in which the "obvious and essential first step is to decide on policy."[68] This concept underlies the NMCS Study statement that clearly articulated national security policy is a prerequisite to sound military planning and advice. It is also the basis for the DH Study recommendation that a Defense Policy Guidance document be prepared annually to govern preparation of the more detailed and pragmatic Consolidated Guidance.[69]

On the other hand, the ASD(PA&E) maintains that policy, objectives, strategy, plans, programs, budget, costs, schedules, forces, and capabilities

> are all inextricably bound into a single entity and it simply makes no sense whatever to think that any one of these components can be lifted out and treated in isolation Therefore, the linear, sequential view of decisionmaking makes equally little sense to me.

The decisionmaking process is in fact iterative. "It simply cannot be—and indeed never has been, is not now, and never will be—a simple linear sequence starting with policy and ending with cost."[71] Capabilities, for example, especially in the near term, may determine policy. Consequently, it makes no more sense to start with treating policy in isolation than it does capabilities, or any of the items in the middle, such as budgets. According to this "iterative, integrated, single ball-of-wax/can-of-worms theory," decisionmaking is the product of developing alternative policies with their assorted programs and comparing them on the basis of all relevant considerations, such as cost and effectiveness.[72]

These statements concerning the decisionmaking process are remarkable as much for the perceptiveness of their insights as for the wide margin by which they miss their intended mark, the two studies in question. The assistant secretary for PA&E recognizes decisionmaking requires skillful integration of all parts of the organization to achieve balance among the many competing, diverse demands In DOD, decisionmaking requires accommodating capa-

bilities and objectives; tailoring the "push" generated by technological opportunities on the basis of an enlightened understanding of the priorities most likely to optimize the accomplishment of organizational purposes; and merging the empirical evidence of operational experience with the deductive processes required to anticipate political expectations and objectives. But this description of the policy process more nearly describes the study concept than *the straw man* erected by ASD(PA&E) through selective quotations.

Valid arguments against a Defense Policy Guidance may exist, but those advanced by the assistant secretary are not among them. A major theme of the studies is the necessity to increase the integration of decisionmaking—the need for a more capable joint military view, and increased advocacy of that view—to furnish decisionmakers with alternatives based on both service and joint perspectives. Claiming the study conception is not iterative is unjustified. The defense planning, programming, and budgeting process is, and would remain, cyclical, several cycles at different stages underway at any one time, with one cycle completed each year. The DPG would be based on the results of the previous cycle and amended through integrated and coordinated inter- and intra-departmental efforts. Moreover, as noted earlier, a principal criticism made by the DRM Study is that the feedback required for iterative "single ball-of-wax" policymaking or adjustment is inadequate. The study recommendations address this problem."

> Alternative I3. JCS/services approach to increased joint military integration: Accept the proposals concerning the undersecretary of defense for policy and the defense agencies with these modifications: (1) employ the JCS staff structure, not the chairman, to establish the joint interface with OSD; (2) increase OSD oversight of military planning, but far less than recommended by the studies.

If any of the elements of DOD might tend to view the decisionmaking process as the "linear, sequential, one-time-through" exercise which the assistant secretary, PA&E discusses, it would logically be the military. The quest for service *autonomy* within a system of civilian control is more easily realized (theoretically) when the

civilian "masters" enunciate clear and concise policy and leave it to
the military to implement that policy, unfettered by political "inter-
ference." Not unexpectedly, the service and JCS discussions of the
proposals related to the under secretary for policy elements of this
thinking. For example, the Navy supports the proposals because
they will result in "more sharply define   statements of national
interests, policies, and policy guidance n   ssary to enable military
planners to "develop operations and con   jency plans to meet the
objectives of current US national policy   interpreted by the plan-
ning office." [4]

The military responses, nevertheless, demonstrate a sophisti-
cated appreciation of the "real" decisionmaking process described
by the ASD(PA&E). Furthermore, contrasting with the PA&E inter-
pretation, the military responses correctly identify the study pro-
posals with the iterative conception of policymaking. The Army sup-
ports the planning office as a means to effect "continuing readjust-
ment of policy to resources and capabilities" and the Navy response
states that the planning office would "help tie together international
political considerations, resource allocation, and military plan-
ning." The Air Force discusses the needed linkage between policy
planning and program development which the under secretary for
policy would facilitate. [5] The JCS response emphasizes the need for
a focal point for policy advice.

> The office of the USDP should assure that national security
> policy and objectives are clearly and cogently disseminated
> and that national security objectives and defense policy are
> accurately reflected in the Consolidated Guidance and other
> PPBS documents. The policy planning office would provide a
> long-needed focal point for policy advice in support of long-
> range and contingency planning. The focus of this office should
> be on articulating policy guidance, and it should be responsible
> for insuring that defense policy is consistent with national pol-
> icy and that all DOD elements carry out that policy in their
> planning functions. [6]

In sum, the military responses envision the articulation of defense
policy as the synthesizing element in the decision process which
integrates political considerations, capabilities, requirements, and
resource constraints. To serve this function, defense policy must
necessarily be responsive to changes in the variables, such as force
structure requirements, which it serves to integrate. The formulation

and adaptation of policy is to be the responsibility of the under secretary for policy.

The services and JCS also support the expanded joint military role envisioned by the studies as a component of the increased emphasis on integrating the DOD policy process. Their responses indicate they fully understand the importance of access to decision arenas. They strongly support all of the recommendations which would increase the military interface with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the defense agencies. " At a minimum, the services/ JCS anticipate military officers will form a significant part of the staff of the OSD planning office.[78] The Navy boldly suggests that the head of the planning office be a military officer.[79] The JCS endorses the recommendations which stress strong interaction among the defense agencies, OSD, and the joint elements as a means of resolving policy and program issues related to *employing* activities in war or crisis.[80]

The major differences beween the studies and the services/ JCS, once again, hinge on the question of which *source* of military advice will gain access. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, possibly concerned the chairman will not be restricted to his role as its spokesman, suggests lower ranking Joint Staff officers form the linkages proposed in the studies. Rather than formal ties with the chairman, as envisioned by the DH Study, "the planning office should interface directly with the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, who is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with responsibility for recommendations concerning long-range and contingency planning.[81] Rather than close coordination with the chairman in developing the DPG, the JCS suggests "a more appropriate link . . . would be with the Director, Joint Staff."[82] Although the JCS supports coordination of the DOD study program, it recommends that an official of the Office of the JCS (not the chairman) be a member of a senior advisory group formed for this purpose.[83] And the JCS specifically rejects the study proposal that the chairman, in consultation with the USD(P) and JCS, manage the part of the studies program conducted by the Joint Staff, contract agencies, services, and the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency.

> It would be inappropriate for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be involved in the line management of a study program which infringes upon the requirements and resources of the Military Department Secretaries and Service chiefs.[84]

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Finally, the JCS would amend the Defense Agency Review recommendation that the chairman's responsibility for independent military advice on resource matters (recommended by the NMCS Study) extend to the programs and budgets of those defense agencies which support operating forces. Consistent with its intention that he remain its spokeman only, the JCS proposes that the chairman "supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, should have an expanded role."[85]

The subtle differences between the study recommendations and JCS/service formulations concerning increased OSD oversight of military plans and operations also reveal the attempt to safeguard existing *domains*. The NMCS Study discusses an active OSD review role led by the Under Secretary for Policy but personally involving the secretary of defense at specified intervals.[86] The military responses agree with the need to assure plans are consistent with policy guidelines. However, in their formulation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would control the "review." The OSD role would be passive. Civilian officials would receive informational briefings on operational plans. The JCS would review the Unified Command Plan and forward recommendations to the secretary as required. The JCS would also author and present informational briefings on operational plans to a very limited number of OSD officials with a need to know and only on request or when some factor caused significant changes in the plans. The briefings would address assumptions, broad operational concepts, objectives, and general scenarios.[87] Despite the superficial support for the study recommendations, the military formulation differs fundamentally from the study conception of what effective oversight of military planning entails.

> Alternative I4. DOD approach: Strengthen the internal OSD policy structure, thereby increasing opportunities for refining the linkage between the joint structure and OSD. But avoid secretary-of-defense-directed changes to the JCS structure and its procedures.

The influence of the DOS 77-80 is most apparent in DOD actions concerning the under secretary for policy (USD(P)) which closely parallel study recommendations. The somewhat vague

general concept of the USD(P) position which prevailed at the outset has received articulation through several stages of evolution. The position progressed from an unfilled authorization throughout all of 1977, to an initial incumbent with a small immediate staff and relatively minor influence, then through a period of rapid development in which a new under secretary expanded and broadened his charter and finally established firm control over a significant portion of the OSD staff. Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) was published under the sponsorship of the USD(P) to provide the framework for the Fiscal Year 1982 planning, programming, and budgeting process. A new planning office, now headed by an assistant secretary of defense for international security policy (ASD(ISP)), reports to the secretary of defense through the under secretary for policy. Configured with both functional and special projects staffs, the ASD(ISP) office is intended to be sufficiently flexible to deal comprehensively with selected high-priority areas of interest, such as NATO and strategic arms limitations negotiations. At the same time, the office performs the continuing integrative and coordinative tasks su ʰ ʾs those related to force planning and nuclear requirements, ᵢch are inherent in planning the evolution of defense policy.

The under secretary for policy has also assumed a number of responsibilities in areas not antᵢʾipated in the studies. These include mobilization, communicatᵢᵤns, and security policy. These elaborations of the under secretary's responsibilities substantiate Secretary Brown's statement in his *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1981* that the office of the USD(P) is becoming the focal point for the formulation and integration of DOD plans and policy.[88]

In 1980 the incumbent under secretary moved to initiate some aspects of the policy oversight of military plans recommended by the NMCS Study. Selected contingency plans were prepared for review in OSD. Whether these first steps will lead to comprehensive periodic review of the major plans is uncertain. This development will depend in large part on the managerial initiatives of the under secretary, and the degree to which he is backed by the secretary of defense. In any case, the review procedure for contingency plans, to the extent any actions have been taken, has developed more nearly along the lines recommended by the NMCS Study than those suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Office of the Secretary of

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Defense has moved to provide policy oversight on its own terms rather than accept informational briefings as suggested by the JCS.

The congruence between the study recommendations and corresponding DOD measures to increase the influence of the joint military position vis-a-vis other elements of the organization is less striking. No action has been taken with respect to defense agencies or making the chairman formally responsible for recommending priorities to the secretary of defense for service program proposals. Moreover, the chairman's precise role in the extensive and growing interaction between the OSD policy complex and the Joint Staff is unclear. Although strong informal ties now couple the Joint Staff plans and policy directorate (J-5) with the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy office, no formal link between the chairman and that office has been established, as recommended by the Departmental Headquarters Study. Nor does it appear the Defense Policy Guidance was developed "in close consultation" with the chairman (although J-5 played a part).[89] On the other hand, the chairman's informal relationships with the undersecretary for policy and other principal OSD officials, as well as the secretary of defense, afford him a great many opportunities to influence defense policy and resource allocation decisions, albeit as the spokesman for the JCS.

Preliminary Assessment of the Integrating Alternatives

Substantial consensus within the Department on the need for a policy focal point in OSD with a planning capability and responsibility to articulate defense policy guidance facilitated Secretary Brown's consolidation of these functions in a strong under secretary for policy. As a result, OSD is configured to effect the refined and strengthened linkage with joint military elements envisioned by the studies. Moreover, the *influence* of the increasingly powerful under secretary for policy depends in large part on developing a productive OSD-joint military relationship. Consequently, additional initiatives from the under secretary to elaborate the joint military-OSD ties can be expected. However, an absence of consensus on the recommendations intended to reconfigure the joint elements results from conflicting organizational interest. Thus there are intangible boundaries to the evolution of close OSD-joint relationships. The JCS correctly views expanded OSD oversight of military plans and expansion of the chairman's formal role as chal-

lenges to the *influence*, *domain*, and *autonomy* of the present service-oriented system.

Something more than a reluctance to act in the absence of consensus is evident in the pattern of DOD actions in response to the other study recommendations on integration. Comments from throughout the Department generally favor the recommendations concerning increased involvement of the *employing* elements in defense agency activities related to combat support. Yet no actions have been taken in these areas. Secretary Brown and his OSD staff were apparently reluctant to direct actions which would result in organizational realignments in other elements of the Department of Defense.* Thus, despite internal OSD measures to integrate policy under the purview of an under secretary—which can be characterized as bold and far-reaching—no actions have been taken since the studies were published to effect changes elsewhere in the Department. Possibly, the explanation is that the proposed actions were, and are, perceived as unnecessary. More likely, however, it is because inherent in the integration alternatives is the question of the price of mandated structural change—whether the potential benefits justify the certain costs. Divisiveness, disruption, and diminished cooperation and teamwork would inevitably attend "interference" by the secretary of defense in the structural alignments of the JCS, services, and defense agencies.

Those considerations raise the question of the political feasibility of the integration proposals. An assessment of sources of support and opposition to the various recommendations suggests a secretary of defense could successfully implement the proposals and find sufficient support for his position in the executive branch and Congress. The question is more appropriately viewed as one of political advisability which will be considered as a part of the examination of alternative DOD-wide organizational structures in chapters 7 and 8.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

One of the purposes stated by Congress in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 (which amended the National Security Act of

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*As this is written, it is too early to draw conclusions concerning Secretary Weinberger's approach to issues of this nature.

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1947) was to provide for the establishment of "a clear and direct line of command" to the unified and specified commands.[90] At the insistence of President Eisenhower, the legislatively mandated chain of command does not include the service secretaries, individual service chiefs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is simple and direct: president to secretary of defense to unified or specified commander.

The complexities of the "real" world, however, challenge the elegance of the legislated chain of command. A seemingly clear presidential decision to commit forces to establish a blockade, free a ship, gain release of hostages in an embassy, or protect US property in a foreign country, quickly explodes into myriad detailed military questions—which forces, in what strength, nature of support arrangements, designation of reinforcements, mobilization considerations, possible contingencies, etc. A central entity is necessary to provide the decisionmakers the available alternative answers to these questions. Furthermore, an extensive, extremely sophisticated, and continuously operating worldwide military communications system is required to gather unit force status information necessary to formulate the alternatives as well as transmit orders to the field. The need for a *military* interface between the forces in the field and the civilian decisionmakers is apparent.

Congress did not specify the character of the interface between the secretary of defense and the CINCs, however. Whether inadvertent or intentional, the legislation left the detailed structuring of the civilian-military interface in the chain of command to be determined as a matter of policy by the secretary of defense. On the day the 1958 act became effective, Secretary Neil McElroy established the structure which all succeeding secretaries have accepted. DOD Directive 5100.1 places the JCS in the chain of command:

> The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands. Orders to such commanders will be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.[91]

This authority delegated by the secretary complements and supplements *responsibilities specifically assigned to the JCS by Con-*

gress in the 1958 act. These latter include providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces, preparing strategic plans, and assigning logistic responsibilities.[92] As a result of this powerful mix of delegated and legislated responsibilities, the JCS is far more than an advisory body; it is firmly established as an integral part of the chain of command.

The interposition of a group into a command chain originally intended to run through individuals from the president to each CINC has the effect of multiplying the number of possible command relationships. The secretary of defense, or even the president, may communicate directly with a CINC. Or the entire JCS may develop a working consensus which enables it to act as the corporate translator, interpreter, and dispatcher of presidential and secretarial decisions. At times, though not recently, each member of the JCS has assumed responsibility for two or more combatant commands. This mode, in effect, places the service chief back into the chain with direct links to the command "owned" by his service: PACOM and LANTCOM for the Navy; EUCOM, REDCOM and SOUTHCOM, the Army; SAC and MAC, the Air Force. A final pattern is for the chairman, on an informal basis, to act for the JCS in handling day-to-day chain of command responsibilities.

Consider this melange of possible command links from the standpoint of the commander of forces in the field. The actual source of instructions may be unclear. All are issued "by authority and direction of the Secretary," but the source could be the president, secretary of defense, the JCS as a whole, or a service chief. Just as important is the problem of communications from the field to higher authority. Obviously, the secretary's span of control cannot accommodate individual and continual management of the seven CINCs. Their communications channel is, of necessity, to the JCS complex. But where? To the member of the JCS (service chief) most affected, the JCS as a body, the chairman? And by what means are these communications, however addressed, collated and relayed to the secretary of defense who is by law next in the chain of command above the CINCs?

Questions such as these highlight the imprecision of the chain of command and cast doubt on its responsiveness to the president and secretary of defense. True, the chairman presently acts as the

military interface between civilian authorities and the field. But this informal delegation from the JCS could be discontinued at any time. And it probably would be, should the chairman stray from his spokesman role or should a crisis materialize which arrayed the chairman against other chiefs on contentious issues such as, for example, the choice between Marine Corps and Army troops for a Middle East contingency. In these circumstances, the JCS, having reclaimed chain of command responsibilities from the chairman and finding itself compelled to concentrate on resolving divisive issues, might well revert to the pattern of parceling out day-to-day responsibilities for each command among the chiefs.

Undoubtedly, considerations such as these, as well as its finding that the joint system is dominated by the services, prompted the NMCS Study command and control criticisms. To recapitulate, following are the principal complaints. (1) Command relationships are imprecise, the principal problem being the imposition of a committee, the JCS, in the chain of command, as opposed to a single individual who could act as the agent of the secretary of defense as well as a spokesman for the CINCs. (2) The CINCs do not have sufficient influence in determining the composition of the forces they are responsible for employing in wartime. (3) The joint aspects of military activities are neglected. Joint doctrine, which prescribes the methods for employing unified air, sea, and ground forces, is developed by the services. Joint training receives insufficient support. Mobilization capabilities, a joint responsibility, are inadequate. (4) Considering the tendency for political leaders to become personally involved in crises such as the Mayaguez incident and the evacuation of US personnel from Beirut in 1976, crisis management procedures should be streamlined and the flexibility of the command and control structure increased.

Alternative Command and Control (CC) Structures

Alternative CC1. Composite studies recommendation: Streamline the chain of command by designating the chairman of the JCS as the agent of the secretary of defense in supervising the activities of the CINCs; by increasing the authority of the CINCs, making them more independent of the services and more

powerful vis-a-vis their components; and by adopting other measures favoring joint military approaches.

The principal recommendations which the NMCS Study advances to overcome the most serious command and control criticisms have already been covered in the section on military advice. The institutionalization of the chairman and CINCs would extend to the chain of command. The study recommends the secretary formally designate the chairman as his agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs. Present directives, including DOD Directive 5100.1, would be amended to state the secretary will normally transmit orders to the CINCs through the chairman. The JCS would continue to act as the military staff to the secretary and would be consulted by the chairman when time permits.[93]

Measures to consolidate the authority of the CINCs and make them more independent of the services would complement this streamlining at the center. The practice of associating each CINC position with a particular service would be discontinued. An officer's suitability for joint command would figure in CINC selection as well as the mission, forces assigned, and service affiliation.[94] As discussed in an earlier section, the concept of readiness evaluation and reporting advanced by the NMCS Study would enable each CINC to go beyond relatively simple assessments of deficiencies to recommendations concerning how resources should be allocated to correct them. With the chairman integrating their recommendations and championing their interests, the CINCs' influence over the composition of their forces would increase significantly.[95]

Consolidating unified command support functions, prop for DOD consideration by both the NMCS and DRM Studies, would increase the dependence of components on the unified commanders. The NMCS Study proposes a special study of component commands to identify redundancies in functions and personnel, particularly in the area of logistics. The study infers consolidation under the CINCs may be advisable.[96] The DRM Study focuses on that part of logistics support related to maintenance and repair of combat unit equipment. It recommends future logistics structures be designed to consolidate off-equipment support of this nature at intermediate locations under the control of the theater commander. This arrangement, the study maintains, would facilitate the ability to

reallocate resources across combat units and "weight the battle" in terms of logistics support as well as combat units.[97]

Recommendations which would make the Readiness Command (REDCOM) a principal source and progenitor of joint military methods and procedures provide further evidence of the NMCS Study support for increasing the independence and influence of the joint elements. REDCOM would assume a broader, more active role in developing joint doctrine for all forces, thus challenging the hold of the services on this cherished means of maintaining organizational *domain*. Expanded REDCOM joint training excercises would provide opportunities to develop, test, perfect, and disseminate doctrine. REDCOM would also become the focal point for coordination of the "day-to-day aspects" of the mobilization and deployment planning of the unified and specified commands.[98]

Two sets of NMCS Study recommendations emphasize increased responsiveness of the streamlined chain of command to the president and secretary of defense during crises. First, the study proposes that command arrangements pertaining to potential trouble spots such as the Middle East and Korea should be sufficiently flexible to allow direct control from Washington as well as through the various links in the chain of command.[99] Second, the study recommends regular crisis management and exercises at the highest levels to familiarize political decisionmakers with the capabilities and limitations of the command and control system. Moreover, it suggests procedures be developed which facilitate rapid and precise tailoring of the chain of command at the outset of any crisis.[100]

In summary, the studies recommend command and control be improved by placing reliance on a single responsible individual at each level, expanding the authority and independence of joint elements, and increasing responsiveness to the National Command Authorities.

Alternative CC2   JCS/services counter to the military chain of command recommendations which would focus responsibilities on the chairman-CINC axis: Improve the relationship of both the chairman and the JCS with the CINCs; reject major changes in CINC status and other proposals for structural changes.

Replacing the JCS with the chairman in the chain of command is the most sensitive command and control study proposal. Surprisingly, the Army concurs with this recommendation, dismissing it as merely a formalization of the manner in which the chain of command presently operates.[101] The Navy, however, cautions that "any attempt to strengthen and isolate the chairman from the JCS corporate body should be carefully weighed."[102] The Marine Corps adamantly opposes the proposal, providing as rationale a penetrating insight into its implications.

> To designate the CJCS as the agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs raises the potential for creating a de facto power structure consisting of the CJCS, the CINCs and a special Joint Staff selected by the Chairman. This structure, if institutionalized, could assume a special mantle of creditability and authority stemming from the alleged void of service bias that would impact adversely on the statutorily grounded authority and prerogatives of the secretaries of the military departments and the service chiefs.[103]

The JCS finds common ground among these multifarious views with the formula which is by now familiar: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with enhancing the role of both the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their relationship with the unified and specified commanders."[104] Although acknowledging it may be necessary to formalize the chairman's role in the military interface between the secretary and the CINCs for the purpose of transmitting orders and instructions, the JCS emphasizes the chairman "will continue to act as the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their corporate advisory role."[105] Thus the issue, once again, is whether the chairman will be assigned responsibilities independent of the JCS.

The services and JCS react ambivalently to increasing the CINCs' status. They agree the CINCs should participate in determining requirements of assigned forces. Furthermore, the JCS and services agree that readiness evaluation needs improvement. They emphasize, however, studies underway are developing methodologies to assess total force capabilities which will correct readiness evaluation deficiencies. But their comments do not indicate the new methodologies will alter the CINCs' involvement in any way. The

cornerstone of the NMCS Study recommendation, creating an independent CINC evaluative role, is completely omitted from discussion in the service and JCS responses. In these circumstances, any revised readiness system is unlikely to approximate the concept proposed by the study.[106]

Nor is it likely CINC selection processes will change. The chief of naval operations acknowledges the selection system is based on service affiliation and argues that (1) change could "adversely impact on statutory grade limits by Service," i.e., it would disrupt the allocation of four-star officers among the services; (2) rotation among the services would preclude grooming a suitable relief; and (3) service affiliation does reflect consideration of other factors, such as mission and forces assigned."[9] The JCS, on the other hand, states current procedures do not restrict assignments to a specific service and concludes selection of commanders of unified commands "should continue to be made on the basis of qualification, giving due regard to mission and forces assigned."[108]

Maintaining the status quo also characterizes the services/JCS position on theater support. The NMCS Study recommends a special inquiry into the advisability of consolidating some support functions now performed by each component command as a means of reducing redundancies and thereby increasing efficiency.[109] Any realignment along these lines would also have the effect of strengthening the unified commander's position vis-a-vis the components and, indirectly, the services. That eventuality is not lost on the services and JCS. They support, pro forma, the objective of identifying and reducing unnecessary redundancies, of course, but they do not include consolidation in the category of possible actions to achieve the objective.

The responses convey a profound skepticism that consolidated support at the unified level could "take into account the unique missions and requirements of each headquarters." The JCS echoes the Navy contention that "any reductions in component commands are likely to be offset by expanding the CINC staff."[110] The Army implies consolidated support at the unified command level might decrease wartime effectiveness."[111] In response to the DRM Study, the services and JCS insist theater commanders already have the authority to reallocate logistics support. (The Navy, however,

acknowledges naval commanders are unable to exercise this authority because they lack an information base which would apprise them of the resources available for reallocation.) The services and JCS express interest in further study of the advisability of concentrating logistics support for equipment maintenance at the component (as opposed to the unit or unified command) level.[12] The JCS declines, however, to initiate further study of consolidation at the unified command level, opting instead to evaluate studies underway for "opportunities to achieve greater efficiency in operations."[13]

The services and JCS are no more enthusiastic about establishing REDCOM as the well-spring of thought and training on joint military matters. Additional mobilization functions, along lines proposed by the NMCS Study, have been assigned to the command. But this action entailed delegation of responsibilities formerly handled primarily by the JCS and Joint Staff. With the exception of the Air Force, the services and JCS uniformly oppose assigning REDCOM doctrinal responsibilities now performed by the services or even allowing it to share these responsibilities. [14] The Navy and Marine Corps would concede the command "an increased doctrinal role for those operations in which REDCOM routinely participates, and for which no Service has current responsibility."[15] However parsimonious that proposal may appear, it is more generous than the JCS position. Although REDCOM should play a significant role in developing joint doctrine, according to the JCS, that role should continue, as at present, to be one in which the command identifies "shortcomings/voids in joint doctrine and refer[s] the problem to the approriate agency for resolution." The JCS concludes current procedures assigning responsibilities to the services or other agencies "best equipped to develop doctrine and resolve issues" should remain unchanged.[16]

The cornerstone of an increased joint training role for RED-COM is greater participation by the Navy and Marine Corps, according to the NMCS Study.[17] These services, however, cast doubt on the feasibility of the proposal. The Navy cites the priority for its units to train and operate with the commands to which they are assigned—LANTCOM, PACOM, and EUCOM—and "rules out any significant change in current practice."[18] On the other hand, the Army and Air Force agree increased sea service participation is necessary.[19] The JCS concurs with the recommendation but leaves it to the princi-

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pals to implement: "The Navy and Marine Corps, in conjuction with USREDCOM, will seek ways to increase participation in USRED-COM exercises of mutual benefit."[120] In these circumstances, it appears likely the Navy position will prevail and no significant change will result.

Turning from areas of opposition to support, the services and JCS applaud recommendations which would improve command and control during crises. They maintain the present structure is sufficiently flexible to allow a contingency to be handled directly from Washington as well as through the existing chain of command. However, they uniformly caution that, although this capability exists, prudence suggests the existing chain of command be used where possible. They strongly support the recommendations that the chain of command be clearly delineated at the highest level at the outset of a crisis and that all decisions be recorded in writing, even where initially transmitted verbally. Finally, these responses emphasize that decisionmakers, such as secretaries of defense and state, the president, and their advisers, should understand the rudiments of the worldwide military command and control system capabilities and procedures so that they can skillfully use the system during crises. Consequently, the services and JCS strongly support proposals to increase participation of senior officials in exercises to achieve those results.[121]

Surveying the JCS and service positions on the variety of command and control recommendations yields responses which range from strong support to outright rejection. Unifying the responses, however, is an underlying willingness, even eagerness, on the part of the services and JCS to correct deficiencies which mar the performance of the present organization coupled with firm resistance to any proposal which would alter the structure of that organization.

> Alternative CC3. A composite option based on several OSD officials' responses: Increase the command and control responsibilities of the chairman consistent with study recommendations— but possibly without changing his formal status; consolidate unified command support under a single-manager service; adopt study proposals concerning strengthening the CINCs and other issues.

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Comments by OSD officials on the command and control proposals indicate general agreement with the studies. On the most controversial issue, they support increasing the chairman's role in the chain of command. However, the general counsel suggests it may be desirable to accomplish that objective informally because the 1958 legislation stipulates the chairman "may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces."[122]

The response by the assistant secretary for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics (ASD(MRA&L)) advances an alternative method of consolidating common support functions within each unified command. He proposes each CINC designate one service as the common support logistics agency for the entire command. A similar single service system for a designated area was finally adopted in Vietnam after the disadvantages of four separate supply lines converging on a small area became overbearing, he notes. Further drawing on the Vietnam experience, the assistant secretary emphasizes these realignments need to be accomplished during peacetime rather than waiting for wartime to force changes.

Consolidating maintenance of combat unit equipment, however, poses problems the DRM Study did not address, according to the ASD(MRA&L). He expresses concern about the vulnerability of consolidated facilities, the requirements for additional in-theater air transport and communications, and the associated costs of change. Consequently, although agreeing theater-level control offers a number of attractive benefits, he suggests careful study on a case-by-case basis before adopting this proposal.[123]

Alternative CC4.   DOD approach: Maintain the status quo.

Although the principal command and control proposals of the studies are controversial, others receive general support from throughout the Department of Defense. Nevertheless, the DOD response to the studies in this area has been to maintain the status quo.*

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*To reiterate, the "DOD approach" alternative reflects Department of Defense actions in response to the studies. Also, unless otherwise noted, it is limited to the Carter administration because this volume is being completed in the early months of President Reagan's incumbency.

Doubtless this assessment would be challenged from many quarters throughout the Department. Modifications designed to improve the command and control system are continually adopted. An exercise in late 1978 designated *Nifty Nugget* led to a number of changes, including the realignment of mobilization functions involving REDCOM. Studies, such as those on readiness cited in the responses as being underway, eventually are completed and result in changes.

These evolutionary events, however, would have occurred with or without the DOS 77–80. In the area of command and control, the studies have had little impact. That no additional attention has been given to the controversial issue of formalizing the chairman's role is perhaps understandable. But comments from throughout DOD revealed substantial support for a number of study proposals. In light of the ASD(MRA&L) comme..ts, for example, why has OSD not initiated further inquiry into the question of consolidated theater support? That question is applicable to a number of other issues which received mixed responses: REDCOM training exercises, CINC involvement in readiness evaluation, and CINC selection procedures. Even more puzzling is the absence of DOD action on a group of proposals supported in all comments, those on crisis management.* In sum, proposals on several issues received sufficient favorable responses to warrant (1) further investigation and (2) subsequently, a conscious decision by the secretary of defense and his staff on their acceptance or rejection. It is difficult to ascribe the lapse to other than extreme reluctance by the top managers to venture into affairs outside of the Office of the Secretary of Defense—or, possibly, to apathy.

Preliminary Assessment of the Command and Control Alternatives

The most significant command and control structural issues

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*The NMCS Study findings and recommendations probably influenced the routine updating of crisis management procedures within the JCS complex which takes place almost continuously. But the study proposals address revised procedures and exercises at the highest levels of government. Those changes could not be effected unilaterally within the JCS complex. They would require OSD cooperation with the JCS and leadership in gaining National Security Council coordination and presidential acceptance.

cannot be evaluated in a preliminary assessment. Institutionalizing the chairman, enhancing the CINCs' authority, consolidating selected component support functions, and establishing REDCOM as the principal source of joint warfare employment methods and instruction must be explored in the context of their implications for the overall structure of the Department of Defense. The basic issue, as in the case of the military advice and integration proposals, is whether to modify the existing structure or attempt to improve its performance by correcting identified deficiencies. The examination of alternative DOD organizational structures in chapters 7 and 8 is devoted in large part to this question.

Consolidating Theater Support. Challenges to several other command and control proposals of the studies, however, can be evaluated at this point. The ASD(MRA&L) advances significant reservations, paralleling service and JCS concerns, with respect to consolidating off-equipment maintenance at the theater level. Making theater commanders capable of marshalling their support resources to achieve the greatest impact in a manner analogous to concentrating combat forces, although abstractly appealing, would be a difficult concept to realize in practice. Repair equipment, spare parts, and technicians are not interchangeable among different types of weapon systems. In an era of increasing specialization, shifting these resources from, for example, aircraft maintenance to tank or artillery repair is not feasible. Consequently, collocation of disparate maintenance capabilities would offer few advantages. On the other hand, a number of the disadvantages of such an action are readily identifiable: vulnerability of centralized facilities, increased requirements for costly air transportation and communications facilities, and the expense of changing to the new system. Clearly, the proposal must be set aside until these issues are adequately resolved.

Such reservations do not apply, however, to revising theater arrangements for handling common support functions such as supply, health care, commissary, subsistence, and other personnel provisioning. The studies and responses have presented DOD with at least three alternatives: (1) the present system in which each *theater component independently provides support for the forces of its service;* (2) consolidation of common support functions under the theater commander; and (3) designation of one service to pro-

vide support for each theater. Although the structural issue involves the power of the CINCs, additional grounds nave been advanced for further examining the question of consolidating componei support. The NMCS Study proposes a study to ascertain whether efficiency can be improved by eliminating redundancies. The ASD(MRA&L) cites the Vietnam experience in casting doubt on the efficacy of the present arrangements in a wartime environment. The issue deserves the recommended special study.

The JCS Chairman as the Secretary of Defense's Agent. The general counsel questions the proposal to designate the chairman formally as the secretary's agent in dealing with the CINCs because legislation prohibits him from exercising command. However, the general counsel position appears to be motivated more by caution concerning political advisability than legal reasoning. One comment concludes by suggesting that, if the system is working, "the greater part of wisdom might be to avoid a formal delegation."[124] Another comment, in effect, verifies it would be legally possible to accept the recommendation.

> At the present time, the chain of command runs from the President, to the Secretary, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the CINCs. The formal role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to relay the commands and directions of the Secretary and they may issue commands only under his authority. Within that command relationship, it may be possible to give the Chairman a special role as the agent of the Secretary, but that role should be defined so as not to include the power of military command.[125]

That passage acknowledges the legal acceptability of accomplishing precisely what the NMCS Study recommends. Provisions in regulations such as DOD Directive 5100.1 which, as a matter of DOD policy, place the entire JCS in the chain of command for the limited purposes cited above could be rewritten to substitute the chairman for the JCS. The issue is not whether the secretary of defense has the authority to change the structure but whether it is advisable, politically or in terms of structural improvement, for him to do so.

Costs. The costs of implementing some of the recommendations have also been criticized. They include the monetary cost of increasing the staff support of the chairman and the CINCs and the

intangible, but no less real, costs inherent in actions which would inhibit cooperation within the Department. In addition, the crisis management recommendations for expanding the participation of the most senior decisionmakers would be expensive, considering the other demands on their time. Nevertheless, in light of the significance of the underlying issue of whether to restructure DOD, the cost factor, in all of its manifestations, appears insignificant.

Crisis Management. The crisis management recommendations receive a positive assessment on all sides. The uniform support throughout DOD suggests the need for action along lines recommended by the NMCS Study with respect to revamping the crisis management procedures and exercises as well as testing the flexibility of the chain of command to accommodate direct control from Washington during crises.

STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter has focused on relating recommendations for structural change to improved functional performance in three areas related to *employing* military forces—military advice, policy formulation and oversight, and command and control. By way of summary as well as in order to return to the central concern of this volume, this last section reverses the focus and relates the proposed functional realignments to the elements of the DOD structure they would affect.

The study proposals would strengthen the *employing* arm of the structure, giving it a separate identity and *de facto* coordinate status with the *maintaining* arm, in an effort to increase the influence of the joint military position vis-a-vis the services. The recommendations have two objectives: (1) to increase the authentically joint character of the joint military structure; and (2) to provide vehicles which enhance the capability of genuine joint positions to influence other elements of the Department of Defense. As a result, if the structure worked as intended, defense issues would be scrutinized from differing perspectives by independent military institutions, the three services, and the joint elements; and thus the quality of advocacy of military viewpoints would improve. At times conflicting military judgments would present alternatives to civilian leaders; at others, consensus would magnify military influence. In any

case, the civilian leadership would no longer find it necessary, as alleged by the NMCS Study, to make decisions in which the military dimension is significant without benefit of realistic military advice.

To take the second study objective first, the statutory and delegated JCS responsibilities and formal position of the CINCs in the chain of command ensure an authentic joint military voice, if it existed, would exercise significant influence on defense issues. The study proposals would place additional powerful tools at the disposal of the joint arm with which to influence service and defense agency policies and activities. Moreover, strong, stable links with OSD, particularly the under secretary for policy, would multiply the opportunities for independent joint advice to exert influence over all aspects of national defense policy. Even the proposals to tighten civilian oversight of military plans would create additional opportunities for joint influence.

But providing the *means* for joint influence is of little value to the study objectives in the absence of genuine joint military positions on defense issues. One way to ensure its existence is to create an organization whose objective is to promote the joint military viewpoint—that is, to *institutionalize* the joint interest. The study recommendations can be interpreted as an attempt to create an authentic joint organization consisting of the chairman, his supporting staff, and the unified and specified commands.

As discussed in chapter 2, organizations have interests in expanding their *influence, capabilities,* and *budgets,* protecting their *essence* and *domain,* enlarging their *independence,* and maintaining the *morale* of their members. The proposed joint organization would exert *influence* through the chairman's advisory role in resource matters, including service and defense agency programs and budgets, and his links to OSD; it would partially control immense *capabilities* assigned to the operational command of the CINCs, sharing in the determination of the composition of the entire US military force structure; its *essence* would be defined, continuously refined, and imparted through the doctrine and training activities of the Readiness Command; and it would be responsible for important aspects of the *morale* of its members through the chairman's role in joint personnel selection and career advancement. Conscious intent need not be imputed to the study authors to

conclude the thrust of the recommendations is to invest the advocacy of the joint military position with an independent organizational base, its core being the chairman-CINC axis.

The remainder of this section analyzes the study recommendations in that light—how the revised structure would function, weaknesses in the proposals, other complementary measures, and how this approach compares with that preferred by the services and JCS.

The Study Structure in Operation

The apparent changes in the employment arm would be slight—and their import easily misinterpreted. The new joint organization would be formed *within* the present structure by strengthening and linking existing entities, the chairman and the joint commands. And it would constitute only a portion of the *employing* arm. The JCS, Joint Staff, and components would continue as integral parts. Though ostensibly modest, however, the structural changes would significantly alter the functioning of the organization as the chairman and CINCs responded to their modified charters.

At the Department level, the JCS, chairman, and Joint Staff would develop more independently and their relations would become more complex. JCS responsibilities would remain undiminished except in one area, participation in the chain of command. The statutory authority of the JCS would not be altered and all of the functions subsumed by its responsibility for providing military advice would remain undisturbed. On the other hand, the chairman and the Joint Staff would develop more distinct identities, separate from, but related to, the JCS.

The increased responsibilities proposed for the chairman as means of improving military advice, policy integration, and command and control have a structural significance which transcends their functional rationale. The proposed list of added duties includes the following: providing independent military advice; acting as agent of the secretary of defense in the chain of command supervising the CINCs; acting as spokesman for the CINCs; holding memberships on the Defense Systems Requisition Review Counsel and Defense Resources Board; ranking service and defense agency

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programs according to their priority; formally coordinating the defense policy guidance document; and creating dedicated staff support. Also, the chairman's continued role as JCS spokesman would remain a source of influence facilitating mediation of conflicts between JCS and independent joint positions. Clearly, the chairman would become a formidable presence in his own right, no longer limited to acting as surrogate for the JCS.

As a consequence, the changed structural formula would fundamentally alter the milieu in which national defense issues are considered at the highest military levels. The JCS, with four of its five members still rooted in service perspectives, would find itself arrayed in almost the same organizational orbit with an independent, institutionalized chairman. The latter, possessing a potent joint command constituency as a power base and formally assigned responsibilities which intersect and sometimes overlap the JCS charter, would represent a continuing credible challenge. The potential for increased conflict and divisiveness would increase, and become manifest at times. But the advantages to the military of a united position in national councils would undoubtedly favor compromise, where possible. As a result, the dynamics of the changed situation would favor skewing the JCS position toward accommodation with the chairman and, presumably, the joint perspective.

The Joint Staff, although by no means rivaling either the chairman or the JCS, would also constitute a more independent element in the joint structure. Formally, its independence would be affirmed in relation to the services, its subservience to the JCS remaining unchanged. Nevertheless, as a result of the identity of service chief-JCS membership, a Joint Staff more independent of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps headquarters staffs would tend to formulate issues in a different, and less service-oriented, framework than that enjoyed by the JCS today. That change in Joint Staff perspectives would be reinforced to the extent the chairman succeeded in selecting and molding personnel capable of discerning and advocating joint military positions. Staff arrangements to support the chairman in performing his new responsibilities would also influence Joint Staff performance. If a directorate within the Joint Staff were established to provide dedicated support for the chairman, its influence would tend to permeate the remainder of the Joint

Staff, and vice versa, possibly facilitating resolution of JCS-chairman differences. On the other hand, a separately constituted staff, inevitably more remote from the Joint Staff, might be more responsive to the exclusive needs of the chairman. In any case, the patterns of staff support for the chairman and JCS would change significantly if the study recommendations were accepted.

Consistent with the technique of reallocating joint responsibilities among existing elements of the structure are the study recommendations to streamline and clarify unified command relationships, with more influence accruing to the commanders at the expense of the subordinate components. As in the case of the chairman, the study objectives transcend functional improvements, seeking structural reinforcement for the joint positions. The most significant proposal would allow the CINCs, through readiness assessments, to intrude on current component-service functions and participate in decisions which shape the composition of the forces they command. Although components would continue to conduct readiness assessments, the CINCs' new role would provide a continuous potential challenge in favor of joint positions to component commanders' assessments analogous to the chairman's institutionalized questioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To the extent the CINCs pursued joint interests, the mediated outcome would benefit the joint position, as compared to the present.

Despite the efficacy of the readiness proposal, the CINCs would not be strengthened by the study recommendations nearly as much as the chairman. Discontinuing the "ownership" by individual services of various CINC positions, although not insignificant, would hardly ensure the CINCs' independence. Although clouded with uncertainty over how it could be implemented, consolidation of component support functions under the CINCs would be an effective way to strengthen their position. But the services and JCS oppose even studying support consolidation, as recommended by the NMCS Study. In the absence of strong backing from the highest levels of DOD, consolidated theater support is a moot issue. In these circumstances, the relationship between the CINCs and their component commands will remain one in which the formal subordinates are more influenced by their parent services than their field commanders.

Weaknesses of the Study Proposals

Interpreting the DOS 77–80 proposals as an attempt to establish a genuine joint organization is useful in considering whether the ultimate objective of improving and strengthening advocacy of the joint military position would be achieved. Three potential weaknesses would present obstacles to the effectiveness of the proposed organization. First, the *domain* accorded to the CINCs would be insufficient, as discussed previously. The chairman's broad enhancement contrasts with minimal increases in CINC prerogatives. Second, the capabilities of the joint organization, although extensive in theory, might prove less substantial in practice. Control of subordinate forces would continue to be exercised through the components, an arrangement which would significantly dilute joint influence unless the CINCs became more powerful.

The study proposals also fail to appreciate the importance to the new joint organization of adequate staff capability to enable the chairman and CINCs to perform their additional responsibilities. True, one study recognizes the need for additional staff for the chairman. But the treatment is fleeting and cursory, failing to discuss such factors as staff size, source of personnel, and relation to the Joint Staff. And the studies do not even mention additional staff support for the CINCs. Those are substantial oversights. For example, without substantive staff analyses of such factors as present and proposed mission requirements, the costs and capabilities of present and proposed weapon systems, and trade-offs among capabilities, the enhancement of the CINCs and chairman on resource allocation issues would amount to little more than cumulating and giving voice to eight opinions. The national defense can hardly be expected to benefit greatly from according increased significance to the military advice and operational responsibilities of seven individual CINCs and a chairman bereft of staff capabilities to perform their additional duties. Dedicated staff support for both the CINCs and chairman is a prerequisite to successful establishment of a viable, independent perspective on military issues.

The third potential weakness in the study proposals is more theoretical and, if valid, even more significant than the others. As previously discussed, the study proposals can be interpreted as an attempt to create an independent joint organization within the

employing arm. That interpretation is convincing when endeavoring to analyze the interests with which the organization is to be vested. It is less persuasive in considering the composition of the organization itself—the members. Friedrich's definition, cited in chapter 2, emphasizes that an organization is a combination of people, with common values and a shared set of beliefs, who work together to achieve a purpose or objective. The participants in the *envisioned joint organization* would continue to be members of the services, among the strongest of organizations within the meaning of Friedrich's definition. Furthermore, the intent of the studies is to *increase advocacy of positions on military issues* which at times will conflict with those of one or more of the services. Can service members fill the requirement for a joint perspective while assigned to a joint organization? If not, the study recommendations, as presented, have little chance of achieving their objectives.

A number of proposals have been advanced over the years to overcome the alleged inability of service members to serve a joint organization wholeheartedly. These range from creation of a full-blown general staff, patterned after the German (Third Reich) or Russian models, to the somewhat more modest proposal by David Roe to people the Joint Staff with officers from a Joint Staff Corps.[26] All of these proposals assume the service ties of officers assigned to joint positions must be severed to attain satisfactory *performance.*

That premise is subject to question. Members of the military services are also members of many other organizatior ' groupings, including the Department of Defense, military departments, the *federal government,* and at times the Joint Staff or joint combatant commands. As will be discussed more fully in later chapters, each organizational grouping makes claims on its members which are *sometimes conflicting.*[27] If an individual is assigned to the Joint Staff, is encouraged to pursue joint military objectives by a JCS chairman who hired him using a highly selective referral system, is evaluated professionally on his performance in the joint context, and expects his advancement opportunities to be influenced significantly by his performance evaluation, a strong possibility, if not a presumption, exists that the individual will stand where he sits." In any case, the likelihood is sufficient to conclude the proposals which emerge from the DOS 77–80 ma *rials should be tried before

accepting more far-reaching schemes involving a general staff, or even a Joint Staff Corps.

The principal protagonists of the proposal to institutionalize the joint military interest are subject to analogous reservations—and rebuttals. Is the NMCS Study justified in assuming the chairman and CINCs can, and will, pursue joint and national positions even when they conflict with the dictates of these officers' service affiliations? Once again, considering the available organizational options suggests a positive, though tentative, answer to this question. The choices are (1) the status quo with little, if any, attention to correcting present deficiencies; (2) fundamental changes involving the uncharted realm of a general staff with unpredictable consequences; and (3) the relatively modest DOS 77-80 proposals with their accompanying premise of chairman and CINC evenhandedness and undiluted sensitivity to the national interests. Posing the dilemma in this fashion suggests opting for institutionalizing the chairman-CINC axis, at least as a first step.

Compatible Measures for Strengthening the Study Proposals

The genius of the study proposals is that they would leave the overall organizational structure essentially intact while instituting a series of adjustments whose combined effect would be to change the operation of the Department of Defense significantly. Avoiding the potential weaknesses discussed above while keeping the structure essentially unchanged may no be possible, however. Nevertheless, most of the measures discussed in the following paragraphs meet this desideratum.

Despite the Navy and JCS objections, dedicating staff support for the chairman and increasing CINC staffs as necessary would not be difficult. The additional personnel could be reallocated from present Joint Staff and service component headquarters in conjunction with the functional realignments.*

More disruptive are measures to enlarge the *domain* of the new joint structure. The chairman's *domain*, although sufficiently articulated by the study proposals to ensure independent status, could be broadened to include military advice on *all* issues (that is, not

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*Another source is service headquarters staffs, discussed in chapter 8.

confined to resource allocation, as proposed in the studies). His responsibility for military advice would then be coextensive with the JCS. The CINCs would be significantly strengthened if common support resources were consolidated at the unified command level. More far-reaching, but nevertheless consistent with strengthening the CINCs, are measures which would restructure the combatant commands by eliminating component headquarters and consolidating functions at the unified command level. The resulting headquarters would consist of the CINC and air, land, and sea deputies, as appropriate. No inherent logic or other military imperative dictates that unified commands must contain fully self-sufficient service components.

Contrasting the Studies and Services/JCS Approaches

The approach of the studies may contain technical weaknesses; however, given the study objectives, it is basically sound. The strength, viability, and resiliency of the services attest to the theoretical validity of an approach which would achieve advocacy of the joint position by making this the underlying purpose of a powerful organization.

The services and JCS advance the principal alternative to the study proposals. The structure would not change. Instead, the deficiencies identified by the studies would be corrected, where substantiated, on a case-by-case basis. Thus the present organization would move to improve the quality of military advice on resource allocation matters through increased attention to this area by the JCS. Joint Staff procedures would be changed minimally to meet study criticism.

The result of accepting the services/JCS approach would not be lasting. If the structural configuration which spawned the problems identified by the studies remained unchanged, no incentive would exist to maintain procedural changes which conflict with the interests of organizational elements of that structure.

Chapter 5

The Maintaining Arm: In Search of Genuine Service Secretaries

The DOS 77-80 treatment of the Department of Defense *maintaining* arm is not as comprehensive as its examination of the *employing* arm. The latter is concerned with all elements from the JCS to the component commands. The Departmental Headquarters (DH) Study, by contrast, in its analysis of the military departments, focuses almost exclusively on the service secretaries and their secretariats. The service military headquarters staffs, despite their great influence, are almost completely ignored as separate entities. Only one formal study recommendation specifically addresses them and it is hortatory, proposing "continuation of the effort already underway to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area." Otherwise, the service staffs receive attention principally in the context of the consideration of measures to enhance the position of service secretaries.

This limited focus is not as disadvantageous as it might appear. The military staffs figure prominently in the DOS 77-80 in various proposals for their partial or complete integration with the service secretariats. As will become evident, the concept of integration is in the forefront of current thinking concerning departmental headquarters organization

The DOS 77-80 effort is also incomplete in its treatment of the *maintaining* side with respect to defense agencies because the charter for that study limited the inquiry to determining whether a comprehensive long-term study of this subject is needed. Nevertheless, the Defense Agency Review contains a number of substantive proposals for interim action with structural implications. The last

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section of this chapter will briefly consider the significance of those proposals for the *maintaining* arm.

STRENGTHENING THE SERVICE SECRETARIES— THE ISSUE AND THE ALTERNATIVES

The Departmental Headquarters Study Statement of the Issue

The thesis of the Departmental Headquarters Study, elaborated earlier in chapter 3, can be summarized as follows. The basic Department of Defense organizational problem is how to assert strong central control of the Department and at the same time delegate sufficient authority for efficient decentralized operations. Failure to solve that problem satisfactorily results in (1) uneven management by the Office of the Secretary of Defense—micro-management in some areas, neglect in others; (2) imprecise delineation of responsibilities between OSD and the military departments, undermining the service secretaries' authority; and (3) conflicts which lessen teamwork and cooperation. The specific problems and the larger issue of proper balance between central control and delegation can be resolved by altering the structural position of the service secretary to realize the full potential of this office. That change would produce several results: freeing the secretary of defense and his staff to devote more time to larger policy issues; better policy implementation by military departments as a result of their participation in policy formulation; diminished conflict because the allocation of management responsibilities would be better understood; and a reduction of the number of staff layers.

That brief recapitulation demonstrates the Departmental Headquarters (DH) Study approach differs markedly from that of the National Military Command Structure (NMCS) Study. The latter distinguishes specific functions which are not being performed well—military advice, policy formulation, command and control—and proposes structural solutions. The DH Study, on the other hand, focuses from the first on structural flaws—weak service secretaries and multiple management layers—as the causes of less-than-satisfactory performance of the *maintaining* functions in general. Its emphasis is on correcting the structural flaws and its underlying premise is that this progress will improve performance across the board.

Summary of Alternatives

One solution, enhancing the position of the service secretaries, will suffice to overcome both problems, according to the DH Study. The following discussion groups the measures it considers to accomplish this objective into three alternatives based on the degree of structural change they would entail. Also included, as in chapter 4, is a fourth alternative which reflects the Department of Defense (DOD) approach to the proposals based on actions subsequent to the publication of the DH Study. In this case, the DOD alternative is to retain the status quo.

Missing from what follows are separate alternatives based on comments from the defense community. Those comments uniformly support the study conclusion that the service secretaries should not be eliminated and agree, in principle, with the study objective to strengthen them. But, with a few relatively minor exceptions, the defense community comments overwhelmingly reject the specific DH Study recommendations for accomplishing the objective. Furthermore, rather than suggesting alternative measures, the comments concentrate on forceful arguments opposing the recommendations. As a result, the comments lend strong support and rationale for the DOD status quo alternative and will be discussed as a part thereof.

Following are the three Departmental Headquarters Study service secretary (SS) alternatives and the DOD alternative which the remainder of this chapter discusses and evaluates.

Alternative SS1.   DH Study recommendation: Strengthen the service secretaries by elevating them to the status of senior DOD-wide managers.

Alternative SS2.   DH Study recommendation: Selectively integrate service secretariats and military headquarters staffs in each department.

Alternative SS3.   DH Study option (considered but not recommended by the study): Completely integrate the service secretariat and military headquarters staff in each military department.

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The Maintaining Arm

Alternative SS4.   DOD Approach. Maintain the status quo.

Alternative Approaches to Organizing the Service Secretaries

Alternative SS1.   DH Study recommendation: Strengthen the
service secretaries, elevating them to the
status of senior DOD-wide managers,
through the following secretary of defense
actions: (1) make the Armed Forces Policy
Council, on which the service secretaries
sit, the principal policy advisory body to the
secretary of defense; (2) increase service
secretaries' management responsibilities—
and their corresponding accountability; and
(3) place greater emphasis on the qualifica-
tions of candidates for service secretary
positions.

The National Security Act, as amended, assigns service secre-
taries responsibilities second only in importance to the secretary of
defense. Each is the "head" of his department. He "is responsible for
and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs" of his
department.[2] The Army and Air Force legislative language lists
specific functions for which he is responsible: "training, operations,
administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, prepar-
edness, and effectiveness, . . . including research and development."[3]
In light of these provisions, the formal legal authority of the service
secretary within DOD has only two boundaries: the secretary of
defense under whose "direction, authority, and control" the entire
Department of Defense is administered; and the combatant com-
mands which assume operational command and control of the
forces the service secretary's military department provides and
supports. In this context the *maintaining* arm can be viewed as the
input side of DOD organization with the service secretaries as the
officials responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces
to be employed by the joint combatant elements.

Despite the *de jure* position of service secretaries, over the
years their influence has declined as the secretary of defense and
his staff assumed prominence, trends which were discussed in
chapter 2.

Nevertheless, the Departmental Headquarters Study steadfastly clings to a conception of the service secretaries writ large, which is consistent with the language of the National Security Act. The study perceives them as top DOD managers running their departments through energetic exercise of their legislative authorities, sure of their course as a result of their intimate working relationship with the secretary of defense, with whom they devise the overall policy which guides the entire Department of Defense. If the potential of the service secretaries inherent in this concept were realized, each would more adequately fill the several roles necessary for optimum performance of the *maintaining* arm: (1) manager; (2) defense policy adviser; (3) intermediary between the secretary of defense and the services; and (4) civilian presence. Examining each of these roles reveals the DH Study appreciation of the potential contribution of service secretaries to DOD organization and facilitates understanding how the study proposes to enhance their position.

Manager. Their function as principal resource *managers* of the Department of Defense provides the most nearly unassailable *raison d'être* for service secretaries. Managing an organization the size of DOD from one level of authority is not feasible.[4] Some division of responsibilities into smaller, more efficient elements is required to facilitate operations. Although many other ways to arrange responsibilities exist in theory, the military departments, possessed of long historical standing pre-dating the Department of Defense, fill the organizational requirement for decentralizing the accomplishment of the *maintaining* functions. And, in light of past experience, they will continue to do so. Consequently, the service secretaries shoulder a major portion of the DOD management burden which would of necessity be decentralized whatever the structure.

The better the military department management, the more the secretary of defense and his staff are free to concentrate on major defense policy issues.[5] The DH Study strongly defends the position that military departments are better managed with service secretaries at the helm than would be the case without them. With their political standing and civilian status, service secretaries embody, represent, and serve as a constant reminder of the public interest to the members of their military department. Moreover, they provide a

valuable, otherwise unavailable, nonmilitary perspective on service problems which serves as a source of new ideas, alternative civilian management techniques, innovation, and independent judgment.[6] The study approvingly quotes the April 1976 GAO Report statement that the service secretaries "are, in effect, presidents of operating companies" serving "many useful functions, particularly resource management, personnel administration, budget justification, and establishment of unique Service policies."[7]

The DH Study would extend that traditional concept of the service secretaries' departmental management role "to encourage a perception of him as a DOD manager as well as the head of a component department."[8] The study recommends that the secretary of defense on occasion "make multi-service assignments" to the service secretaries instead of OSD under and assistant secretaries. Those assignments would entail "DOD-wide tasks" transcending in scope a service secretary's own military department's concerns.*

Defense Policy Adviser. Consistent with DOD-wide management responsibilities would be additional *policy* responsibilities. The military departments approach defense policy issues from the perspective of their impact on departmental interests. In this regard, the service secretaries, although their outlook is service-oriented, are at present important participants in policy formulation. The broader perspective is the province of the secretary of defense and OSD. The DH Study recommends this pattern be changed—that the service secretaries assume the role of principal policy advisers to the secretary of defense. The service secretaries would undertake to examine issues of individual and general service interest from an overall perspective, ascertaining and considering all pertinent factors and differing points of view.

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*Although the Departmental Headquarters Study gives no examples of "multi-service" assignments, the term presumably refers to single-manager, executive agent, and lead service responsibilities more far-reaching than the hundreds already assigned to the military departments. (The latter include, for example, drug abuse testing—Army; NATO infrastructure—Army; tactical shelter program—Navy; space surveillance and defense—Air Force; and weather support—Air Force.[9]

The study acknowledges that "institutionally, this charge is an unaccustomed one for the Service Secretary." But it is by no means unprecedented. The study cannily proposes an existing institutional vehicle with impeccable formal credentials to transform service secretaries to senior policy advisers, the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC). This body, established by the National Security Act, as amended, possesses a legislative charter consistent with the study purposes.

> The Armed Forces Policy Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces and shall consider and report on such matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.[10]

Statutory members of the council are the secretary, deputy secretary, and under secretaries of defense; the service secretaries and service chiefs; and the chairman of the JCS." Attendance is not limited, however, to statutory membership.

Open-ended attendance undermines AFPC effectiveness, according to the study. As many as 40 people regularly attend meetings, resulting in a *de facto* membership which far exceeds the small body of 12 top officials designated in the National Security Act. In these circumstances, the AFPC serves as little more than a communications channel for senior DOD officials.[12]

The DH Study recommends recasting the AFPC, focusing on its original purpose.

> Use the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), as it was chartered, to offer the Secretary of Defense regular and frequent advice in the formulation of defense policy, restricting membership to civilian and military statutory authorities.[13]

This change, according to the study, would result in the secretary of defense relying on his principal subordinates. Service secretaries, and their service chiefs, "would assume a more prominent role in assisting the Secretary in the formulation of Defense policy, and the Secretary in turn could expect more effective implementation of policies as a result of the active involvement of the Headquarters' principals."[14] The AFPC would be assisted by a supporting staff, either a secretariat or the office of the special assistant to the

secretary of defense, which would plan the agenda for meetings and exercise oversight of the meeting results.[15]

To assist the service secretary in his broader management and policy responsibilities, the DH Study further recommends the under secretary in each department assume a formal role "oriented to common liaison functions with OSD."[16] His tasks would include coordinating with the under secretary of defense for policy and acting as the service secretary's executive for AFPC activities and multiservice assignments.[17]

Intermediary. As discussed in chapter 4, the National Military Command Structure (NMCS) Study urges the necessity of a military interface, the JCS chairman, to translate national policy decisions into military directives for the combatant commanders and, in turn, serve as spokesman for the latter in their dialogue with the civilian leadership. The DH Study emphasizes the value of a somewhat analogous intermediary role played by the service secretaries. In this case, however, the translation involves rendering the existing and anticipated military requirements of each service into the language of program and policy proposals for consideration by the civilian leadership. The service secretary supervises this activity and serves as a principal spokesman and advocate for the position of his department in the DOD decisionmaking process.[18] The advocacy role of service secretaries ensures the valid aims and needs of each service are persuasively expounded at the highest levels. It also guarantees the secretary of defense will have access to alternatives based on the service secretaries' experience as well as divergent positions of the services.[19]

But advocacy is only one side of the intermediary role. The DH Study states the service secretary must be "a representative at the Service level of the Secretary of Defense."[20] His responsibility extends to explaining and defending decisions of the secretary of defense and eliciting the support of his military department, even when the outcome has not favored the service position. In this respect, the service secretary's role as intermediary promotes the teamwork, cohesion, and cooperation which the study finds essential but lacking at present.[21]

The DH Study also places value on other mediating activities of

the service secretaries to facilitate the interface between the military and Congress, executive agencies, business, and the public. In those relationships, the service secretary's civilian perspective and experience are valuable aids to the service chief and qualify him to be a persuasive proponent in his own right.[22]

Convincing as its case may be for the value of the service secretary's intermediary role to the Department of Defense, the DH Study advances no specific recommendations to strengthen that role. The study states, instead, that its recommendations, taken as a whole, are designed to strengthen service secretaries, and infers their acceptance will improve the performance of all of the roles.

> If these recommendations are carried out, we believe the Service Secretaries would be adequately organized and have sufficient authority and capability to exercise their responsibilities as resource managers.[23]

Civilian Presence. In addition to the benefits already elaborated, a constitutional democracy derives two advantages from interposing a civilian presence at the pinnacle of military institutions. First, the service secretary is a constant reminder of the civilian, politically accountable character of the leadership of the military instrument. In the words of the Departmental Headquarters Study, he is "the immediate personification of civilian authority and control."[24] Second, the service secretary personally represents the incumbent president. He embodies "an essential line of concern for the combat forces that starts in the White House with the Commander-in-Chief."[25]

The study contends this position, which represents the highest national authority, should be strong, vigorous, and effective. Three recommendations are particularly applicable to increasing the weight of the civilian presence. First, the service secretaries should avail themselves of the investigatory and evaluative capabilities available in the military departments to reach their own conclusions on issues. The study recommends that access to the systems analysis, inspector general, and audit capabilities of each department be provided to, and used by, the service secretaries. It notes the perspectives of the secretaries and chiefs, though compatible, are not always identical. Consequently, "systems analysis capabilities that

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permit independent judgment are required for both principals if the Secretary's dual role to the Secretary of Defense and to the Service is to be honored and if the Service Secretary's judgments are to be credible."[26]

A second recommendation would broaden the data base for independent judgment by restructuring the readiness evaluation system to reflect resource application needs of the combatant commands. That proposal has been discussed in chapter 4; it is only necessary to note here that the DH Study stresses the role of the service secretaries who, "as the Department's principal resource managers, . . . should be directly engaged along with their Military Chiefs, in the overall effort" to revise the readiness evaluation system.[27]

Finally, the DH Study affirms in a brief recommendation without discussion that the type of service secretary it envisions requires "high calibre, well-qualified people" who serve "for periods long enough to be effective."[28] That is the only recognition of two major obstacles to the study objectives.

> Alternative SS2. DH Study recommendation: Selectively integrate service secretariats and military headquarters staffs in each department in the following areas: (1) manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics; (2) research and engineering; and (3) financial management.

The examination of the DH Study critique in chapter 3 draws attention to the apparent contradiction between supporting strengthened service secretaries and, at the same time, reduced layering. The latter would apparently result in curtailment or elimination of the former. This alternative embodies the study solution to this dilemma. A careful reading of the text reveals the study strongly defends retention of service secretaries and separate military departments, but gives scant attention to service secretariats per se.[29] Although it does not criticize the secretariats directly, the DH Study, in a lengthy discussion, agrees with past studies that layering represents a serious problem which should be corrected.

The remedy proposed by the DH Study is to realign military

department staffs so that only one level performs a given function. One recommendation proposes assigning the responsibility for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics to the military headquarters staff, thereby allowing elimination of the portion of the service secretariat presently performing these functions. The service secretary, though remaining responsible for these activities, would depend on the military staff through the service chief and (in a novel attempt to foster greater cohesion and teamwork) appropriate parts of the OSD staff.[30] A second recommendation would integrate the separate research and engineering staffs in each military department to support the service secretary and service chief. In this case, an assistant secretary, research and engineering, in the secretariat would have a military officer as his deputy who would also act as the service deputy chief of staff. The integrated research and engineering staff would serve both the service secretary and service chief.[31] A third proposal would integrate the financial management function in the service secretariat (as is now the case in the Navy).[32]

A brief return to figure 2-4 (page 23) reveals the effect of these recommendations on the existing organizations. Despite differences in the configuration of the secretariat and military headquarters staff in each military department, the current duality of functions is obvious—for example, in the Army, two separate levels are responsible for logistics, research, acquisition, manpower (personnel), and financial management (comptroller). Also apparent, however, is the range of expertise at the secretariat level. Although their small size relative to the military staffs limits the depth of their expertise, the secretariats nevertheless provide an independent source of information and advice covering the spectrum of the service secretary's nonmilitary functional responsibilities. The service staffs duplicate these functions and, in addition, are solely responsible for functions of a decidedly military cast: operations, plans, intelligence, command and control, communications, and training.

The DH Study recommendations would change the character of the service secretariats while leaving the military staffs intact and fundamentally unchanged. The only remaining functional staff solely responsive to an assistant secretary would be financial management (with the possible exception of the Army's essentially nonmilitary civil works function). The research and engineering

staffs would occupy an intermediate position between the secretariats and the military staffs. Predominantly composed of military officers, the R&E staffs would, however, tend toward greater responsiveness to the military staffs. The manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics functions would disappear from the secretariat level.

The DH Study offers a number of arguments favoring its recommendations. First, they would reduce staff layers while retaining certain advantages of the present structure. Reduced layering would alleviate the problems of excessive reviews and multilevel supervision, thereby increasing efficiency. At the same time, the independent sources of ideas and divergent views for senior defense management would be preserved.[33] Second, the recommendations would facilitate achieving a number of other worthwhile objectives: greater cooperation, cohesion, and teamwork throughout the Department of Defense as a result of the obligation of OSD officials to support service secretaries in performing their manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics functions; enhanced prestige of service secretaries for the same reason; increased military staff capability to manage research and engineering projects, thus allowing a reduction of detailed OSD involvement; and a more efficient distribution of manpower expertise.[34]

Another reason for supporting the recommendations which influenced the DH Study is that selective integration is consistent with the evolution of thinking on military departmental headquarters organization. Although the Symington Committee in 1960 proposed eliminating military departments (though keeping the services intact), subsequent studies have recommended measures designed to continue the departments and, at the same time, reduce layering. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1969 proposed integrating secretariat and military staffs to the extent necessary to reduce duplication. The Defense Manpower Commission in 1976 suggested only one layer at the military department level is needed to manage manpower activities. Its recommendation for integrating the manpower function was made contingent on similar treatment of other functions such as logistics.[35] Thus the DH Study recommendations are in the mainstream of recent thinking.

Nevertheless, the study acknowledges some potential disadvantages of its recommendations. They violate generally accepted

management principles by assigning staff elements to serve two supervisors, thus clouding lines of authority.[16] Also, military officers may be legally prohibited from serving as a deputy assistant secretary of a military department because they would then be in line to assume the civilian official's responsibilities in his absence.[17] The study would simply accept the ambiguity of authority highlighted by the first criticism. It would overcome the legal question by assigning other civilian officials (for example, the under secretary) the responsibility for acting for the assistant secretary in his absence. This stratagem would eliminate the possibility of a situation in which a military officer would be called upon to act as an assistant secretary.[18]

> Alternative SS3.   DH Study option (considered but not recommended by the study): Completely integrate the service secretariat and military headquarters staffs in each military department.

The DH Study recognizes and discusses a logical extension of its recommendations on reducing layering in the military departments: a complete merger of the separate staffs. It notes that the arguments of more recent studies favoring the selective integration alternative also support complete integration. The Blue Ribbon Panel's prescription that the "Secretariats and Service staffs should be integrated to the extent necessary to eliminate duplication" is open-ended.[39] Moreover, a vigorous supplementary statement by three Defense Manpower Commission members in 1976 strongly recommend that the military departments contain only one headquarters staff.[40]

In examining the advantages and disadvantages of complete integration, the DH Study finally opts for the selective approach. Advantages of complete versus selective integration include: elimination of an entire staff layer with attendant reduction of reviews, other paperwork, and manpower requirements; greater continuity during changes of administration or periods in which the politically appointive positions are vacant; and, closer working relationships between civilian and military officials in each functional area. Disadvantages include: possible legal complications; an impression of weakened civilian control; and clouded lines of authority between the integrated staff and the service chief and secretary.[41] On bal-

ance. the study supports an evolutionary approach with strong encouragement of selective integration as the pattern for any future realignments.

Most defense community comments will be addressed in the next section as a part of the discussion of the status quo alternative.[42] However, one OSD official's comment favoring the complete integration alternative is appropriate at this point. The deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration (DASD(A)) castigates the selective integration alternative as unworkable. But rather than opt for the status quo, he emphasizes the need for "a more comprehensive and coherent plan" consistent for all functional areas and providing "clear, concise lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability."[43] A complete merger would accomplish these objectives by integrating "civilian executive influence directly into the newly consolidated staff, instead of trying to impose this influence solely from the top, as is the case under present arrangements."[44]

The DASD for administration suggests a way to merge the two military department staffs completely and recognizes the existence of other valid approaches. The DH Study discusses one, and another is suggested by the Blue Ribbon Panel's endorsement of the Navy practice of combining the comptroller and financial management responsibilities.[45] Despite the DH Study support for selective integration, complete integration of military department staffs remains a viable alternative which will be explored more fully later in this chapter.

Alternative SS4.   DOD approach: Maintain the status quo.

Markedly contrasting with DOD responsiveness to the DH Study recommendations concerning the under secretary for policy. the study proposals concerning the military departments have had no discernible effect. In this case, the comments from throughout the DOD provide vigorous arguments for continuing the present organizational arrangements. Differences between the defense community and the study derive principally from disagreements over (1) altering the roles of the service secretaries, and (2) the contributions of service secretariats.

Opposition to Altering the Roles of the Service Secretaries. The

defense community respondents agree on ends but take issue with the proposed means. They agree with the DH Study that the service secretaries contribute as managers, policy advisers, intermediaries, and representatives of civilian authority and concern. They also agree that service secretaries should be strong executives. The secretary of the Army rather eloquently expresses the common ground between the respondents and the Departmental Headquarters Study:

> The Ignatius Study offers important insights into the contribution to management made by the civilian Service Secretariats. I specifically refer to its recognition of the role played in managing innovation, in critically examining and then acting as focal spokesman for legitimate service needs, and in providing alternative and augmented perspectives to both the Secretary of Defense and the military chiefs. Accordingly, I appreciate and welcome its announced objective of achieving greater recognition of Service Secretaries' authority and position and more opportunity to participate in the policy-making process.[4]

Despite their warm acceptance of the study objective, the DOD respondents adamantly refuse to accept the necessity or advisability of expanding service secretaries' management and policy responsibilities. And they reject the proposals to integrate the service secretariats on the ground this alternative would impair the secretaries' ability to fulfill all their roles.

Defense community comments insist each service secretary should focus attention on his own department. He is principally a military department manager, not a "top" DOD manager in the DH Study sense. He participates importantly in DOD management and policy decisions—but as the spokesman for his department. The Army maintains that "the challenge of administering each military department is imposing, and a diffusion of attention is not likely to be beneficial."[47] The DASD for administration agrees; service secretaries "already have jobs requiring their full attention and efforts."[48] Rather than seeking to expand the service secretaries' responsibilities for overall DOD management and policy, more attention should be given to the roles and relationships of service secretaries within their own services.

This is the place to look if one wants to define a strong, mean-

> ingful role for the Service Secretaries. In fact, a strong argument
> can be made that their positions have been eroded considerably
> more from within their own Services than from outside
> influences—that they have in effect abdicated significant
> authorities and prerogatives to the Service Chiefs.[49]

Finally, the DASD(A) suggests that the thrust of the study recommendations is fundamentally misguided. If the continued existence of service secretaries hinges on giving them additional duties or "enriching" their jobs, "the need for these officials becomes questionable."[50]

The respondents also point out other obstacles to a DOD-wide management and policy role for service secretaries. Such a role would involve the service secretary in an institutional contradiction comparable to that inherent in the dual responsibilities of the service chief.[51] Critics of the study proposal are skeptical that a service secretary could act as the spokesman and advocate of his department, on the one hand, and transform himself into an impartial administrator mediating the interests of all four services, on the other. But even if this feat were possible, it would cause difficulties. A service secretary's impartial acts would not be accepted as such by the other services when their interests suffered. And decisions contrary to the positions of his own service(s) would undermine, perhaps fundamentally, his ability to manage his department.[52] Finally, the question of staff support must be considered. A secretary's military department probably would not contain, nor be able to develop on short notice, sufficient staff expertise and depth to undertake unanticipated functional assignments with a DOD-wide purview.[53]

The more narrow defense community concept of the service secretary's function and capabilities foreshadows basic disagreement with the specific DH Study proposals intended to expand his management and policy roles. The following paragraphs summarize reactions to the study proposals contained in alternative SS1.

- The comments support the existing practice of designating a military department as the single manager of a function in cases where the department has a primary interest or special capability. For example, the Air Force is the single

manager for several satellite communications functions which serve all DOD organizations.[54] However, scores of this type of management arrangement have been in effect for years, without any discernible enhancement of service secretaries; thus it is fair to conclude the DH Study recommendation concerning "multiservice assignments" is much more ambitious. The respondents object to broader multiservice assignments undertaken principally for the purpose of enhancing the service secretaries; for example, management of an entire defense agency.[55] The Army holds such assignments are not likely to enhance service secretaries, "but to the contrary, may promote role confusion and a dissipation of the Secretary's identification with his Service."[56]

- Similarly, all respondents accept the proposal for limiting the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) to its statutory membership, but fail to accord this measure the significance attributed by the Departmental Headquarters Study. The military departments merely view a more prestigious AFPC as an opportunity to increase their influence.[57] One OSD respondent opines the collegial approach can be useful in resolving differences among the principals on issues. But another OSD official believes little benefit would result because AFPC members' actions are shaped by interests which would not change, leading to "contributions little different than those they now offer."[58] None of the respondents perceives the revised AFPC as the forum for the service secretaries' emergence as broad policy advisers in the DH Study conception. As a result, the AFPC proposal is accorded little import in DOD. Not surprisingly, nothing has been done to implement it despite the apparent general acceptance of the study proposal.

- If the service secretaries are not to undertake a DOD-wide policy role, the study rationale for assigning their under secretaries formal liaison responsibilities with the Office of the Secretary of Defense disappears. In any event, the respondents maintain a better case can be made for leaving under secretary duties to the discretion of the service secretaries who are responsible for military department management.[59]

- The defense community respondents agree that service secretaries, in keeping with their department-oriented role, should enjoy access to military department systems analysis, audit, and inspector general capabilities. But the respondents insist the service secretaries already enjoy this access.[60] And the deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration, who contends the service secretary "problem" is more appropriately addressed in terms of their having abdicated significant authorities and responsibilities, suggests the recommendation is of little significance in the absence of other changes. "If, for some reason, they have chosen not to exercise this authority, it is difficult to see how changing procedures will stimulate significant change in this regard."[61]

Support for Maintaining the Service Secretariats. In contrast to the somewhat blase negativism concerning proposals for altering the service secretary roles, the DOD respondents express ardent opposition to the recommendations for selective integration of the service secretariats. The general consensus holds that, without the secretariats, the service secretaries would be unable to fulfill their principal roles in the areas of policy and management, as intermediaries and as the embodiment of civilian control.

Contrary to the Departmental Headquarters Study contention, the DOD respondents insist staffs cannot be used interchangeably. The military headquarters and OSD staffs belong to the service chiefs and OSD officials, respectively. They have corresponding loyalties and perspectives which preclude their serving the service secretary adequately. The Army response disagrees with the study position that sharing staffs would increase cooperation and teamwork:

> Forcing the Service Secretaries to rely upon other peoples' staffs would have precisely the opposite effect and could result in a significant reduction of the Service Secretary's role.[62]

The only way for the service secretary to participate meaningfully in the bureaucratic game, according to the respondents, is for him to have an independent staff to support him. Otherwise, he will be a captive of the viewpoint of the service chiefs.[63]

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Supported by service secretariats, on the other hand, the service secretaries are equipped to play independent management and policy roles. The secretariats contain a repository of immediately available expertise which provides long-term continuity and facilitates the secretaries' ability to manage effectively from the beginning of their incumbency.[64] The secretariats review, evaluate, and advise the secretaries on programs, policy issues, and management actions "from the point of view of civilian chief executives statutorily responsible for effective management within their respective Departments."[65] Once decisions are made, they also assist the secretary in developing policy positions and monitoring implementation.[66]

Thus the respondents view the service secretary and his staff as an organizational entity with interests distinguishable from the service he manages, as well as from the secretary of defense and his staff. Functioning independently, the secretaries/secretariats act as a valuable check on the military services, according to the Air Force secretary. In fact, the Air Force response characterizes the service secretary, supported by his staff, as the "decisionmaker," and the service chief and his staff as the "program advocates" and "managers."[67] Such an extreme dichotomy need not be accepted, however, to support independent secretaries as a check on the services. The Army, for example, values independent reviews by the secretariat "and the operational efficiency which is promoted by the expectation of such reviews."

> The staff of the ASA(RDA) [assistant secretary of the army for research, development, and acquisition] performs independent review and advisory functions, which are largely made effective by its independent base and source of authority. Sometimes approaching an adversary role, these functions provide significant benefits—sharpened arguments, resolution of issues, better decisions and more efficient development of acquisition programs.[68]

Service secretariats are also the facilitating mechanism in the secretary's role as intermediary.

> As with other major offices within the Service Secretariat, it [the manpower and reserve affairs office] performs an induplicable role in policy intermediation between OSD and the mil-

itary staffs, acting to refine and reformulate proposals for
greater acceptance at DOD level and more certain implementa-
tion at military level.[69]

Thus the secretariats add dimensions to the intermediary role not
recognized by the Departmental Headquarters Study. They assist
the overall DOD organization, accommodating those unique char-
acteristics of each of the services which stem from their different air,
sea, and land warfare missions. In the various functional areas, such
as manpower and logistics, the secretariats tailor the comprehen-
sive perspective of OSD to the special requirements of each service,
and vice versa.[70] In this respect the secretariats are perceived as
acting as extensions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
serving to ameliorate micro-management at the OSD level as well as
counseling and assisting OSD civilians in dealing with the "uni-
formed service."[71] Without a service secretariat office dealing with
his area of responsibility, the assistant secretary of defense for
manpower, reserve affairs and logistics indicates additional staff
personnel at the OSD level would be necessary.[72]

Turning to the other side of the intermediary relationship, the
respondents claim the secretariats, in working with the military
headquarters staffs, develop a natural division of tasks within func-
tional areas which is complementary, not redundant, as charged by
critics of "layering." The secretariats interpose relevant nonmilitary
factors into policy deliberations and provide balance to military
department positions, making them more acceptable to OSD and
external agencies.[73]

Significantly, albeit ironically, the assistant secretary of defense
for health affairs voices the keenest appreciation of the value of
service secretariats as intermediaries in expressing regret that the
secretariats do not contain a health care office:

> I acknowledge that this arrangement has several advan-
> tages as noted in your [DH Study] report, however it should be
> pointed out that several significant disadvantages also exist. In
> dealing directly with the military elements of the service staffs
> we consistently receive "pie-in-the sky" demands or require-
> men:.. completely devoid of any political or other external con-
> siderations pertinent to the issue. It is important that these type
> items be filtered or better reasoned within the Service. By not

having this filter it tends toward the development of adversary relationships instead of cooperative arrangements and by necessity involves the OSD staff in more day-to-day operational matters. An equally important point is that it places an already over-burdened Service Secretary in the position of being a "captive" or "prisoner" to a single viewpoint, that of the Service Surgeon General.[74]

Finally, the secretariats facilitate civilian control. In realizing the management, policy, and intermediary roles, the civilian presence permeates the processes which govern the military services. This is in reality how the service secretary effectuates civilian control. Thus, to the degree the secretariats make performance of the other roles possible, they contribute importantly to the fundamental objective of maintaining civilian control of the military.[75]

The comments overwhelmingly agree the selective integration proposals would weaken the secretariats and correspondingly diminish the position of the service secretaries. The Air Force secretary states the recommendations "would severely impair the ability of the service secretaries to manage their departments." As a consequence, the respondents maintain, the proposals are completely inconsistent with the expressed study objective of enhancing the service secretaries.[76]

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES FOR STRENGTHENING THE SERVICE SECRETARIES

Service Secretaries as DOD-wide Managers—An Unrealistic Concept (Alternative SS1)

Role as Top Manager Unsustainable and Irrelevant. The Departmental Headquarters Study concept of the service secretary has two distinguishable components: (1) traditional department head, and (2) top DOD manager. The traditional concept is easily understood in terms of the discussion of chapter 2: as the head of an organization, the service secretary seeks to realize, and is compelled to adjust, organizational interests in a milieu of competing demands from other services, DOD agencies, and executive departments. His authority and responsibilities are vested by law. The supplementary component as a senior DOD manager envisioned in the study would apparently vest the service secretary with a certain

charisma by virtue of the status of his office. Regardless of his qualifications and experience, the capabilities of his staff, and other relevant factors, the service secretary would be called upon to render judgments on defense policy in all of its ramifications and undertake management assignments from the loftiest DOD purview.

The defense community comments persuasively argue that the additional component of service secretary responsibilities should be avoided. More responsibilities would undermine rather than enhance the service secretary. Contradictory dual responsibilities, for which he and his staff were ill-equipped in many cases, would burden him. Overall DOD management would not improve in these circumstances. But the service secretary's position within his own department would be weakened. The overall objective of strengthening the service secretary would not be achieved; nor would the lesser study objectives of diminishing OSD detailed management, increasing teamwork, and more clearly delineating service responsibilities. Moreover, adding responsibilities to a position claimed to be a full-time job either is inconsistent or calls the claim into question and, as a corollary, continued existence of the position.

Finally, the supplementary role would not come to grips with what the deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration (DASD(A)) terms the service secretary "problem." The Departmental Headquarters Study focuses on DOD centralization as the cause of the deteriorating service secretary position. The DASD(A) emphasizes erosion of the position within the military departments. The common ground in both positions is the secretary of defense-service secretary-chief of staff interconnection; or, alternatively, the OSD-service secretary/secretariat-military headquarters staff linkage. A straightforward approach to strengthening the service secretary would logically attempt to modify the relationships in this triumvirate in his favor. Instead, the DH Study proposes to attack the problem by indirection through creation of a supplementary role for the service secretary with tenuous links to the governing relationships, and consequently, little chance of altering them.

Therefore, the proposals for multiservice assignments, recasting the Armed Forces Policy Council as a panel of detached advisers, and establishing liaison roles for under secretaries, can be discarded as unworkable and probably counterproductive. That

conclusion does not imply, however, that DOD should change its approach to single manager assignments when the service or secretary is the appropriate manager. Nor does it mean the AFPC cannot be the forum for policy formulation. The service secretaries and other participants would continue to act in their traditional AFPC roles as interested participants who both pursue and are compelled to modify their objectives in light of the demands of other organizations and the more comprehensive purview of the secretary of defense. Rejecting the study proposals merely discounts the efficacy of single manager assignments, the AFPC, etc., as vehicles for a supplementary broad DOD management and policy role for service secretaries.

The other proposals of alternative SS1 are directed at enhancing the traditional service secretary roles. To its credit, the DH Study identifies several areas which could be fruitfully exploited to enhance the service secretary in the secretary of defense-service secretary-chief of staff triumvirate. But the specific recommendations exhibit an approach as unimaginative and unhelpful as the supplementary management concept is excessively grandiose. The DOD comments reveal, for example, it has been a long-standing practice of the secretary of defense to meet in closed session with the statutory members of the AFPC from time to time." Also, the respondents uniformly agree (and the DH Study acknowledges in one passage!) that service secretaries already have access to military department study, analysis, audit, and inspector general capabilities. The DH Study "recommendations," then, amount to little more than hortatory remarks. The same is true of other recommendations in this category suggesting readiness evaluation meet the needs of the service secretary and encouraging continuing emphasis on qualified service secretary appointments and extended tenure. Merely exhorting the service secretaries, secretary of defense, and administration officials responsible for appointments to change their behavior and thereby strengthen service secretaries is insufficie .. Why should they? These proposals need not be rejected but merely set aside as incommensurate with the DH Study objective of enhancing service secretaries.

Distinguishing Management Style and Organizational Configuration. This analysis, however, does not presume upon the unquestioned ability of the secretary of defense to employ whatever

management style he chooses, including that suggested by the study. Any secretary of defense can, if he chooses, by fiat vest service secretaries with status as top DOD managers and principal advisers for the duration of his tenure. Indeed, the Departmental Headquarters Study, with its emphasis on teamwork, cooperation, and cohesion, appears to call for something akin to Secretary Melvin R. Laird's participatory management approach. He sought, albeit with limited success, to manage by delegation through a "chief executive who is not just a single executive, but sometimes several people . . . recognizing that if you have capable people in top offices, they can and will work together. . . ."[78] Laird included the service secretaries in his concept but later expressed concern that he spent "far too little time" conferring with them.[79] Secretary Robert S. McNamara, on the other hand, sought centralized control and moved "the civilian advisory function on all major defense decisions" to OSD; McNamara's rationale was his belief that service secretaries merely advanced narrow service viewpoints, according to Richard J. Daleski.[80] Between those extremes—all-inclusive participation and exclusion—exist many other possible secretary of defense-service secretary relationships. For example, despite his appar⸮ ⸮t disdain of service secretaries as advisers, McNamara eff⸮ ⸮ely employed their talents as managers and mediators on several occasions. In one notable instance, at McNamara's request, Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance was instrumental in securing Army acceptance of the OSD-favored design which became the M-16 rifle.[81] The secretary of defense has the authority, responsibility, and power to seek advice and to manage the Department of Defense to achieve the best performance possible according to his own lights.

The questions of management style and organizational configuration, although obviously related, are separable. Granted a secretary of defense can choose to place more reliance on service secretaries during his tenure, the question remains why should he? The only satisfactory answer is that he should do so when service secretaries offer the best available source of policy advice, management capability, mediation, or whatever other attribute he seeks. After sifting through the history of the last quarter century, Daleski provides ample evidence that secretaries of defense, on occasion, have availed themselves of the assistance of service secretaries when the latter's management ability, political acumen, temperament, tal-

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ents, or other capabilities made them the best available vehicle for achieving DOD objectives. As a result, Daleski persuasively demonstrates, service secretaries have from time to time brilliantly performed each of the roles elaborated by the DH Study, as well as other roles not contained in the study. Presumably because those contributions, however valuable, are oases in a desert of relative inutility, Daleski advances them as indicators of the *potential* roles of service secretaries.[82]

The DH Study thesis is that the Department of Defense "would benefit from fuller use of the Service Secretaries in the management of Defense activities."[83] Its recommendations for organizational changes are intended to enhance the position and ensure service secretaries are "adequately organized and have sufficient authority and capability to exercise their responsibilities as resource m nag-ers."[84] That is, the recommendations are intended to move the service secretaries in the direction of Daleski's perceived *potential* and equip them for more significant contributions *irrespective of the particular management style* of the secretary of defense. The study recommendations of alternative SS1 are inadequate because they would not facilitate accomplishment of that objective, and likely would have the opposite effect.

Selective Integration—A Counterproductive, Halfway Measure (Alternative SS2)

The selective integration proposals of alternative SS2 serve to heighten lack of confidence in the Departmental Headquarters Study recommendations. The force of logic is decidedly on the side of the defense community respondents who claim adopting those proposals would severely weaken the service secretaries' already tenuous positions.

If service secretaries are to continue as separate and independent institutions situated between the services and OSD, they must have separate, dedicated, adequately manned staffs. The Air Force response bluntly states that a service secretary cannot be effective either as an individual essentially on his own without sufficient staff support or by using borrowed staff.[85] In a meeting of the DOS 77-80 Steering Committee, Secretary of the Air Force John C Stetson elaborated this position, cautioning that

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> the proposals implicitly distinguish between Service Secretar-
> ies as an institution (Secretary *and* Secretariat) and as individ-
> ual persons. In his judgement, ability to act effectively requires
> the institutional approach. Removing staff weakens the Service
> Secretary, reducing him to an individual without the wherewi-
> thal to develop coherent positions on issues and to monitor
> implementation of his decisions.[86]

Secretary Stetson also contended the service secretariats are already small and should not be further reduced. Reference to table 2-1 (page 24) indicates that contention is true only in a relative sense; although the secretariats are large in absolute terms, varying in size between 300 and 850 individuals, they are only a fraction of the size of their miitary headquarters staffs and OSD. Just as signifi- cant, the secretariats were continually reduced during the 1970s until at present they are approximately one-half their fiscal year 1968 size.[87]

The DH Study proposals would further undermine the staff support available to the service secretary. They would result in an additional loss of approximately one-third of the secretariat func- tions, the associated personnel (manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics functions), and a sharing arrangement with the service chief for an additional one-third (research and engineering). Those changes would radically diminish the number of assistants avail- able to aid the service secretary in arriving at independent assess- ments of issues. At best, they would create ambiguous lines of authority and accountability as the service chief and service secre- tary pursued their separate needs. At worst, the service secretary would abandon the shared functions to the service chief, following the pattern highlighted and criticized, ironically, by the same Departmental Headquarters Study in its discussion of systems analysis, inspector general, and audit functions.

Selective integration would reduce some staff layers. But this advantage would be purchased at the cost of abandoning the over- riding objective of the DH Study to strengthen service secretaries. The project director of the study, in response to Secretary Stetson's objections at the Steering Committee meeting, emphasized all of the study recommendations are intended to enhance the role of service secretaries. Nevertheless, the selective integration propos- als must be rejected as inconsistent with that purpose.[88]

Two Other Approaches—One Not Feasible, the Other Insufficient

Elimination of the recommendations of alternatives SS1 and SS2 ostensibly leaves only two DOS 77-80 alternatives for service secretaries: retaining their present status or integrating the secretariat and military headquarters staffs. That is not precisely correct, however. Eliminating the service secretary position, rejected by the DH Study, is an alternative. But that option is not politically feasible, nor would it be organizationally beneficial. Earlier studies of defense organization, the Daleski monograph, and the defense community comments all confirm the DH Study conclusion that "the Service Secretary is a vital element in the Defense management structure."[89] Although service secretaries are only intermittently capable of approaching the full potential of their roles, those sources agree their contribution, albeit less than optimum, merits retention of the position. Simply put, better alternatives to the civilian service secretary do not exist; certainly not the military chief, who could not be held politically accountable and would be unable to fulfill the intermediary and civilian control roles; equally, not the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which would find it impossible to exercise effective control without decentralization.[90]

Granted the position is valuable and should not be eliminated, are there opportunities for strengthening the service secretaries' positions and more nearly realizing their potential, even though the specific recommendations of the DH Study have been rejected? If the premise that the service secretary must remain a separate institution is to be preserved, the menu of suggestions is limited and of marginal value. Although normally subscribing to the objective of strengthening the service secretaries, the defense community comments offer no suggestions for achieving this goal. Daleski turns to advice on focusing the selection process to "get the right man" and a discussion of managerial and bureaucratic techniques available to the appointee intent upon improving his effectiveness.[91] His points are well-taken. But they offer little hope of permanently counteracting the factors which have gradually undermined the service secretaries. Those factors are structural. They are inherent in the altered relationships among the OSD-service secretary/secretariat-military headquarters staff triumvirate resulting from the long-term trend toward centralization in OSD and the countervailing service reaction. If the service secretary/secretariat must

remain a separate institution, there may be no alternative, despite misgivings derived from past experience, to retaining the status quo and intensifying efforts to obtain outstanding appointees committed to longer tenure and higher standards of performance.

The Real Choice: Completely Integrating Military Department Staffs or Maintaining the Status Quo—Promising Departure versus Present Value (Alternatives SS3 and SS4)

Integrated Staff Operating Relationships. The complete integration alternative offers the prospect of strengthening the service secretaries by abandoning the premise that they must remain separate institutions. Its somewhat paradoxical thesis is that the service secretary must give up staff to increase his influence. The service secretariat would disappear as a separate entity through absorption, merger, or integration with the military headquarters staff. The new unitary staff would respond to the service secretary with the senior military officer of the service performing within the *literal meaning of his title, chief of staff* to the secretary. Both the service secretary and chief would have a small, generalist personal staff (40-60 individuals), but a single, large functional staff, headed by appointive assistant service secretaries and their military deputies (the present deputy chiefs of the service staffs), would comprise the bulk of the department headquarters.

This alternative would dispel fallacious service positions which implicitly limit the secretaries' authority: the contention that there are "other peoples' staffs" beyond the reach of the service secretary within his military department, advanced in the Army and Air Force responses; and the tenet that the service chief has departmental (as distinguished from joint)* responsibilities apart from, distinct, and

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*The distinction between joint and departmental responsibilities is important. The service secretary is clearly by law the senior official concerning departmental matters, as shown by quotations which appear in the text shortly. The service chief, as a *departmental* official, is the service secretary's subordinate. But, *as a member of the JCS*, the service chief is legally assigned joint duties for which he is not accountable to the service secretary. The text in the above passage and in what follows, in discussing departmental headquarters organization, refers to military department responsibilities; that is, to those matters in which the service secretary has preeminent legal responsibility and the service chief is his subordinate.

independent of the service secretary's authority, advanced in the Navy response.[92] The service secretary would be free to choose among several working relationships with the integrated department staff. He might opt to work in unison with the service chief on departmental matters, thereby simultaneously focusing the senior military and civilian perspectives on emerging issues. More likely, the service secretary would exercise his legal authority "to assign, detail, and prescribe duties" to allocate primary responsibility for functions directly related to military operations (readiness, plans, doctrine, intelligence, etc.) to the military chief. The secretary would then focus his own energies on the "business" functions of the staff (policy, logistics, installations, personnel/manpower, training, engineering, research and development, acquisition, programs, evaluation, comptroller/budget/financial management).[93] Note that this delegation of authority to the service secretaries in legislation is explicit with respect to the Army and Air Force. The Navy legislation is more generally stated, but no less comprehensive. The Navy secretary is designated as the "head" of the department and empowered to "administer the Department under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense."[94]

The service secretary could go even further and insist that the service vice chief assume the major portion of service responsibilities, reporting directly on these matters to the secretary, thus freeing the service chief for more attention to JCS duties. That division of responsibilities would finally realize one of the purposes of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 as explained by President Eisenhower in a letter to Congress containing his recommendations:

> I have long been aware that the Joint Chiefs' burdens are so heavy that they find it very difficult to spend adequate time on their duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This situation is produced by their having the dual responsibilities of chiefs of the military services and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>
> I therefore propose that present law be changed to make it clear that each chief of a military service may delegate major portions of his service responsibilities to his vice chief. Once this change is made, the secretary of defense will require the chiefs to use their power of delegation to enable them to make their Joint Chiefs of Staff duties their principal duties.[95]

Would complete integration work? How well, as compared to

the present? The answer to the first question must be, Yes, it would work in some sense. After all, the alternative merely calls for restructuring the military departments along lines similar to virtually all other government agencies—integrating politically accountable executives with career employees into a coherent organizational whole. And, as one respondent pointed out, other DOD organizations already follow the integrated pattern. Both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service secretariats, for example, are successfully integrated civilian and military staffs.[96]

From this vantage—that is, the perspective of what is the "norm" in government organizations—the issue is not whether complete integration will work. It is precisely the opposite. Why is it necessary to have a separate secretariat staff and service staff in each military department? Senior staffs in an organizational hierarchy almost invariably exist to support the efforts of a supervisor responsible for a number of subordinate organizations. In this context, the rationale for an OSD staff is that the secretary of defense is responsible for a number of large organizations, the Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS, and others, whose activities must be orchestrated. But a service secretary is responsible for only one military department. Why is it necessary, then, to have two military department headquarters staffs in a one-on-one relationship, one to assist in supervising the other? No compelling logic supports the present structural arrangements; integrated military department staffs could be established and made to work.

The more important question is whether integrated staffs would work as well or better than the present structure. Would the service secretaries be strengthened? One cannot forecast precisely the outcome of a realignment of the scope of the integration proposal and answer the question definitively. Nevertheless, the two basic patterns of interaction representing the extremes of performance, the "weak" and "strong" service secretaries, are sufficiently discernible to provide the basis for an assessment of this alternative.

Weak Secretary Pattern. A weak service secretary (by virtue of inadequate experience, insufficient motivation, or unsuitable temperament) could be maneuvered into the position which palpably disturbed Secretary Stetson, that of a single individual, unprotected by a dedicated staff and almost completely ineffective.[97] This official

could be exploited easily through informal as well as formal staff mechanisms which controlled his agenda and the framework within which issues were addressed and "decided" by him. In the most extreme case, without a secretariat discreetly guiding his activities, the inherently weak service secretary would be rendered a figurehead, governed by the military service he nominally heads.

The possible emergence of the "weak secretary" pattern would weigh almost decisively against the integration alternative *if* the present organization were not characterized by the same flaw. The description of the figurehead secretary differs only in degree from the critical picture of the present organization discussed earlier. Moreover, this pattern occurs today despite the fact the present organization provides each service secretary with a secretariat consisting of several hundred individuals and, as a consequence, incurs the intangible costs of an added management layer.

Strong Secretary Pattern. The other pattern discernible in the integration alternative is that of a strong service secretary who *trades a secretariat numbered in the hundreds for an integrated military department staff numbered in the thousands.* If this pattern resulted, the complete integration alternative would overcome the two principal causes of weak service secretaries: inadequate information on which to base decisions, and inability to participate in initial policy deliberations.

Service secretaries lack access to the balanced, accurate, comprehensive, and timely information Lucas and Dawson have identified as crucial to civilian participation in defense policy decisions.[98] Merging the headquarters staffs would almost automatically solve this problem by interjecting the service secretary into the primary departmental communications channels. The strong service secretary would ensure his position as chief executive officer of the department was respected. Although he might delegate certain military operational functions to the principal cognizance of the service chief, the service secretary would make it clear his departmental management orbit completely subsumed that of the senior military officer. Staff meetings of the senior management would be chaired by the service secretary or his deputy with the military chief acting as the chief staff officer. No exclusively military or civilian staff meetings outside the purview of the secretary would be coun-

tenanced. The military department would operate as a civil-military partnership with the service secretary indisputably the senior partner.

The second source of service secretary weakness in the present system which the integration alternative would alleviate is the secretaries' inability to participate significantly in the formulation of military policy in their own departments. Paul Y. Hammond describes this problem as follows:

> In each of the service departments, although the civilian secretariat performs important and necessary functions in the management of the department's business, supply, and supporting activities, the Secretary can have little legitimate effect upon the program of policy which he must administer, for by the time it reaches him within his department he is no match for the size, skill, and claims of professional competence of the military staffs organized under his military chief.[99]

Hammond explains the military headquarters staff must of necessity be the working level of policy planning for the military establishment. Initial thinking on all of the questions which relate force structure to strategy

> must be dealt with through the channels of military planning which originate deep in each military department, but extend past the Secretary of the Department, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and into the National Security Council and the White House.[100]

Although the service secretary is "very active in his department, the major policy questions lie just beyond his reach."[101] Merging the headquarters staffs would, as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration notes, "integrate civilian executive influence directly into the newly consolidated staff."[102] The present obstacles to participation in policy deliberation and formulation would disappear.

Clearly, then, if the strong secretary pattern prevailed, merging the two headquarters staffs would enhance the position. Overcoming the problems of inadequate information and structural remoteness would make the service secretary more capable of sustained,

consistent performance of the four roles envisioned by the Department- mental Headquarters Study. He would become the chief executive of his department in the fullest sense, confronted by the full range of departmental issues now fielded by the military chief. He would make decisions in conjunction and coordination with the military chief who would also provide assistance and advice. But the military chief would no longer act as a filter or buffer insulating the secretary from the real nexus of departmental activities.

Advantages and Disadvantages. The management opportuni- ties available to a service secretary heading an integrated military department staff contrast markedly with those offered by the pres- ent organization. No doubt an active and energetic secretary can today exert his authority fully on any given set of issues he chooses. But in doing so, he quickly saturates the meager resources available to him and leaves the field on other issues to the military chief and the service headquarters staff. This situation may be one explana- tion of Daleski's demonstration that past service secretaries have intermittently performed one or more of their roles outstandingly. In any case, the present organization, with a small secretariat staff atop a very large military staff, makes comprehensive, continuous management of a military department by a service secretary impossible.

The Air Force response indirectly acknowledges this in advanc- ing the proposition that the service secretary (with his secretariat) is the decisionmaker and the service chief and military headquarters staff are "program advocates and managers."[103] Because meaning- ful decisions are made in the course of managing the department, this quotation in effect admits the service secretary is remote from the basic functioning of the Air Force. Merging the staffs and inter- posing the service secretary as an integral part of the processes by which the department is managed would undoubtedly increase the opportunity of the service secretary for actual departmental management.

The integration alternative would also enhance the other roles of the service secretaries. As their grip on their own departments became apparent, their status in policy deliberations at the secre- tary of defense level would increase. As mediators, they would no longer act as an entity *between* OSD and the "military." Having been

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an integral part of the development of the positions of their departments, they would be more effective service advocates. But the mediation process would continue in an altered form. Their new positions at the genesis ôf military department policy formulation would provide the opportunity to ensure early and continuing service consideration of the political, economic, and other factors emphasized in the response of the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs (quoted earlier; see pages 166-167). Finally, because it is in reality a derivative of other roles, more effective performance of the policy, managing, and mediating roles would result in a fuller realization of civilian control.

In addition to enhancing the service secretary's position, the integration alternative promises other advantages. It would tend to bias the structure toward the strong secretary pattern by alleviating the problem of obtaining qualified service secretaries willing to serve for sufficient periods to ensure their effectiveness. The qualifications and commitment necessary to manage a military department *de facto* (as opposed to the present *de jure*) would at once discourage lesser individuals and challenge those who realize the inherent opportunities for accomplishment resulting from the merger of the military department staffs.

The integration alternative would also eliminate an entire bureaucratic layer. The service secretariats, however well they perform their responsibilities, are nevertheless separate organizations with attendant interests in garnering and exercising influence as well as protecting their well-being. Although small relative to other DOD staffs, they are large by most other managerial standards. They consist of several hundred individuals who inevitably levy a heavy tax on the supervisory resources of any secretary. Furthermore, they represent a separate, time-consuming review layer which scrutinizes military department and DOD-proposed actions through the lens of their organizational interests. Their elimination would have the advantage of discontinuing three independent, often conflicting, staffs in the Department of Defense.

But that is precisely the measure of the cost of the integration proposal, loss of the secretariats. The benefits they offer the service secretary have been discussed at length earlier in this chapter. Against the certainty that the service secretariats are valuable

organizations *in the present* structure, without which the service secretaries could not perform, the integration alternative offers the possibility of improved performance if the secretariats are merged with the military staffs. Moreover, supporters of the status quo can maintain that the secretariats bolster the performance of weak service secretaries more effectively than would be the case in the merged configuration.

Those arguments, *while cogent*, are not convincing. True, service secretariats are indispensable to the *present* organization. But that merely means they are a significant part of a military department headquarters structure broadly criticized for its ineffectiveness. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that a weak service secretary would be appreciably worse off if the integration alternative were adopted. The services would attempt to avoid secretarial management, channeling that role, as at present, to one of overall cognizance and general responsibility—the "decisionmaker" in the Air Force response. But the services would continue to have a strong interest in adequate performance by the service secretary in his dealings with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the other departments, and Congress; that is, in pursuing his policy and mediation roles. Concluding that a weak appointee would be significantly less effective in the integrated staff organization is not warranted.

Political Feasibility. Having determined that the integration alternative *would work in some* sense and might work well if an able secretary were appointed, and that the benefits of the alternative appear to outweigh the costs, a final issue raises the most formidable obstacle to a strong recommendation for change. Chapter 1 discussed the futility of organizational recommendations which exceed the bounds of political feasibility. Is the integration alternative of this genre? The possibility cannot be dismissed. It may be too far-reaching to be accepted. The secretariats constitute built-in opposition to integration. Their members would work within the Pentagon and in Congress to safeguard their position. The services, if their analyses paralleled that here, would also oppose integration. On the other hand, some support apparently exists in OSD for this alternative. Additionally, the idea is gaining ground among those who study defense organization, as indicated by the studies cited earlier. Moreover, some elements of Congress and the Executive

Office of the President can be counted upon to support enthusiastically a proposal to eliminate a DOD staff layer with a current payroll of approximately $50 million.

Considering the opposing forces, the integration alternative would probably be politically feasible under circumstance `are-fully selected and orchestrated by the president and secr  ry of defense. An incoming administration (or possibly, but les  `ely, one in transition after a first term) could neutralize a great `ai of DOD opposition by selecting service secretary nominees  mit-ted to integration and submitting a reorganization propos  `e outset while its position remained strong. Once working r `on-ships began to crystallize, there would be progressively less enthusiasm for the additional disruptions (over and above the transition to a new administration) the integration alternative would impose on the military departments.

In summary, two alternatives remain as possibilities from the DOS 77-80 consideration of the military departments. Retaining the status quo would leave DOD with relatively weak service secretaries who nevertheless perform useful functions with the aid of service secretariats. Integrating the military headquarters staffs, although encumbered with politica; obstacles, is the preferred alternative.

STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

A common, if implicit, premise found in the DOS 77-80 materials, both studies and comments, is that organizational structure is directly related to organizational performance. The viable remaining DOS 77-80 alternatives from this and the previous chapter invariably recognize certain consequences of structure which they attempt to overcome or to exploit in order to improve overall DOD performance. This section interprets several alternatives on the basis of their intended purpose either to counteract or usefully employ the consequences of organizational structure.

Centers of Interest and Conflict

Institutionalizing the chairman-CINC axis, an alternative discussed in chapter 4, would take advantage of the tendency of elements of an organization to form "centers of interest," in Philip

Selznick's words.[104] Lucas and Dawson explain this phenomenon as an inescapable consequence of delegation; as authority is decentralized, "there develops a divergence of interests among the different departments of the organization, or between a particular department and the central management of the organization."[105] The existence of different, and competing, interests as a consequence of delegation also means conflict is an inherent characteristic of an organization. The NMCS Study found that strong military service centers of interest at times overwhelm the *employing* arm. The study would counteract the services by establishing a separate organization whose interest in terms of *influence, domain, independence, essence,* and *morale* are devoted to advancing the joint military position. Thus proponents of this proposal would employ the inevitable conflict between the service and joint centers of interest constructively to secure a broader evaluation of military issues.

Structural Isolation

The examination of the *maintaining* side of DOD organization in this chapter reveals that another consequence of structure can be the partial, at times almost total, isolation of an official. The secretary of defense has superseded the service secretaries as the key link between the military and other elements of government. That eventuation in itself, however, fails to explain the impotence of the service secretaries. They occupy a formally powerful position between the services and the secretary of defense which ostensibly guarantees their participation in the intercourse between OSD and the services. How can service secretaries fail to exert strong influence on both the Department of Defense and their military departments? From an organizational perspective, they are impotent because the structure facilitates their isolation in at least two ways. First, they can be easily "short-circuited" as a result of the existence of multiple avenues of interaction between OSD and the services. Second, the services have the ability to determine or strongly influence the agenda of issues which the secretarial channel addresses, the framework in which the selected issues are considered, and, as a result, the substance of the secretary's decisions.

Regardless of the formal structure, the service secretaries represent only one of the channels between the services and the

Office of the Secretary of Defense. The extent to which this channel is employed defines the parameters of the service secretary's position at any time in each military department. The broad support for continuing the office unchanged stems from the secretaries' undeniable contributions to DOD performance on issues they handle. A second service-OSD channel is the JCS. As discussed in chapter 3, the integrated DOS 77-80 critique finds the services have, in effect, co-opted the joint structure, principally through the dual roles of the service chiefs and their mastery of the Joint Staff. As a result, the critique finds the JCS position on contentious issues is often a composite consisting of the best outcomes each service could negotiate with the others.

A third channel available to the service is direct interface with the secretary of defense and OSD. The formal structure prescribes this for some functions; for example, health care, as indicated in the response of the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs quoted earlier. But the parallel functional structuring of the OSD, service secretariat, and military headquarters staffs, coupled with their close proximity in the Pentagon, allow informal linkages between the services and OSD which short-circuit the secretariats. Examples include contacts between service and OSD staffs responsible for research and development, logistics, international security policy, and personnel.

As a result of the multiple avenues of interaction between the military headquarters staffs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries are excluded from important decision processes. The formal and informal structures of the Department of Defense simply bypass them on many important issues nominally within their purview as department heads.

Moreover, the service secretaries' inability to influence significantly the agenda, substance, and outcome of those issues routed through the secretarial channel further impairs their position. As discussed earlier in this chapter, except for initiatives they might individually undertake, service secretaries are occupied by (1) the concerns of the secretariats, inevitably restricted as a result of their small size and the limited scope of their expertise, and (2) the issues the services pursue through this avenue. In these circumstances, the military headquarters staff often determines the framework for

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discussion and the substance of the eventual service position before bringing an issue to the service secretary.[106] Consequently, service secretaries' institutionalization as separate entities in the structure has the paradoxical effect of contributing to their impotence by permitting, and in fact facilitating, their isolation.

Two alternatives remain after the preliminary assessment: (1) acknowledging and accepting the service secretaries' limited, but nevertheless valuable, contribution to DOD management; and (2), merging the secretariats and military staffs, thereby interposing service secretaries at the center of military department action. The second alternative, if the service secretary were active and assertive, would overcome his isolation, thereby terminating the service staff practice of tailoring issues before they reach him and securing his ascendancy over the avenues of interaction between OSD and the services. Only two service-OSD channels would remain, one through the secretary (any direct contact would be only at his sufferance) and the other through the JCS. And the latter would be subject to much greater influence by a service secretary who takes part in developing the policies of his department from the outset. (In addition, of course, acceptance of the proposals to modify the joint structure would affect this avenue of service influence.)

Delegation and Control

The Defense Agency Review recommendations intended to increase the responsiveness of defense agencies indicate concern with other consequences of organizational structure which affect Department of Defense performance; namely, the dilution of centralized control which attends delegation of authority. Lucas and Dawson explain this phenomenon in theoretical terms:

> Delegation is inescapable in the functioning of any complex organization. One man is incapable of supervising all the activities of an organization of any size, so the manager must pass on responsibility to others, who in turn must also assign tasks. The inevitable hierarchies of staffs and departments emerge with specialized tasks to perform based on some sense of a division of labor.[107]

Though necessary, delegation has at least two other consequences. First, it provides an opportunity for the development of divergent

interests among the specialized elements of the larger organization. The proposals for institutionalizing the chairman-CINC axis seek to take advantage of this phenomenon. Second, delegation by definition accords a degree of discretion to the subordinate elements in performing the assigned function. But, as Selznick finds,

> in the exercise of discretion there is a tendency for decisions to be qualified by the special goals and problems of those to whom the delegation is made. Moreover, in the discretionary behavior of one section of the apparatus, action is taken in the name of the organization as a whole; the latter may then be committed to a policy or course of action which was not anticipated by its formal program.[108]

The consequence, therefore, of delegation of authority is a diminution of the ability of the central management of an organization to control its activities. Thus any rationalized organizational structure inherently embodies a conflict between the need for coordinated orchestration of its activities to achieve its overall purposes and the imperative to decentralize performance of the many tasks necessary to achieve those purposes.

Aspects of the centralization-decentralization issue are evident in the DOS 77-80 treatment of departmental headquarters; nevertheless, the basic concern is to discover ways to improve the military department organization *per se* (and, in terms of DH Study objectives, as a prerequisite to greater delegation from the secretary of defense). The Defense Agency Review, however, is principally concerned with control. It recognizes the inherent tendency *for all organizations to pursue their own interests and emphasizes* the absence of checks on this tendency with respect to defense agencies in the present DOD structure. The study concerns include lax supervision by overburdened OSD officials responsible for the agencies; relative inattention to agency program proposals and budget requests not subject to the PPBS competition military department submissions receive and the planning, programming, and budgeting process; and inadequate procedures to ensure satisfactory performance of agencies supporting operational forces.

The Defense Agency Review concerns deserve careful attention because they implicitly warn of the potential reincarnation of a structure similar to the War Department bureau system which for

decades at a stretch was almost devoid of central control. In light of the danger which even a partial realization of this structure portends, a brief recapitulation of its salient characteristics and destructive consequences is warranted.

During most of the nineteenth century and continuing into World War II, Army support organizations ("bureaus") such as the Ordinance Department, Signal Corps, Medical Department, Quartermaster Department, and Corps of Engineers were in effect autonomous within the War Department. Although nominally subordinate to the Secretary of War, they maintained independence in a number of ways: political power based on direct alliances with powerful congressmen and manifested in separate detailed appropriations; position in the Army structure reporting directly to the secretary which allowed them to avoid intervening supervision and easily overwhelm any secretary indiscreet enough to inquire more than superficially into their activities; absence of responsibility to commanders of operating forces; authority to deal "directly with their own officers in the field at all levels of command."[109] James E. Hewes, Jr., describes the organization as follows:

> The secretaries were unable as a consequence to exercise any effective control over the bureau chiefs upon whom they had to rely for information. The bureaus operated as virtually independent agencies within their spheres of interest. These spheres often overlapped and conflicted, demonstrating what Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard Law School, described as "our settled American habit of non-cooperation." The whole system was sanctioned and regulated in the minutest detail also by Congressional legislation, and any changes almost invariably involved Congressional action. Bureau chiefs in office for life also had greater Congressional influence than passing secretaries or line officers.[110]

The bureau structure failed each time the Army was called upon to justify its *raison d'etre*. "During the Spanish-American War the absence of any planning and preparation, the lack of coordination and cooperation among the bureaus, and the delay caused by red tape [became] a public scandal."[111] The uncoordinated activities of the bureaus in World War I directly contributed to the near-paralysis of the war effort in a massive December 1917 congestion of eastern ports and rail yards "with literally thousands of rail cars, which

could not be unloaded for lack of space and labor or even located for lack of identification."[112] An emergency reorganization centralized management within the Army General Staff structure for the duration of the war.[113] Nevertheless, immediately after the war Congress rejected the centralized organization and once again placed effective control at the bureau level.[114] It remained for General George Marshall, with the Army facing its greatest challenge burdened by an organization tending toward paralysis, to effect a reorganization which permanently established the principle of central control over the bureaus in the early stages of World War II.[115]

The bureaus represent extreme examples of decentralization and the deleterious effects of inadequate central control.* But the similarities of these support organizations to the present defense agencies is too striking to disregard in the face of warnings by respected authors such as John Ries and the Defense Agency Review findings that the conditions for excessive agency autonomy exist, at least in embryo. Ries asserts that

> there is absolutely no reason to believe that the new agencies...
> will not become the vested interests of tomorrow. Since vested
> interest is promoted by special interests, these agencies are
> fully capable of gaining a congressional power base sufficient
> to challenge the authority of the secretary of defense.[116]

Rather than dismantle, consolidate, or otherwise tamper with the internal structure of the agencies, at least until a more comprehensive study is completed, the DA Review, in effect, recommends gaining control through evaluation and manipulation of their input and output. The organizations they support would monitor and evaluate their performance. Feedback from the combatant commands and components channeled through the JCS, OSD, and the services would provide the basis for close scrutiny of agency programs and budgets and participation on boards which oversee the formulation of their policies and objectives.

How would control be effected in the absence of agreement among the agency principals and the service, OSD, and JCS representatives of agency clients? The Defense Agency Review

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*The history of the Navy bureaus parallels in many respects the Army experience.

does not address that question. However, it is crucial because conflict which derives from divergent organizational interests is inevitable in such an organizational setting. The input-output mechanism affords the opportunity to elucidate problems and achieve a degree of voluntary or negotiated consensus consistent with conflicting interest. At times this would be sufficient. Inescapably, however, after achieving the highest degree of discretionary consensus, the exercise of authority by the secretary/OSD would occasionally be required to establish, by fiat if necessary, the standards for satisfactory performance and the appropriate policies and resource levels required to achieve it. Thus higher control involves the selective employment of a spectrum of relationships ranging from cooperation to coercion. The nature of these relationships and the ramifications of their employment by the secretary of defense and OSD are the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 6

The Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense— Controlling Incipient Anarchy

The secretary of defense is supposed to lead the Department of Defense. The National Security Act, as amended in 1958, makes this clear. But how does the secretary exert "direction, authority, and control" over the melange of disparate organizations which comprise DOD, especially when each presses constantly for greater independence?[1] One hypothesis is that the secretary can choose from a number of possible (and relatively discreet) relationships between top management and the rest of the Department, and govern accordingly. In theory, for example, the secretary might play the role of the strong, possibly even autocratic, central manager; or he might become the "arbiter" among the three military departments; or the "broker" between the military and the White House or Congress.[2] Reality, it happens, is more complex.

That conclusion emerges from analysis of the DOS 77-80 treatment of the secretary of defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The studies are not timid when it comes to defining the position of the secretary/OSD in the Department; they explicitly state their concept of the appropriate relationships between central management and the rest of the Department. They also recommend that central management perform a variety of activities which imply additional relationships. The first section of this chapter discusses those relationships and activities.

What are the implications for central management if the secretary elects to lead by undertaking the recommended activities and cultivating the corresponding relationships with subordinate elements? In general, there are two. First, central management must possess the requisite organizational capabilities. Second, it must pursue an approach to DOD management compatible with the proposed activities and relationships. The second section of this chapter analyzes those requirements. The resulting conclusions are summarized in the final section as precepts for organizing and managing the Department of Defense.

RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OSD TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF DOD*

The General Concept versus the Empirical Results

The problem in attempting to discover the appropriate relationships between the secretary of defense/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the other elements of the Department is not an absence of consensus. Widespread agreement among the component DOS 77-80 studies exists concerning (1) general prescriptions of the "proper" relationships and (2) specific recommendations concerning particular issue areas. The problem is that in many cases the specific recommendations conflict with the general propositions, and at times contradict them.

General Concept: Policy Direction Links the Secretary to His Department. At the conceptual level, the DOS 77-80 materials reveal agreement that the central management should provide policy direction for the Defense Department but refrain from involvement in the details of implementation. The National Military Com-

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*In some respects, it might be more clear to present the material in this section as secretary/OSD "roles" rather than "relationships." However, every role implies a relationship of the role player to some other actor(s). Because the central concern here is organization, the nature of the ties between central management and the other elements of DOD, the text focuses on relationships.

mand Structure (NMCS) Study asserts "policy direction is the primary responsibility of OSD." It is required as "the basis for military planning" and the derivation of "the DOD program and budget."[3] The absence of clear policy direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) makes it necessary for military staffs to determine their own goals as a starting point for planning, thus undermining civilian control. The Departmental Headquarters (DH) Study states that the reason for its emphasis on increasing the responsibilities of the military departments is to free the secretary of defense from management burdens, allowing him "to concentrate on national security policy and overall direction of the Department."[4] The study describes OSD as the means "to relate national security objectives to the allocation of resources among Military Services whose capabilities and operations increasingly interact and overlap."[5] The Defense Resource Management (DRM) Study praises the original concept of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) established by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in 1969: "Packard wanted to decentralize day-to-day management, but to keep OSD informed about the progress of the programs and in control of them."[6]

Study criticisms also reflect the view that OSD should concentrate on overall policy and depend on the other DOD organizations for operational implementation. The NMCS Study states OSD "should limit its 'how' directives and encourage military initiatives to the extent compatible with reasonable exercise of OSD policy direction."[7] The DH Study repeats that theme in calling for "a more careful delineation between policy direction and operating responsibility" which would distinguish "where OSD's responsibilities end and those of the Military Departments begin."[8] The study notes widespread criticism of the OSD "tendency to become absorbed unduly in day-to-day operating details" of the other elements of DOD and agrees central management is frequently too detailed; it finds "some evidence of undue involvement by the OSD staff in details better left to the Military Department management."[9]

Finally, the DRM Study faults OSD for failing to accomplish the planning which is a prerequisite for periodic reassessment of defense policy. Guidance directions are overly detailed and voluminous—as opposed to "documents that focus on strategies, objectives, and capabilities while maintaining a link to aggregate force

and budget levels." Weapon system acquisition reviews are too
frequent and far-reaching. Also, they tend "to overlook vital issues
while grappling with a multitude of lesser questions."[10] Clearly,
when the position of the secretary of defense and OSD are consid-
ered in the abstract, the studies picture a central management
guiding the Department without actually participating in the activi-
ties which lead to the realization of the guidance.

Empirical Results: Policy Plus Four Other Relationships Obtain.
A different picture of the relationships of the central management to
the other elements of DOD emerges from an examination of the
recommendations the studies advance to overcome specific prob-
lems their investigations identify. Rather than have the secretary/
OSD maintain a rather detached, aloof stance which guides the
Department through the development, articulation, and adjustment
of policy, the recommendations almost invariably propose an acti-
vist central management. They would expand secretary/OSD
responsibilities and activities, regardless of whether the area of
concern is general policy, health care, training, logistics, or other
specialized subjects.

The remainder of this first section examines a number of OSD
relationships to the other elements of the Department derived from
the study findings and recommendations. The section concludes
with an attempt to reconcile the contradiction between the general
and issue-oriented concepts. Although what follows may be con-
sidered unduly detailed, several cogent reasons call for a compre-
hensive treatment:

1. To demonstrate the marked contrast between the general
concept of the appropriate relationships of the secretary/OSD to
the remainder of the Department and the picture which emerges
from study proposals which address DOD problems and issues on a
case-by-case basis. OSD has been sharply criticized for more than
two decades for not adhering to the general concept. One need not
agree with each study finding and recommendation to conclude
central management cannot possibly hew to the general concept
and accomplish what is expected.

2. To convey the breadth and scope of the organizational and
managerial tasks the secretary/OSD face. A simple concept of the

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relationships between the central management and other elements may be inadequate. But it is also true that the burden of leading the Department will quickly overwhelm a central management lacking an adequate, systematic approach which defines and continuously maintains, reinforces, and strengthens the relationships among OSD and the other DOD elements. To the degree such a central management perspective is absent, the military departments, defense agencies, and other organizations are free to pursue their own interests.

3. To suggest the range of subjects addressed by the DOS 77-80. The focus of this volume on structure means many topics treated in depth by the DOS 77–80 are of marginal interest to this work and receive superficial attention. They may be of direct interest, however, to others concerned with the organization and functioning of DOD. Consequently, this section provides an indication of the scope of the DOS 77–80. And, parenthetically, in discussing the study materials, this section demonstrates the interrelatedness of the various aspects from which organizations may be examined, e.g., functions, processes, structure, informal organization, management, communications/information flow, and interest perspective.

4. To categorize the relationships which emerge from analysis of the activities recommended by the studies for performance by the secretary/OSD. Categorization is a prerequisite to resolving the conflict over the appropriate central management-subordinate element relationships.

Although they overlap, and many recommendations can be placed in two or more categories, those relationships to the other elements which most accurately reflect the study data characterize the secretary/OSD as (1) the source of policy direction; (2) a complement to other DOD elements—challenger of the status quo, performer of activities unique to central management, offset to parochial tendencies; (3) the integrative mainspring of DOD—originator of DOD-wide systems, architect of input/output relationships, locus of coordination, primary determinant of cooperation; (4) a line manager; and (5) the ultimate source of authority.

The Policy Relationship

The recommendations concerning changes in the policy pro-

cesses are perhaps most consistent with the general concept of the OSD role in the Department. Even in this area, however, acceptance of the study proposals, most of which have been discussed in previous chapters, would result in a pronounced increase in OSD responsibilities. The NMCS Study emphasizes the need for "annual review by the Secretary and selected key assistants of the principal military plans to assure that their political assumptions are consistent with national security policy." Furthermore, it proposes a review of the Unified Command Plan at least every other year by the JCS *and the secretary of defense*, a procedure which would potentially ignite serious interservice conflict biennially as responsibilities and missions throughout the world were reassessed and possibly reassigned. The secretary and deputy secretary do not have the time for a sufficiently thorough personal review of military plans; thus the undersecretary for policy should be made responsible, according to the study, thereby institutionalizing in OSD shared responsibility for functions hitherto performed almost exclusively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[11]

The DH Study elaborates that proposal, suggesting creation of an OSD planning office, with close ties to the JCS, to concentrate on contingency and long-range planning "for better integration of military planning with political considerations and overall national security policy-making."[12] The NMCS Study also proposes central coordination of the separate studies, analysis, and gaming programs of OSD, the JCS, and the services which often form the basis for key policy, strategy, and force structure proposals. The under secretary for policy would ensure they proceed "from a common focus" while allowing dissenting views to be expressed.[13]

Complementary Relationship

A number of study recommendations can be interpreted to suggest that the secretary/OSD should act as a complement to the other parts of the Department. Whatever the shortcomings of the other elements, they should somehow be balanced or offset by central management. Three types of complementary relationships are identifiable in the study findings and recommendations. They portray the secretary/OSD (1) challenging the status quo; (2) performing activities the other elements are incapable of accomplishing; and (3) offsetting undesirable contra-organizational proclivities of the other elements.

Challenger of the Status Quo. Several otherwise diverse recommendations suggest the secretary/OSD should act as a *continuing* challenge to the *modus operandi*, not necessarily to force change but to ensure the assumptions which underlie organizational activities remain valid in a changing world. The NMCS Study recommendations concerning periodic OSD review of JCS plans are of this genre; they are supported by the DRM Study call for "a process for periodically challenging basic defense policy."[14]

The DRM Study goes much further than policy, however. It contends there is a "lack of quality analysis" capable of "inventing credible challenges to current practices or systems." The study suggests rapid development of the resource analysis capabilities of the assistant secretary of defense for program analysis and evaluation (recognizing this will require additional staff). It also proposes creation of a Support Analysis Improvement Group (SAIG) sponsored by OSD to act as "a clearing house of innovative operating and support concepts" and to ensure their consideration in the weapon systems acquisition decisionmaking process. Finally, the DRM Study recommends DOD-wide adoption of several new principles for the evaluation of the logistics support structure which would require intimate OSD involvement in revamping current practices.[15]

Each of the other studies include recommendations which would sustain or expand opportunities for the central management to challenge the other elements of DOD. The DH Study emphasizes the importance of safeguarding the independence of the OSD program analysis and evaluation function to preserve its integrity.[16] The Defense Agency Review notes "there are no adversary proceedings in the PPBS for the Agencies similar to those between PA&E [the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office in OSD] and the Services" and recommends "more specific program guidance and more intensive scrutiny" of agency programs and budgets.[17] The Combat Effective Training Management (CETM) Study recommends that "the OSD staff working closely with the services should reverse the trend" of limiting training in formal schools, a practice which results in "exporting" training to operational units. The overall effect is to degrade combat readiness, the study finds; moreover, the practice is

suspect even on grounds of cost effectiveness.[18] Thus each of the studies conceives of the secretary/OSD as a viable challenge to the other elements even though the proposed measures may result in detailed involvement of the central management in operational activities.

Source of Activities Which Subordinate Organizations Are Incapable of Accomplishing. Similar in some respects to the foregoing, but nevertheless distinct, are a number of activities recommended by the studies for the secretary and OSD because they cannot be adequately performed elsewhere in the Department. They may, for example, be too complex for a subordinate element to undertake; require the efforts of two or more elements; transcend the domain of any one element; overlap the responsibilities of several; or involve interface with external organizations and thus require a DOD-wide position.

The overlap with the concept of OSD acting as a challenge to the other elements of DOD is apparent in the proposals for the creation of the Support Analysis Improvement Group (SAIG) and expansion of the resource analysis capability. The SAIG would involve the JCS, all of the services, and several defense agencies. The resource analysis activity would marshall data from the services, intelligence community, and domestic and international sources concerned with strategic, economic, technological, and political trends. Only the central management of DOD, with authority to access information from the entire Department and external sources, could perform those activities.

This conclusion applies to several other recommendations in which collecting, processing, and analyzing data are the common elements. The Training Study proposes that OSD establish a management information system which would

> serve as a central repository for data and research results produced by the three [service] laboratories. It should also have the capability to access data banks of other appropriate agencies, and should permit rapid retrieval by researchers.[19]

The DRM Study criticizes the absence of a useful medical management information system at the OSD level and strongly recom-

mends rapid completion of a number of projects which would "make real progress in management information." The study also recommends collection of data and development of methodology "for determining the appropriate experience mixes of enlisted occupations" which could only be accomplished at the OSD level.[20]

Problems which are common to a number of subordinate elements but transcend their individual capacity to resolve are also assigned to the central management by the study recommendations. An example is shortages, particularly in the personnel area. The DRM Study finds all services will experience significant shortages of doctors with key specialties early in a war. It recommends that OSD "evaluate various ways to enhance the recruitment and retention of shortage specialties into the Reserve components."[21] Similarly, the DA Review, noting a scarcity of specialist personnel and a possible imbalance in their allocation between the services and agencies, recommends that OSD "review Service and Agency requirements for specialist personnel and their availability in the functional areas where Agencies exist."[22]

Another area in which OSD is considered responsible by the studies is in representing the combined interests of the other DOD elements in intercourse with external organizations. DOD relations with Congress, other departments, the White House, and the public are obvious examples.[23] However, the studies focus on much more specific, technical-operational areas. The following recommendation strikingly illustrates the multifaceted representational responsibility. It proposes OSD interaction with other governmental agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments.

> OSD should develop a plan to make large-scale use of private sector, Veterans Administration (VA) and Public Health Service (PHS) beds in wartime. Further, OSD and the JCS should ensure that host nation support for overseas hospitals is fully exploited.[24]

In the interface with external organizations, OSD is seen as the protector as well as proponent of the other DOD elements, as shown by the following Training Study recommendation.

> OSD should assist the services in resisting external pressures to economize in the R&D process at the expense of training. It is

> difficult for the services to resist these pressures individually
> under the current management system.[25]

In a similar vein, the DH Study recommends "a reduction, if possible, in the extent of detailed management intervention by outside agencies" which include the Office of Management and Budget and Congressional staffs.[26]

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is also considered a necessary participant in efforts to integrate the activities of two or more subordinate organizations which perform the same or related tasks. Because many job specialties in each of the services are similar (cooks, clerks, vehicle mechanics, vehicle operators, helicopter pilots, etc.), the Training Study indicates that "joint service institutional training is a strategy which could help reduce training costs without sacrificing effectiveness." The Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) is responsible for recommending opportunities for joint training. The study recommends that "OSD should support ITRO, assist the services in consolidation of training where feasible, and help them resist consolidation when analysis determines that it is not feasible." The study further recommends that OSD assist the services in conducting a comprehensive analysis of recruit training objectives.[27]

The secretary/OSD is also viewed as an appropriate level for research and, consequently, a source of new technical knowledge in instances where the results will be useful to a number of DOD elements. The DRM Study recommendation that DOD improve the methodology "for determining the appropriate experience mixes of enlisted occupations" is in this category. Also included is a Training Study recommendation that OSD sponsor research to develop methodologies which evaluate combat effectiveness in terms of training.[28]

Offset to Parochial Tendencies of Departments and Agencies. Chapter 2 discussed the theoretical basis for the conflict between the interests of the constituent elements and those of DOD as a whole. Chapter 3 catalogued the specific criticisms in the DOS 77-80 materials which suggest the detrimental effects those tendencies sometimes have. Many of the DOS 77-80 recommendations would employ the secretary/OSD to counterbalance or offset the

contraorganizational proclivities of subordinate DOD organizations.

The NMCS Study recommendations proposing OSD review of JCS plans, particularly the Unified Command Plan, are in this category. Also notable is the DRM Study position that OSD must take action to resolve the problems in medical planning. Chapter 3 discussed the study finding that the services employ different approaches in arriving at medical requirements which lead to seemingly bizarre differences—for example, Air Force projected wounded in action rates exceeding those of Army troop units, anesthesiologists per physician requirements varying from a ratio of 1 to 2 for the Navy to 1 to 19 for the Air Force. Even though medical readiness planning has traditionally been a service responsibility, the study faults the central management for health care shortcomings. It cites a need for "stronger leadership and more effective management by the Secretary of Defense" and OSD officials. And it recommends that

> the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should take a more active part in medical resource programming. Specifically, the two offices should . . . improve the consistency of service planning factors. . . .[29]

Just as explicit is the treatment of weapon systems acquisition, particularly by the DRM Study. As discussed in chapter 2, the study suggests "the understandable desire of the services to modernize equipment inventories to counter the threat" influences actions inimical to overall defense interests. These include the tendency of the services to accelerate the introduction of new weapon systems in spite of the concomitant increase in costs and lessening of reliability; emphasize systems closest to completion and neglect less mature systems; limit consideration of possible alternative systems; and encourage military program managers to push through to production when delay or cancellation might be more appropriate. The DRM Study calls for changes in overall DOD policy to offset those tendencies: increased emphasis on testing which demonstrates technical adequacy and operational sustainability before production; special attention to alternative system concepts to satisfy mission needs; and a DOD-wide specialized program manager selection process and evaluation system "built around criteria relevant to systems acquisition."[30] The DH Study addresses the alternative

weapon systems issue; it calls for OSD to ensure all options are considered at the earliest acquisition decision point by assessing the value of a candidate system "in connection with other planned or operating systems designed to meet the same primary or secondary missions."[31]

At times, OSD must counterbalance a subordinate organization in areas normally within the domain of that component. The DH Study provides one example in discussing decisions involving base closings.

> The Services sometimes resist because they tend to want to keep what they have, and can often cite valid military considerations in opposition to the proposed action. Thus, OSD must take the lead, working to insure a cooperative effort by the Services and be prepared to explain and defend the action to the Congress.[32]

Even more to the point is the Training Study recommendation that OSD intervene in the intraservice procedures which apportion manpower resources. Citing the detrimental effects which result from assigning personnel in training to accomplish base support tasks, the study recommends that OSD ensure reductions in base operating support resources will not result in absences of personnel from training.[33]

The services are not the only elements of the Department OSD must counter. According to the DA Review, the semi-autonomous positions of the defense agencies should be offset more forcefully by a number of actions. All of the proposed measures would require OSD initiation and many would require continuing OSD involvement. These include greater attention to defense agency programs and budgets and establishing policy councils in each agency with representatives of OSD and client organizations as members.[34]

Integrative Relationships

The central management is also responsible for integrating organizational elements within the Department of Defense. That involves much more than achieving agreement on policy objectives. The DOS 77-80 recommendations propose that OSD (1) sponsor DOD-wide "systems" which incorporate specialized functions per-

formed by individual elements; (2) relate input to output, and vice versa, across DOD organizations; (3) coordinate the efforts of sub-ordinate elements; and (4) foster cooperation and teamwork through-out the Department.

Originator of DOD-wide Systems. Each of the elements of DOD performs a number of common or similar functions; for example, budgeting, training, and logistics support. Treatment of those func-tions from an overall DOD perspective assumes various forms. As discussed earlier, Congress authorized the defense agencies as an organizational approach to the performance of common functions when, in the judgment of the secretary of defense, the government will benefit in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency.[35] A second method of treating common functions is through broad delegation; in effect, the Department emphasizes the decentralized, partially autonomous nature of the constituent elements and coun-tenances extensive discretion in the way in which a function is accomplished.

The central management may also create a DOD-wide "sys-tem" which incorporates closely related functional specialties from several or all constituent organizations. The planning, program-ming, and budgeting system (PPBS) is the most noteworthy exam-ple of the systems approach. It combines several functions per-formed by DOD elements into an integrated system. One result for any functional area included in such a system is that the function is automatically considered from two perspectives: as a discrete activ-ity of each individual organization, for example, the Air Force budget; and as a part of the DOD-wide synthesis, namely, the defense budget. Another result of creating a system is that the central management is strengthened; decentralized decisionmak-ing is more subject to challenge because the flow of accurate, timely, system-wide information provides the secretary/OSD with knowledge on which to base decisions which rivals or exceeds that of the individual elements.

Two other observations are relevant to the system concept. First, central management *creates* systems. Secretary McNamara established the PPBS, which had the immediate effect of strength-ening his position vis-a-vis the services. Second, the system and functional approaches in DOD differ principally in degree. Budget-ing was accomplished before McNamara, as was planning and pro-

gramming. Systemization normally involves overlaying formerly disaggregated functional activities with a set of procedures which facilitates an integrated approach. Decentralized performance of each function continues, but it receives management scrutiny from two perspectives—that of the constituent element and that of DOD as a whole.

Health care for military personnel illustrates these points. It is a decentralized function of each of the services at present, despite the existence of an assistant secretary of defense for health affairs. It is susceptible to a systems approach, however, as manifested by the DRM Study recommendations which encourage completion of a DOD medical management information system and increased OSD involvement in securing uniform planning procedures.

The significance of the system concept is that the DOS 77-80 recommendations favor moving toward creation of more systems. The most clearcut call for a system approach is elaborated in detail by the Training Study. The study recognizes the basically decentralized structure of DOD training: "each of the four services has been assigned specified functions and roles" among which is training. Nevertheless, the study insists that a "total systems approach to training management" is also necessary because "there are many training operations which are not solvable within the individual services." Yet the study finds that "within the OSD staff, training operations are not viewed in terms of the total system ..." Training has traditionally been regarded as principally an individual service responsibility and "historically, OSD has not involved itself in the management of training." The study is sharply critical of this position, finding that "in its present configuration, OSD is improperly organized, inadequately staffed, and incapable of properly performing its training management function." The study proposes a structure centered in the Office of the Secretary of Defense capable of addressing training in DOD as a system.[36]

Although not as fully elaborated as the training concept, a number of other DOS 77-80 recommendations favor expanding DOD "systems."

- Several recommendations would facilitate "a (partial) return to stronger SecDef leadership" in the PPBS after a post-

McNamara interlude which emphasized "participative management."[37]

- Proposals by the NMCS and DH Studies support establishment of a uniform joint readiness management and reporting system across the services. The system would serve as the basis for resource allocation as well as operational decisions by the JCS and the secretary of defense. The DH Study implies OSD should assume responsibility for such a system:

No one at the OSD level is specifically charged with action responsibility for readiness evaluation procedures. The ASD (PA&E) and to some extent the ASD (MRA&L) both have an interest in a system that would permit a quantitative measurement of the increased levels of readiness that could be obtained with given levels of increases in resources made available.[38]

- Some recommendations consider military and civilian DOD manpower issues from an overall perspective: the DRM Study suggestion that determination of the appropriate experience mixes of enlisted occupations may require a DOD-wide data base, improved methodology, and level of aggregation which must be determined through OSD-service interaction; the DH Study recommendation that OSD "take the lead, working with the military Departments" in establishing more flexible procedures for reassigning senior civilian personnel.[39]

- The DRM Study recommends that DOD adopt four design principles which would apply to all services in developing future logistics support systems.

Architect of Input/Output Relationships. Every organization can be analyzed in terms of the relationship between its output and its input—the result of its effort in applying resources as compared to the amount of resources consumed. In an organization as large and complex as the Department of Defense, entire constituent organizations can be considered predominantly output- or input-oriented; the basic organization model arrangement of the constituent elements into *employing* and *maintaining* arms is one such typology.

The study recommendations suggest it is the responsibility of

the Office of the Secretary of Defense to foster relationships between output and input elements which allow continual assessment and adjustment of overall DOD performance. The DRM Study states that "better feedback is needed, not only to monitor execution, but also to make adjustments to past decisions that, in turn, will motivate better execution."[40] It contends that

> reporting systems that key on purchased manpower, equipment, or units (divisions, wings, or ships) are relatively meager reflections of the actual defense capabilities purchased. The ingredients of a combat-ready division stretch from the effectiveness of the recruiting and training command to the intelligence services that assure correct deployment posture—factors exogenous to the unit.[41]

The proposals to develop a joint readiness evaluation and reporting system can be interpreted as attempts to break the monopoly held by input organizations, the services, on the assessment of output. Evaluation by the joint or *employing* arm would channel readiness information through the JCS and OSD back to the services and defense agencies. The policy councils recommended by the DA Review for combat-support-oriented defense agencies provide another method of relating input to output. According to the study, "the JCS representatives should represent the requirements of the U & S [Unified and Specified] Commanders."[42] This technique would emphasize the two-way flow of input/output communications because the respective agencies would be fully represented on the councils.

Other DA Review proposals also stress the role of OSD in effecting indirect control of the defense agencies through input/output arrangements: institution of recommendations by the chairman of the JCS to the secretary of defense on those agency programs which support the operating forces; periodic review of agency plans by the JCS and unified and specified commanders; periodic readiness tests and exercises by the defense agencies; and review of agency charters "to ensure that the existing arrangements provide adequate coordination with the JCS and the Unified/Specified Commanders in war and crisis."[43]

The Training Study employs input/output analysis as the basis of its approach, with training as the input related to combat effec-

tiveness as the output.

> Efforts were focused on combat effectiveness as the final criter-
> ion of effective training and training management. This is a
> broader and more comprehensive perspective than traditionally
> has been taken. . . .
>
> . . .By using combat effectiveness, rather than training output,
> as the focal point, the Study Group has been able to review a
> training establishment as having a single overrriding mission
> (the preparation and maintenance of combat effective units)
> rather than an establishment made up of a number of agencies
> having overlapping, interrelated, but not identical missions.[44]

As previously discussed, the system approach to training recom-
mended by the study would be centered in a strengthened OSD
organization. But the responsibility for training would remain with
the services. OSD would ensure that output is related to input
through several means: establishment of training review panels
somewhat similar to the defense agency policy councils; develop-
ment of methodologies to evaluate unit combat effectiveness with
relation to training; and development of a "feedback system capable
of providing decisionmakers at the service, JCS, and OSD levels
responsive and relevant information on current unit status."[45]

Locus of DOD Coordination. Setting aside, for the moment, the
existence of conflicts which undermine concerted action and
assuming harmony among the constituent elements, a bureaucracy
as large and complex as DOD nevertheless finds it enormously
difficult to achieve coordinated action. This hindrance results in
large part from the associated problems of (1) communicating
required information to all participants needed to accomplish a
given action and (2) correct interpretation of the part he is to play in
the action by each recipient. Even in the absence of conflict, merely
collecting, transmitting, ensuring receipt, and correctly interpret-
ing the information necessary for united action—such as objec-
tives, activities of various elements, and technical data base—can
be overwhelming tasks.

The study recommendations indicate coordination must be
accomplished by central management. The DRM Study concludes
that specialist components of the manpower force must be man-
aged individually, but *centrally coordinated* because of the "interre-

lationships among the components (they draw from the same pool of accession-age youths)."[46] Likewise, with respect to medical planning, the DRM Study acknowledges differences in service planning are to be expected but suggests OSD and the JCS must intervene "when differences derive from fundamentally different planning scenarios, have large resource implications, or cannot be rationalized." The goal of coordination should be "consistency, not uniformity" in this case.[47] The NMCS Study indicates that "few argue that all defense studies, analyses, and gaming should be centrally controlled" but it strongly recommends centralized coordination of the terms of reference and wide dissemination of results.[48]

Although responsibility for the foregoing coordination proposals would rest with individual OSD officials, other recommendations would effect united action by employing various types of corporate bodies—the Armed Forces Policy Council, training review panels, defense agency policy councils. A major proposal of the DRM Study (which has been implemented) is to establish a Defense Resources Board (DRB) composed of senior officials from appropriate functional areas to manage the program and budget review "ensuring a collaborative review of service program/budget submissions by the OSD officials most directly responsible."[49]

A final aspect of coordination involves harmonizing the internal activities of DOD with those of external organizations. The DH Study describes the major part the under secretary of defense for policy should play in this regard.[50] A study of *National Security Policy Integration* conducted by Mr. Philip Odeen as part of President Carter's reorganization project proposes placing even greater emphasis on the coordinative responsibilities of OSD. It recommends that internal DOD deliberations on defense policy, weapon systems acquisition, and the defense budget include consultation with the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Executive Office of the President *prior* to the determination of a DOD position. The under secretary for policy and other senior OSD officials would provide the coordinating links which would bring external agency considerations into the DOD policy, DSARC, and PPBS processes.[51]

Primary Influence on Cooperation Throughout DOD. Dropping

the assumption of internal harmony and returning to the real world, differences exist among the constituent elements of the Department which undermine coordinated action. But conflict can be exacerbated or ameliorated depending on the degree of the prevailing spirit of cooperation or, conversely, acrimony. Whatever their technical managerial accomplishments, Secretary McNamara and his OSD staff found it increasingly difficult to secure military service cooperation during a period of ever-increasing defense budgets. A major factor appears to have been a dual, and scarcely concealed, conceit: a presumption of intellectual superiority on the part of senior OSD officials and a corresponding disdain for the military. By contrast, Secretary Laird, emphasizing participative management, is credited with fostering a cooperative attitude which prevailed throughout a time of relatively severe reductions in service programs and budgets.[52]

A cooperative approach to defense problems and issues cannot eliminate conflicts which ultimately stem from different views of the best way to expend scarce defense resources to maximize national security. A spirit of goodwill, however, can subdue lesser conflicts based on personality, narrow interests, etc. More important, a cooperative approach is crucial to increasing the degree to which decisions are accepted and implemented by those elements which have recommended and supported a different course of action.

Two studies treat aspects of the subject of cooperation. Both suggest fostering a cooperative relationship among the elements of DOD is primarily a responsibility of the secretary and OSD. The NMCS Study calls attention to the problem of the "manner in which civilian control is sometimes exercised." The study notes that the military legitimately resents excessive OSD involvement in the details of policy implementation and improper attempts by lesser OSD officials to direct the JCS, Joint Staff, and field commands. The study admonishes OSD officials to "be sensitive to these issues and careful to exercise only such authority as has been clearly delegated to them by the Secretary."[53]

Increasing cooperation in DOD is a principal focus of the DH Study. Its cover letter calls for increased teamwork, a theme which is elaborated throughout the study:

What is needed is a greater sense of teamwork, encouraged by

> organizational and management changes that encourage participation, reduce management turbulence, and meet reasonable tests of acceptability. . . .[54]

> . . .Dealing with the problems likely to be encountered will require a clear expression of common purpose, an enhanced sense of teamwork, and a more careful delineation between policy direction and operating responsibility.[55]

The study introduces its recommendations for OSD with the statement that "they are broadly intended to meet a need for a more cohesive management effort in which appointed officials, professional military officers, and career civilians can work together with a greater sense of common purpose." It advances its key proposal, revitalization of the Armed Forces Policy Council, as a method of increasing cooperation. The principal subordinates of the secretary of defense, the service secretaries and chiefs and three senior OSD officials, would participate more fully in policy formulation; the secretary of defense "in turn could expect more effective implementation as a result of the active involvement of the [military department] principals."[56]

The Secretary/OSD as a Line Manager

Even though organizational purists may take exception with the practice, it is nevertheless a fact, recognized and implicitly accepted by the studies, that the central management acts as a line manager in performing some tasks relevant to the Department as a whole. The assistant secretary of defense for health affairs directs the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) which provides medical services for eligible non-active-duty DOD beneficiaries.[57] The defense agencies are supervised at the secretary/OSD level. Although the studies find problems in the management of CHAMPUS and the defense agencies, they do not challenge the propriety of their operation by central management.

The Authority Relationship

A relationship which the studies seldom discuss but nevertheless recognize is that which exists by virtue of the secretary's authority to impose decisions on the other elements as a result of

the broad, comprehensive legislative powers vested in him. A great deal of evidence in this volume and elsewhere indicates that the secretary who attempts to "rule" the Department of Defense or any other bureaucracy arbitrarily by fiat is doomed to failure. Inevitably, other constructive relationships, such as coordination and cooperation, are destroyed and the secretary's accomplishments extend only as far as his individual resources carry him. On the other hand, when the other relationships will not yield satisfactory resolution of issues, the studies propose that the secretary resort to explicit exercise of his authority.

That is the basis for the DRM Study call for "stronger leadership and aggressive management by the Secretary of Defense" and other OSD officials with regard to health affairs. It will be recalled the study finds the service medical corps do not give the medical benefit mission the priority intended by Congress and specified in legislation. Also, immoderate discrepancies and inconsistencies in service medical planning give reason to doubt the validity of stated requirements. In these circumstances, the study calls for the secretary of defense to assign the benefit mission explicitly and impose consistency in service medical planning.[56] The possibility for an outright exercise of secretarial authority is also evident in the NMCS Study recommendations for secretary/OSD review of military plans. If in the secretary's judgment the political assumptions and objections of the plans are not consistent with national security policy, the obvious implication is that he would act to correct this situation.[59] Finally, both the DRM and DH Studies criticize conditions which allow disgruntled elements to reopen issues in the PPBS after they are "decided." The DH Study suggests that revisiting decisions can be eliminated by secretarial fiat which unilaterally forecloses changes after program decisions are made.[60] Even though the latter example m· · ·e unrealistic, it demonstrates that the study which places the gr· ·est premium on cooperation also recognizes the hierarchical authorit / relationship of the secretary/ OSD to the other elements is at times appropriately invoked.

Resolving the Conflict between the General and Issue-Oriented Concepts

The study materials clearly evidence a contradiction between the general concept of a detached, policy-oriented secretary of

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defense/OSD and the activist approach. The latter approach would necessarily result from accepting the myriad responsibilities recommended for top management to attack identified problems. A secretary/OSD intimately involved in revamping logistics, adjusting enlisted personnel experience mixes, allocating training resources between service schools and units, evaluating readiness, negotiating for wartime hospital beds, and coordinating studies, analyses, and war games cannot credibly be pictured as uninvolved in the day-to-day activities of the Department of Defense.

But does this mean the general concept should be dismissed? Obviously not. Central management must disengage itself from the exigencies of the moment and deal with the ultimate purposes and general processes of the Department.[61] It must take the broader view, conducting long-range planning and analyses which in turn support the development of objectives, general policy, policy direction, and policy evaluation and adjustment. The general and issue-oriented concepts must be accepted side-by-side despite the necessity of subsuming the inherent contradiction between disengagement and involvement.

This multifaceted approach is the key to successful management. No single factored concept of the relationship between the secretary/OSD and the other elements of the Department remotely approximates the complexities of the actual situation. Many relationships exist simultaneously. The secretary/OSD may at the same time provide general policy guidance allowing the military departments broad discretion in one area and devote the most detailed attention to another; coordination and cooperation may suffice to achieve objectives for some activities while more authoritative measures are necessary for others. An eclectic interpretation most accurately depicts the relationships of the secretary/OSD to the remainder of the Department.

That explanation accommodates the existence of a number of inherently conflicting relationships, as well as others which are mutually supportive. Many of the relationships discussed earlier in this chapter are contradictory in some respects. The overt exercise of authority undermines cooperative and coordinative relationships; the system approach may contradict delegation of responsibilities and decentralized operations; the products and services of input organizations may not jibe with the demands of client output

organizations; overall DOD interests are at times contradicted by the organizational interests of elements—indeed, the organizational interest of DOD conflict with and must be accommodated to those of external organizations; vested interest in the status quo is challenged by the implications of changing conditions. On the other hand, mutually supportive relationships which result from parallel or coincident interests of DOD elements are also present. These include general concerns with maintaining national security and furthering the interests of the defense establishment; OSD performance of activities beyond the capabilities of other DOD elements, such as coordination, data gathering, and negotiation with external agencies; and military department and defense agency performance of responsibilities delegated by central management. Clearly, the secretary/OSD must pursue a multifaceted approach to governance of the Department to accommodate the studies.

REQUIREMENTS AND DEVICES OF HIGHER CONTROL

Merely demonstrating that an eclectic explanation more accurately describes the relationships between central management and the remainder of the Department is not enough. What is needed is an appreciation of (1) which relationships are preferred, and in what circumstances; and (2) how central management can realize them. Those questions concern the requirements and "devices of higher control."[62] To answer them requires reexamination of the secretary/OSD in light of relevant organizational theory and the particular organizational circumstances of the Department of Defense.

Organizational theorists often divide the activities of central management into two parts, those which link the organization to the outside world and those which involve internal direction and control." The DOS 77-80 materials suggest a third category The Department of Defense central management is also responsible for several "source" activities which originate with the secretary and OSD. Satisfactory performance of each of the three categories of activities imposes requirements on both the secretary/OSD and the Department as a whole which must be considered in assessing the most appropriate methods of achieving higher control.

Interface with the External Environment

The secretary/OSD represents the Department of Defense to the outside world and vice versa. Satisfactory performance imposes three requirements on the secretary/OSD. First, on any given issue, there must be something to represent—a unified position as opposed to a number of conflicting service, agency, and JCS positions. Developing a DOD position involves the question of internal direction and control which will be discussed below.

The second requirement is that the central management be capable of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting relevant *intelligence* and *strategic planning* information from the external environment. Intelligence information (employing the term in a general sense which includes, for example, relevant information gained from Congress and the White House, as well as formal intelligence organizations) "helps management determine where they are and what problems need attention—particularly problems *originating* from changes in the external environment." *Strategic planning* information is concerned with gaining an understanding of changes in the external environment and their impact on the behavior of the organization. This information should "provide a basis for the decisions that are to be taken today. . . to provide lead time for tomorrow's actions."[64] The Departmental Headquarters Study emphasis on freeing the secretary of defense from a portion of his internal management burdens to allow him to devote more attention to "questions of overall national security policy" reflects an appreciation of the importance of the information requirement.[65] Also of this genre is the Defense Resource Management Study recommendation that the OSD resource analysis capability be greatly expanded to include monitoring of national economic indicators, cognizance of aggregate resource use in DOD, and estimating the long-term resource implications of new weapon systems.[66]

The third requirement is for central management to effect external-internal coordination. The information from the external environment must be brought to bear on the activities of the Department of Defense and result in accommodation of its positions to outside conditions. As discussed in chapter 4, the DH and NMCS Studies recommend precisely this role for the under secretary for policy who would fill the need "for better integration of military

planning with political considerations and overall national security policy-making."[67] The Odeen Study, cited earlier in this chapter, would employ OSD officials to assist in effecting coordination with the external environment as a part of the process of developing DOD positions.[68] In sum, the interface with the external environment must be an iterative process in which the central management represents departmental positions and at the same time gathers information on external conditions which in turn influences modification of departmental positions.

Source Activities

Central management originates a number of activities. Some are unique to the secretary/OSD; they must be performed at this level, or not at all. Because they depend on the secretary, these might be termed "initiator" activities in accordance with one of Lucas and Dawson's models of DOD management.[69] The study findings and recommendations suggest several types of initiator activities. In one, the secretary maintains control by challenging the other elements to justify their current methods of operation and program proposals. Recommendations consistent with this technique support improving the OSD program analysis and evaluation capability and encourage central management to sponsor evaluation of alternative approaches in the areas of logistics, training, budgeting, programming, and design of weapon systems support. A second type of initiator activity would apply a system approach similar to the PPBS to a number of functions as a method of comparing, as well as integrating, individual service performance. Finally, initiator activities also include those the other elements are incapable of performing, e.g., development and maintenance of integrated DOD management information systems, resource analysis capabilities, and some types of research.

The secretary/OSD level is also the source of a number of quasi-operational activities not necessarily unique to central management; these include, for example, supervision of CHAMPUS and defense agencies. Significantly, the under secretary of defense for research and engineering (USD(R&E)), the fourth-ranking OSD official, indicated in his comments on the studies that he considered himself primarily a line manager responsible for program execution. He also included the assistant secretary of defense for man-

power. reserve affairs, and logistics in that category. The remainder
of OSD is "staff" in his view.[70]

The Need for Wherewithal. Central management activities
impose several requirements on the Department of Defense as an
organization. Most mundane, yet least acknowledged, is the neces-
sity for the secretary/OSD to have the wherewithal to perform them.
That means OSD must have personnel with the requisite capabili-
ties, and in sufficient numbers. Although its activities have not
diminished, OSD has been reduced by over one-third in little more
than a decade to approximately 1,600 individuals. It is less than
one-half the size of any of the three military department headquar-
ters staffs (i.e., secretariat and service staff), and is only marginally
larger than the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[71] The DH
Study, even though it recommends reducing service headquarters
staffs, proposes that OSD not be cut further. And the DRM and
Training Studies recommend increasing the size of OSD commen-
surate with the additional responsibilities their recommendations
entail.[72]

Wherewithal also includes access to accurate data and other
information from throughout DOD necessary to perform the cen-
tralized source activities. Subordinate DOD organizations at times
undermine the information requirement. Their practices include
dilatory tactics, variations in accounting and reporting systems, and
limiting access. The DRM Study analysis of the first term/career mix
of enlisted personnel, for example, is based on Army and Air Force
submissions because Navy data was not made available.[73] The DH
Study notes the readiness rating ("R") system is not uniform among
the services; "that is, the definition of what may constitute an 'R-2'
rating for an Air Force wing may differ considerably from that for a
mechanized infantry battalion."[74]

The same study introduces tables enumerating the size of each
military department secretariat with the extraordinary comment
that "it is difficult to establish with accuracy the number of individu-
als involved."[75] In other words, an accurate tabulation of something
less than 1,000 individuals in each military department was beyond
present capabilities. That is because of differences in the way the
military departments count their management headquarters per-
sonnel (despite years of effort by OSD to establish uniform criteria

for this purpose). As a result, the figures of the military departments are not comparable with each other. Moreover, even intradepartmental totals are not comparable over time; when the data were rechecked with the military departments, subsequent submissions varied significantly from the originals. It is apparently impossible for the secretary of defense/OSD routinely to ascertain the size of the military department staffs at present.

Another example, cited in the NMCS Study and discussed in chapter 4, is the JCS reluctance to submit operational plans for review by responsible OSD officials. Through a strict interpretation of "need to know," access has at times been limited to the secretary and deputy secretary of defense. The study convincingly argues the need for annual review of the plans to ensure they are consistent with national policy. Further, the study presents a strong case the review should be conducted on behalf of the secretary by the under secretary of defense for policy because "present arrangements place too great a burden on the secretary."[76]

The JCS, services, and other elements of the Department of Defense are understandably reluctant to share information in areas such as plans, personnel, and readiness which may be used to question their *modus operandi*. Without information, however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense cannot act as the source of activities which, although they challenge the elements, foster integration of the Department as a whole and reduce central management's isolation from the operational decisions of the elements.[77] If central management is to possess the wherewithal to initiate activities effectively, it must eliminate barriers to the flow of information.

Combining Line and Staff Responsibilities in OSD. A second requirement for performance of OSD source activities is that central management be capable of satisfactorily combining supervision of the operations for which it is directly responsible with its myriad other tasks. It must establish workable approaches to OSD line management responsibilities. The Defense Agency Review finds that overburdened OSD officials are unable to devote the time necessary for adequate oversight of the agencies; as a result, the agencies are essentially free of OSD supervision. But when an OSD official focuses on line responsibilities, as in the case of the under secretary for research and engineering (USD(R&E)), he may ne-

glect broader issues. The DRM Study criticizes management of the acquisition process, which is the responsibility of the USD(R&E), for "the tendency to overlook vital issues while grappling with a multitude of lesser questions."[78] If line responsibilities are to remain at the secretary/OSD level, more satisfactory methods of balancing the demands of supervisory and staff activities are necessary. Approaches suggested by the DOS 77–80 materials and organizational literature are contained throughout the remainder of this section.

Finding the Balance Between Centralization and Decentralization. Finally, satisfactory performance of its source activities requires that OSD continuously attempt to approximate the optimum balance in the Department of Defense between centralizaton and decentralization. But what is optimum? The DOS 77-80 materials are apparently biased in both directions. Their guidance for central management would seem to be:

- Do not perform any unnecessary activities but ensure that all which are necessary are accomplished, even if they have to be performed at the secretarial level.

or

- Decentralize everything that can be decentralized but, if necessary, do not hesitate to assume central control of any issue or problem to ensure it is resolved.

Those ambiguous statements add credence to Herbert Simon's argument that abstract debate over principles of organization, including centralization and decentralization, is essentially irrelevant; no *one* best solution exists. Both centralization and decentralization of an activity offer advantages. The activity must be examined in the context of the conditions which prevail in a given organization. In some circumstances, centralization is the best solution; in others, decentralization.[79] Equally important, a dynamic element is involved: because circumstances change, an activity may justifiably be centralized at one time and later decentralized, or vice versa.

Centralization Proposition. The DOS 77-80 recommendations in light of Simon's insights on the relativistic nature of organiza-

tional "principles," lead to two conclusions which are profoundly significant in the context of DOD organization. Although decentralization eventually receives preference below, the first conclusion, or proposition, coincides with the thrust of the issue-specific study recommendations and strongly affirms the legitimacy of centralization: *the secretary of defense is justified in devoting the most detailed scrutiny and supervision to (i.e., centralizing) any activity in DOD*, if circumstances warrant. In this regard, the derogatory connotation of the term "micro-management" is misplaced.

Before discussing the implications of that proposition, what is meant by centralization and the circumstances which warrant it must be explained. Centralization may mean central management assumes responsibility for performing an activity. More likely, however, in the case of DOD, it will mean intensification of review by central management and concomitant limitation of the discretion of a subordinate element which continues to perform the activity.[80] Virtually all secretary/OSD supervisory activities are in the second category, including supervision of CHAMPUS, the defense agencies, and even the under secretary for research and engineering's "line management" of weapons research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition.

Circumstances which warrant centralization are situations in which one or more advantages which centralization offers justify priority; for example, increased responsiveness to organization goals, improved communications (information flow), and concentration of expertise.

One implication of the centralization proposition is that no area of DOD activities should in principle be off-limits to the central management; no legitimate fences, either in the services or JCS, should limit the reach of the secretary of defense. Because circumstances may justify closer secretary/OSD supervision of any activity at some time (as in the case of training at present, according to the Training Study), the secretary's complete *de jure* "authority, direction, and control" over the Department of Defense should be realized *de facto*. Thus central management should overcome its reluctance to assert its overriding authority in areas such as Joint Staff procedures, review of JCS plans, and training conducted by the services.

A second implication of the centralization proposition is more subtle, yet potentially more far-reaching because, to reiterate, this discussion concludes with a decided tilt toward decentralization: recognition of the legitimacy of centralization throughout DOD will enhance central management influence and thereby facilitate decentralization. Traditional organizations build from a central core by successive subdivisions of activities and delegation from the center. But the Department of Defense has built from its periphery organizations, the military departments, to the center.[81] As a consequence, the study findings suggest the central management has never established its predominant position in all areas, notwithstanding the successively more comprehensive grants of legislative authority throughout the late 1940s and 1950s and the tenure of Secretary McNamara.

To the degree that acknowledgment of central preeminence is missing, subordinate elements are free of the influence of central management. They are not subject to what Carl Friedrich has termed the rule of anticipated reactions which "rests upon the capacity of human beings to imagine and thus to anticipate the reactions of those who are affected by their actions." Friedrich suggests influence develops "whenever the influencer's *reaction* might spell disadvantage and even disaster for the actor, who foresees the effect the action might have and alters it more or less in accordance with his foresight."[82] Thus activities considered the special province of the constituent organizations and beyond the reach of the central management are relatively immune from the influence of the secretary of defense. However, once the centralization proposition holds sway, the rule of anticipated reactions suggests the decentralized activities will voluntarily become more responsive to central management to avoid the possibility of increased supervision.

Simon precisely illustrates this point in discussing the relationship of a legislature to a bureaucracy.

> The fact that pressure of legislative work forbids the review of more than a few administrative decisions does not destroy the usefulness of sanctions that permit the legislative body to hold the administrator answerable for *any* of his decisions. The anticipation of possible legislative investigation and review will have a powerful *controlling effect on the administrator*, even if this

potential review can be actualized only in a few cases. The *function* of deciding may be distributed very differently in the body politic from the *final authority* for resolving disputed decisions.[83]

In sum, central management should be confident of its plenipotentiary powers for the entire Department. Any challenge to its prerogatives should be contested as a matter of principle as well as on substantive grounds.

Decentralization Proposition. The second conclusion which stems from acknowledging the relative or circumstantial nature of organization principles can be stated in terms of a decentralization proposition: *the central management of DOD should constantly seek ways to delegate and decentralize the performance of activities.* The underlying rationale for "organizing" is to divide work into manageable components, each performed by personnel with tailored expertise. At several points this volume has emphasized the compelling necessity for a central management to subdivide and delegate responsibilities. The costs of centralized management of activities which can be performed elsewhere include: (1) saturating top managers; forced to spend time on decisions which could be made at lower levels, they stint attention to broader concerns; (2) duplication of functions; this, in turn, undermines the subordinate organizations, tending to make them superfluous, adds to the cost of decisions in terms of time delay as well as resources, and increases the possibility of error resulting from more complex communications and elaborate coordination requirements; and (3) in some areas, degraded performance because the subordinate elements are more expert and have better access to first-hand knowledge of the situation.[84]

Charles Ries also argues persuasively that centralization may in fact undermine one of its intended purposes. Extensive centralization of activities in OSD has the paradoxical effect of causing loss of central control. Rather than focusing responsibility in one or a few accountable subordinate elements (e.g., the military departments), centralization diffuses it among various OSD under and assistant secretaries as well as the original organizations.[85]

Interpreting Mixed Signals on Centralization. The centraliza-

tion and decentralization propositions assist in interpreting apparently contradictory study recommendations. Taken together, the propositions hold the secretary/OSD must have unbounded power to give close scrutiny to areas of particular concern, but other activities should be delegated as much as possible. For example, two studies emphasize the need for more extensive decentralization of weapon systems acquisition management, the area in which the under secretary for research and engineering considered himself a line manager.[86] On the other hand, the DRM Study in effect recommends centralization of program manager selection and evaluation because service influences bias their work.[87] In accordance with the two propositions, after central management develops adequate new procedures and safeguards, the program manager activity should again be decentralized.

Internal Direction and Control of DOD

In addition to activities which it originates, as a unique source or line manager, and others which derive from its position as the Departmental representative to the outside world, central management engages to some extent in a third major category of activities to fulfill its responsibility for internal direction and control. The secretary/OSD undertake to tailor the patterns of *conflict* and *cooperation* among DOD elements, channeling their disparate activities to achieve organizational objectives.

Coexistence of Conflict and Cooperation in Organizations. Assumptions about conflict and cooperation constitute one of the *major fault lines which divide organizational literature. The rational*, hierarchic model elaborated by Max Weber concentrates on the division of labor and the rules which govern each division in a bureaucracy, e.g., jurisdiction, function, authority, duties and rights.[88] This model implicitly assumes the members of the organization voluntarily cooperate to achieve goals established by the leadership at the pinnacle of the hierarchic pyramid. More recent scholarship by Halperin and others emphasizes what Weber's model overlooks, the conflict among the elements of an organization which inevitably attends delegation of authority and decentralized operations. These authors explain bureaucratic behavior on the basis of interaction among conflicting and competing interests.[89] Neither model is sufficient in itself. The hierarchic model

cannot deal with the complexities which conflict imposes and thus fails to explain nonrational (bargaining) decision processes and outcomes. The conflict model, emphasizing disagreement, does not adequately explain how cooperation is achieved and actions are finally taken.[90]

Nevertheless, the tenor of the DOS 77-80 findings and recommendations concerning the Department of Defense suggests each model approximates significant portions of reality. Once again, an eclectic approach which subsumes discordant premises must be accepted. Despite the apparent contradiction, empirical evidence leaves no room to doubt both tendencies are inherent in bureaucratic organizations. They coexist. In some circumstances, explanations of bureaucratic behavior which assume cooperation are more accurate; in others, those which emphasize conflict hold.

The implications of that conclusion for Department of Defense management are also profound. To achieve and maintain control, central management must create the circumstances in which both conflict and cooperation contribute to achievement of organizational objectives. That is, central management must *manipulate* cooperation and conflict to realize overall organizational objectives.

"Manipulate" might be judged too extreme. It could possibly be replaced with "design," "tailor," "artifice," or "structure." But after considering the bases of both conflict and cooperation below, "manipulation" most nearly describes the actions of an enlightened central management in pursuit of higher control.

Conflict—Sources, Legitimacy, and Requirements for Control.
The treatment of conflict in organized bodies, although overlooked by Weber, has a distinguished lineage. James Madison in essay 10 of *The Federalist* suggests the structure of the United States Constitution derives from an appreciation of the pervasiveness, and potentially disastrous effects, of unregulated conflict among "factions." *The Federalist* attributes the origin of factions, and thus conflict, to (1) man's nature in which reasoning ability and emotional make-up provide the basis for arriving at differing opinions (concerning, for example, religion, government, and political leadership which are pursued with "zeal"); and (2) the claims of different interests based on the distribution of property.[91] Two centuries have done nothing

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to tarnish those insights, although chapter 2 suggests the source of conflict might be broadened beyond "property" in explaining bureaucratic organizations to include interests such as influence, domain, independence, essence, morale, and budget.

As a result of genuinely incompatible judgments and interests, then, conflict within and among organizations is inherent, pervasive, and (regrettably, in Madison's view) legitimate. Because resources are too scarce to accommodate all valid requirements, because the opinions of sincere individuals may diverge on the most appropriate course of action, and because decisions are made in conditions of uncertainty in which no definitive proof exist. that the alternative selected is in fact "best," differences are inevitable and the pursuit of competing claims justified. Ries has given eloquent expression to the legitimacy of conflict in the Department of Defense:

> There is no reason to believe those sharing power will view all policy questions identically. Differences will occur. And these differences do not appear because some individuals have the "right" or the "truly national" view while others have the "wrong" or "parochial" view. On the contrary, differences occur because of the different duties of those who share power. Duties to office, duties to constituency, duties to organization, duties to knowledge, and duties to self are different.[92]

Despite mutual agreement on its legitimacy, Ries and *The Federalist* disagree on the value of conflict. Ries appears to justify all conflict; *The Federalist*, to condemn it. Neither position is tenable. Certain forms of conflict are detrimental. On the other hand, the success of an organization like the Department of Defense in defining and achieving its objectives depends in large part on how it structures conflict to achieve constructive results. Conflict is counterproductive, for example, when based on personal jealousies and animosities; or on narrow organizational considerations of a constituent element manifestly at variance with the objectives and well-being of the parent organization; or when it results from unrelenting pursuit by a subordinate element of a course of action rejected by the secretary of defense in favor of another.

But conflict which derives from the pursuit of their interests by the constituent elements of an organization provides the issue

agenda, complete with alternatives, which constitutes the basic data and framework for organizational decisions. That statement is true whether the competing elements are the sales and production departments of a business or the military departments of the Department of Defense. The conflicts may be over objectives, the operational goals the Department of Defense should pursue to maintain national security; for example, an assured destruction versus a counterforce targeting strategy, or a Navy preeminent in all aspects of sea power (air, surface, and subsurface) and capable of prosecuting all types of warfare (conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic) at the expense, if necessary, of the Air Force and Army. Or the conflicts may involve selection of the means to achieve given ends; for example, the choice between an Air Force and a Navy cruise missile design.

Any assumption that central management has the capability within its own resources to plumb the depths of issues such as these (which involve ultimate national defense goals and ends-means compatibility) and arrive independently at solutions at once feasible and acceptable to elements of the Department charged with carrying them out would be completely erroneous and the most dangerous form of arrogance.[93] A central management which fails to provide access to differing positions denies itself the most innovative thinking and spirited advocacy on pending decisions as well as a valuable source of intelligence on the most significant issues facing the organization.

The Departmental Headquarters Study fully appreciates the constructive value of conflict and consistently emphasizes the need to provide access for a diversity of views. For example, in discussing layering, it states that

> carried to its extreme, the reduction of layering would result in a single staff, but this would expose Defense decision-making to undue risk, since it would preclude the opportunity to consider other perspectives and points of view.[94]

The problem, then, for central management is not to eliminate conflict but to manipulate it to secure its benefits and minimize its harmful effects. This pluralistic approach requires that (1) all relevant interests are represented in decisions which will have an impact on them; and (2) interests are checked through organiza-

tional devices—structure, procedures, and processes—which secure their benefits while harnessing their excesses. The first requirement is self-evident; a decision uninstructed by all significant viewpoints and urged by strongly interested advocates could very easily fall short of approximating overall organizational goals.

The second, more complex, requirement assumes, with *The Federalist*, that organized interests, if left unchecked, will pursue their goals to the point of disregarding "the public good" or "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." This being the case, "the principal task" is "the regulation of those various and interfering interests."[95] *The Federalist* authors proceed in later essays (see numbers 48, 50, 51) to elaborate the techniques of controlling the effects of factions through the separation—but sharing—of powers and responsibilities among the constituent elements of government in such a way that each checks and balances the others.

Organizations, whether private or public, in advancing their interests tend to continue to escalate their claims until checked. The reason is not difficult to find. Whether they merely fail to consider the question of the more general interest, or are able to rationalize their objectives and actions as conforming with it, is irrelevant. The point is that an abstract concept such as the general, public, or national interest, which political philosophers are patently unable to define, poses absolutely no limitation to the activities of organizations in pursuing their interests. That is true whether the interests involved are businesses or labor unions, environmentalists or developers, government departments (DOD versus State), free traders or protectionists, nuclear power advocates or their opponents, minority activists, or Army, Navy, and Air Force proponents. Consequently, in attempting to control the confederation of strong-willed organizations which comprise DOD, *central management should configure the inevitably conflicting constituent elements to check and balance each other.*

Cooperation—Source and Potential for Controlling Conflict.
David Truman has suggested another, more subtle check to the potential excesses of organizational interests which bridges the gap between conflict and cooperation. Truman points out that members of any organization are also members of many other groups, both organized and unorganized. Each of these groups has interests

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which may or may not be compatible. The overlapping member-
ships of the participants in any one organization impose inherent
limits on its demands. Moreover, additional limits result from partic-
ipants' loyalties to latent interests which, when mobilized (or dis-
turbed), are very powerful. The latent interests include a sense of
fair play (or the absence thereof), pride in the overall organization,
and a sense of propriety or impropriety in the manner in which
decisions are made.[96]

Several examples illustrate the limitations which overlapping
organizational membership and unorganized interests may impose
in the context of the Deparment of Defense. A member of the Air
Force may have supported acquisition of the B-1 bomber but
opposed any further Air Force effort to acquire it during the Carter
administration after the president rejected the program. A naval
aviator may support the air against the surface and subsurface
components *within* the Navy, but later support a Navy budget which
stints naval air against Air Force and Army budget proposals. De-
spite personal reservations concerning its wisdom, a serviceman
may willingly participate in a controversial war, such as Vietnam,
because of his commitment to the constitutional and democratic
processes from which the war policy, however misguided in his
view, emerged. A service secretary or chief may advocate that his
department assume jurisdiction over military space activities but,
after thorough consideration of the issue by the secretary of
defense in consultation with all concerned, fully support a multiple
service approach to space activities. Thus the variety of loyalties
and interests of the members of an organization may serve to limit
the objectives and activities of the organization.

A skillful central management can employ the overlapping
interests and loyalties of the organization members to foster coop-
eration. That can be done in a number of ways: by ensuring all
significant interests are represented in decisions (as in the case of
the service secretary above); by establishing "rules of the game" for
decisionmakirg which are generally acknowledged as legitimate
and thus beccme "interests" in themselves (as in the cases of the
doubting Vietnam War veteran and the B-1 advocate); by ensuring
that the broad overall implications of alternatives under considera-
tion are assessed and made known as well as the effects on subor-
dinate organizations (as in the case of the naval aviator). Through

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techniques such as those, the multiple loyalties and interests which characterize each member of the organization make claims on him. He will pursue immediate and intense interests, such as a service position, through bargaining and negotiations with other interests. But beyond a certain point he will give way to other claims which he also perceives as justified. Consequently, in an organization as interlaced with overlapping layers and loyalties as DOD, *central management should manipulate the framework of cooperation to ensure competing claims are at the cutting edge of decision for all participants.* *

The DOS 77-80 Recommendations Interpreted: Manipulating Conflict and Cooperation to Achieve Control. When interpreted as approaches to manipulating conflict and cooperation, a .,odicum of consistency emerges from the otherwise apparently heterogeneous DOS 77–80 recommendations concerning Department of Defense internal direction and control. The study proposals include measures to (1) give voice to unorganized, and strengthen weak, interests; (2) structure conflict to ensure all relevant interests figure in decisions; and (3) structure conflict resolution by facilitating cooperation or, ultimately, through the exercise of central management authority. In the first category are recommendations which would strengthen the joint or *employing* arm of DOD, the service secretaries, and OSD to challenge the status quo, offset contra-organizational activities, and employ a systems approach in managing functional areas.

Tailoring Conflict. The second category suggests tailoring conflict to ensure all relevant viewpoints have access to decision processes. Several methods for achieving that result are advanced in the study recommendations. Merely organizing or strengthening formerly unorganized or weak interests will automatically structure conflict in some cases: the chairman-CINC axis; OSD as challenger and offset to other elements; the service secretary as *de facto* manager, in tandem with the service chief, of his department. Establishing input/output mechanisms structures conflict by evaluating capabilities in terms of the resources expended to achieve them and providing feedback throughout the entire organization. Creating conflict arenas to ensure opposing viewpoints in fact challenge

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*Parenthetically, this conclusion provides one of the principal rationales for participative management.

each other is proposed by a number of recommendations, which suggest creating boards, review panels, analysis groups, and policy councils composed of representatives of DOD elements. Finally, establishing DOD-wide systems, for example, in training, to compete with decentralized management of functional activities results in conflict between macro and micro perspectives.

This interpretation of the study recommendations does not suggest conflict should be fomented where none exists. Earlier, conflict was termed *legitimate* because it is an inherent feature of the organizational environment. Ries and others have noted that successive reorganizations of the Departments of Defense and a number of actions of central management over the years have in fact been completely futile attempts "to banish disagreement."[97] An inherent conflict exists between the goals of maximizing national security (output) and minimizing defense expenditures (input); between optimizing forces for joint operations and fulfilling individual service objectives; between funding a balanced defense establishment and meeting individual military department and defense agency budget proposals.

And the opposing positions of each of these conflicts either is or can be given expression as an interest of one or more of the constituent elements of DOD. The argument here favors (1) accepting conflict as a fact of life in organizations, (2) recognizing the concomitant *interested* behavior of constituent subordinate elements, such as military services and defense agencies, and (3) structuring organizational relationships accordingly to achieve constructive results from the imminent tendencies toward both conflict and cooperation. The penalty for failing to follow this approach in an organization such as the Department of Defense, which is as patently pluralistic in its composition as it is cooperative, is that some significant interests will not be sufficiently strong and advantageously placed to figure in decisions.[98] The study recommendations can be interpreted as proposing a stronger voice for interests which are relevant but at present insufficiently influential.

Structuring Conflict Resolution—Cooperation and Authority. The objective, then, of manipulating conflict is to bring all relevant perspectives to bear on issues, ensure their positions are considered, and ultimately arrive at the best decision for the overall organization. Thus, adequately structuring conflict is a part of—and

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prerequisite for—adequately str .cturing conflict resolution, the third category of DOS 77-80 recommendations for improving internal direction and control.

The study proposals concerned with conflict resolution focus primarily on transforming conflict into cooperation. The most obvious case is conflict which results from inadequate information. Recommendations designed to improve communications (the flow as well as the content) would resolve conflict based on insufficient or erroneous information. Those recommendations include proposals for OSD to develop management information systems, conduct basic research, restructure readiness evaluation, and establish feedback for the purposes of policy evaluation and adjustment.

Even more significant are the large number of proposals which not only structure conflict but automatically tend to foster cooperation. The rule of anticipated reactions suggests that input or output organizations, if certain their performance is subject to challenge, will attempt to avoid this outcome through greater responsiveness to each other. Moreover, ensuring major issue conflicts are made explicit encourages cooperation on lesser issues among the constituent elements which cluster on one or another side of a given watershed. Thus the conflict arenas discussed above—the Armed Forces Policy Council, training review boards, and defense agency policy councils—would also facilitate coalition-building and cooperation. Finally, giving access and weight to formerly unorganized or weak interests is tantamount to intensifying their claims on all participants in the decisionmaking process. To the extent these claims transcend the interests of constituent elements and are recognized as legitimate, conflict resolution through cooperation receives impetus.

In a similar manner, cooperation is also a function of the management approach of the secretary/OSD. The Departmental Headquarters Study discussion suggests latent interests are sensitized when the secretary of defense emphasizes teamwork, cohesion, and shared objectives of the entire Department. The study anticipates these interests will be mobilized in his favor if he establishes "rules of the game" giving constituent elements a part in policy formulation, thereby securing their support of the decisionmaking process as well as cooperation in implementing its results.

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Because underlying conflicting premises preordain organizational conflict, after realization of the absolute maximum of *voluntary* cooperation, many significant issues will remain. They require resolution by other means. These issues are in the realm of *negotiated* cooperation, characterized by bargaining and compromise.[99] With all interests represented, with mutually exclusive or substantially conflicting premises exposed, demonstrating that no one interest can completely prevail, the conditions for negotiation are fulfilled. The role of central management is crucial. Its concern may only be reaching a workable decision without delay, in which case it will serve as a catalyst to expedite resolution and subsequently act as a broker representing the resulting DOD position to the external environment. Or, to avoid a "lowest common denominator" outcome, central management may arbitrate among the elements, favoring one against others.[100] More likely, and most often in the Department of Defense, central management will participate as a strongly interested element with its own position. Its placement in the structure (based on its formal "authority") will allow it to establish the framework for resolving an issue, but the outcome will be shaped through compromises based on the informed judgment of the subordinate elements which will be required to implement it and whose cooperation is therefore critical.

Finally, central management may find it necessary to resort to the outright exercise of authority as a means of resolving conflict. Victor Thompson has scathingly, and justifiably, criticized the hierarchic organization model because it undermines cooperation and accentuates the gap between "the right to decide, which is authority," and the capacity to decide which results from specialized expertise and "the power to do, which is ability."[101] As previously stated, a secretary who makes major defense decisions uninstructed or uninfluenced by, or without otherwise accommodating, the military elements with expertise and "power to do," invites disaster. Arbitrariness cannot reasonably be claimed, however, when he exercises authority as a last resort after bargaining and negotiatior have failed. In this instance, adherence to participative "rules of the game," in which all parties have been heard, will dispose objective participants to accede to the central management decision.

But the outright exercise of authority is far more significant as a

potential expedient than as an actual technique. Two criticisms of bargaining and negotiation as a decision process and the corporate, or committee-like, fora in which it takes place are that it is time-consuming and susceptible to inaction—that is, failing to arrive at any decision.

Those criticisms need not prevail, however. An *imperative to action* invigorates corporate decision processes. Ries discusses two very successful, yet different, examples of bureaucracies employing corporate decisionmaking: The Operations Division (OPD) of the Army General Staff in World War II, under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, adjusted the requirements of overseas *theater commands* to the manpower and materiel output of the three domestic Army commands through a highly structured process of give-and-take. The British Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) *system brought representatives of the various elements of the* defense establishment together in committees chaired by the Minister of Defense or his representatives.[102] The common element which ensured the *success of the organization in each case was the* participants' anticipation that *a decision would be made*—if not by them, then by the authority which the OPD or the chairman represented. The penalty for failing to *reach a negotiated agreement was to lose* control of the decision to another arena and, possibly, to incur the wrath of higher authority for lack of cooperation in the overall effort. Thus authority can be employed to play a *central role in negotiated* organizational decisions.

ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE—PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING HIGHER CONTROL IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

At the outset this *chapter documented the paradox in the* actions recommended for the secretary of defense and Office of the Secretary of Defense by the DOS 77-80. The activities, responsibilities, and general *performance of central management expected by* this most recent study are by no means unique; they parallel those of other studies over the last two decades. But that does not diminish the extent of the contradiction *between the different conceptions of the secretary/OSD which live side-by-side in all of the* materials: one as a detached and aloof presence, providing general policy guidance to decentralized operational elements; the other as

activist, intervening, and involved.

At first blush, the only course may be to conclude that "you cannot have it both ways" and be satisfied with having demonstrated the contradiction in the study literature. But that would imply secretaries of defense must make a mutually exclusive, and equally unpalatable, choice: whether to *reign* or to *govern*. It would mean they must assume either the magistrate's mantle Secretary Forrestal apparently envisioned as he took office, or the shirt-sleeved demeanor of Secretary NcNamara as he initiated and consumed an endless stream of voluminous analyses and individually decided detailed issues. Moreover, *acceptance of an* "either/or" approach would ensure that, whichever choice he made, the secretary could expect criticism. He would be castigated not only for any mistakes he might make as either "magistrate" or "governor," but also because of his selected *modus operandi:* on the one hand, critics would charge that he allowed the services and other elements a free hand and was not in control of DOD; on the other, that he interfered and "micro-managed."

The literature on organizations, particularly Herbert Simon's insights on the flaws inherent in considering any given set of organizational principles immutable, rescues the secretary of defense from what turns out to be a false dilemma. No single formula can usefully be applied to all facets of DOD activities. Policy, acquisition, manpower, logistics, medical care, military operations, training, planning, budgeting, etc., require different structures, processes, procedures, and other techniques *for their successful* accomplishment in a given organization. The secretary/OSD may *reign* over an area which is working well; the most detailed *governance* may be necessary for problem areas. Furthermore, the concepts of *reigning* and *governing* represent the extremes of a spectrum and by no means exhaust the multiplicity of relationships which appropriately may exist simultaneously. The issue is not the *choice among reigning*, governing, or any other single-factored method of managing the Department of Defense, but how best to approach each of the plethora of activities which comprise the Department. And the answer to the question of which choice to make in any given area is: It depends upon the circumstances.[103]

That enigmatic answer would appear to be circular, returning

the discussion to the starting point. But this is not the case *because* the circumstances are ascertainable for a given organization. And once abstract organizational propositions are applied *in concrete* situations, some conclusions begin to emerge. Centralization, for example, has been shown to offer certain advantages which may outweigh, under certain circumstances, its equally apparent costs. The same is true of decentralization, of course.[104] Likewise, reducing the span of control of top executives may, if they are overburdened, be the right course; but this will be accomplished only by increasing the levels of administration below the top managers, i.e., "layering."[105] Considering abstract organizational principles in terms of the particular circumstances of a given organization leads to conclusions which should influence top management behavior and decisions concerning the structure and processes of that organization.

What conclusions do the particular circumstances of the Department of Defense portend concerning its structure and processes? The answers are interspersed throughout this chapter. Nevertheless, because the answers are crucial to an examination of DOD organization, they deserve explicit statement even at the risk of repetition. The following general statements and their subelements summarize the conclusions of this chapter concerning DOD organization. Taken together, they constitute a set of precepts recommended by the DOS 77-80, as interpreted herein, for the secretary/OSD to follow in order to achieve higher control and decentralized operations.

Precepts for Secretary of Defense/OSD Guidance in Organizing and Managing the DOD

1. *Devote more time and attention to the increasingly complex external environment—to learning about adjusting Departmental activities to those challenges which a rapidly changing world imposes.* A shift in focus to external affairs means *internal matters should be accomplished with less detailed top management attention.*

2. *Place more emphasis on ensuring DOD activities are successfully accomplished and less on accomplishing them.*

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a. *Continuously review DOD activities to identify circumstances warranting greater central management attention and others justifying delegation.* Considering the trend toward centralization, the first part of this conclusion would appear to be self-fulfilling and the second, earlier termed a *decentralization proposition,* utopian. *Delegation and decentralization will not naturally arise as alternatives from within a bureaucracy such as OSD; given this fact, the DOS 77-80 must be interpreted to recommend this bias be imparted as a matter of policy through the strong, continuous efforts of the secretary of defense and his political cadre,* whose objective is effective operation of the Department, unconstrained by particular bureaucratic interests.

b. *Pursue, as a matter of principle, the proposition that any activity in DOD is subject to the most detailed scrutiny and supervision of the secretary of defense.* Although this "centralization proposition" coincides with the legal authority of the secretary, it does not reflect his actual position. Until the *centralization proposition* becomes operative, large portions of major areas such as training, personnel, Joint Staff practices and procedures, logistics, military planning, health care, and command, control, and communications, are effectively fenced off from central management oversight. As a result, what Carl Friedrich has termed "the rule of anticipated reactions" is not operative: in the absence of any threat of secretary/ OSD examination, evaluation, or review of their performance in these areas, the subordinate elements have less reason to be responsive to overall DOD objectives, especially when they conflict with more particular interests.[106] Just as harmful, from the standpoint of effective defense organization, in circumstances where delegation jeopardizes higher control, central management is reluctant to decentralize activities.

c. *Strengthen and expand activities which central management is uniquely capable of performing within the Department and which are adequately performed elsewhere today.* These include: DOD-wide resource analysis and program evaluation; developing management information systems; research into new concepts which challenge the status quo in areas such as mobilization, logistics, training, life cycle costing, and acquisition; developing systems comparable to the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) for other major functional areas such as training and health care.

3. *Configure the inherent patterns of conflict and cooperation in the Department so that the activities of the constituent elements contribute to achieving overall defense objectives.* Ultimately, implementing the propositions in subparagraphs 2a and 2b would establish two of the three conditions for increasing delegation. Central management has good reason to place greater reliance on subordinate elements if it is confident (1) it will be cognizant of problems or issues in DOD as they emerge internally, or from the external environment; and (2) it is capable of dealing with those problems—through exercise of the centralization proposition, if finally necessary. The third condition for delegation is confidence on the part of central management that devices of higher control are adequate to ensure that the principal focus of activities, at whatever level they are performed, is their contribution to the overall effort of the Department of Defense. Herbert Simon has written that "administrative organizations are systems of cooperative behavior."[107] With respect to the organizational circumstances of the Department of Defense, that statement is no more than half true, in and of itself— and completely inadequate as an operative assumption. Simon would have been just as wide of the mark, however, to write that organizations are essentially arenas of conflict. Strong patterns of both conflict and cooperation characterize large bureaucracies like the Department of Defense which are composed of powerful constituent elements. Internal direction and control can only be achieved by deliberately arranging these patterns to achieve constructive results.

Therefore, adopt *the following sets of working hypotheses and corresponding operative principles:*

- The constituent elements of the Department are likely at times to pursue their conflicting interests to extremes detrimental to the organization as a whole. Consequently, *relationships within the Department should be configured to ensure competing interests check and balance each other.*

- An incipient basis for agreement and cooperation exists in every conflict situation, because the members of each constituent element (e.g., the Army and Navy) are also members

of the Department of Defense and other groups (e.g., the infantry, naval air, the Air Staff). An individual's membership in a group is almost invariably accompanied by sensitivity to its claims and objectives. Multiple *memberships result in* responsiveness to overlapping, sometimes conflicting, claims and a corresponding disposition toward conciliation. Consequently, *in structuring decisions, ensure the claims of all relevant interests are operative on all participants responsible for deciding.*

Following are types of action for achieving internal direction and control of DOD through organizational and procedural devices in accordance with the third precept and the operative principles:

a. *Mobilize all significant interests whose perspectives are germane to decisions on Departmental activities.* The studies recommend that relatively unorganized interests, such as the genuine joint perspective, be organized, and that weak institutions with a useful perspective, such as service secretaries, be strengthened.

b. *Structure conflict to ensure all relevant interests figure in decisions.* The studies recommend a number of ways to ensure that conflict which exists in the Department is channeled into adversary relationships which delineate the differing positions, alternative *solutions, and their implications:* input/output mechanisms with built-in feedback which foster appraisal of performance and subsequent adjustment; conflict arenas such as policy councils for defense agencies; and DOD-wide systems which provide alternative perspectives for evaluating performance.

c. *Structure conflict resolution to encourage cooperation and legitimize, as a last resort, the exercise of authority.* First, improve the quality, consistency, and flow of communications, thereby reducing conflict based on inadequate or erroneous information. Improve management information systems, military advice, readiness evaluation, and feedback channels. Second, make it a certainty that opposing positions will be revealed and challenged in forums with authority to make decisions, thus encouraging cooperation by participants reluctant to face such exposure. Third, intensify the latent claims on participants for accommodation by unorganized

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or weak interests. Finally, in addition to voluntary cooperation, encourage negotiated cooperation through bargaining and compromise by reinforcing participants' anticipation that central management would exercise its authority to decide in the absence of agreement.

HIGHER LEVEL ADMINISTRATION—
THE ALLOCATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS

A prominent organizational theorist has pictured organizations as a three-layered cake: basic work processes are the first layer; programmed or technical decisionmaking processes which guide day-to-day operations make up the second layer; and the top layer consists of "processes that are required to design and redesign the entire system, to provide it with its basic goals and objectives, and to monitor its performance."[108] At the highest level, management must be essentially concerned with the ultimate purposes and more general processes of the organization, as opposed to the technicalities of the actual work processes and operational decisions which govern them. To fulfill its responsibilities, top management must focus on decisions which (1) formulate organizational objectives; (2) determine the directions in which organizational efforts will be applied; and (3) structure "the decisionmaking process itself." The latter "administrative" decisions "do not determine the content of the organization's work, but rather how the decision-making function is to be allocated and influenced in that particular organization."[109]

The studies, taken as a whole, propose that the secretary of defense and his top management increase emphasis on "design and redesign" of the system and devote less detailed attention to technical functions. The framework within which the lower level activities are performed would be modified to employ conflict and cooperation constructively. Top management's attention to ultimate purposes and the means of achieving them would be more firmly grounded through employment of devices of higher control. By skillfully tailoring conflict and conflict resolution, these devices would focus top management's attention on the performance of the organization as a whole, needed adjustments, and issues and problems not resolvable at lower levels.

This chapter began by emphasizing the *centralizing* tendencies of many DOS 77-80 recommendations. However, careful examination of the content of the recommendations—with their emphasis on participatory policy bodies, the systems approach, input-output mechanisms, cooperation, and decentralization—suggests that their implicit goal is to achieve higher control through *decentralized* processes. These processes would require strong, articulate advocacy of organizational interests with mutually conflicting premises and mechanisms for their adjustment. The last two chapters will examine the implications of this approach for modifying the structure of the Department of Defense.

Chapter 7

DOD Organizational Alternatives— Repose, Refurbish, Restructure, or Rebuild

Each of the principal components of the organizational structure of the Department of Defense has now received separate treatment. This chapter turns to constructing alternative DOD-wide structures from those components. Four alternative organizational configurations accommodate the DOS 77-80 proposals:

- Present Structure
- Corrective Measures without Restructuring
- Limited Reorganization
- Major Reorganization

This chapter describes these alternatives and completes the evaluation of three. Much of the assessment has already been accomplished. The advantages and disadvantages of proposals for reorganizing parts of the Department are applicable when considering DOD-wide reorganization. As a result, the enquiry quickly discards alternatives whose debilities have already been exposed and concentrates on the most promising alternative: limited reorganization. Chapter 8 then concludes with an extended discussion of this recommended approach to structuring the Department of Defense.

An ordering and composition of alternatives which is sensitive to political as well as organizational considerations also facilitates

focusing the analysis. One of the strengths of the DOS 77-80 materials is in the insights they reveal concerning the degree of support and opposition, both within and external to the Department, which various proposals receive, i.e., their political feasibility. Consequently, although the spectrum of structural alternatives listed above extends from the least to the most far-reaching in organizational terms, political factors influence the content of specific alternatives where appropriate.

This chapter also serves a secondary purpose, to summarize the principal recommendations of the five studies and voluminous defense community comments which together comprise the Defense Organization Study, 1977–1980. The critique of the present DOD organization and the most significant proposals and counterproposals which constitute the substance of the alternatives appear in the text of this chapter or the appendices A and B. The patient reader who has already digested this information to his satisfaction will undoubtedly peruse that material rapidly; later, he may find it a useful reference.

THE POLAR ALTERNATIVES:
NO CHANGE AND RADICAL CHANGE

One extreme from the spectrum of alternatives promises too little change, and the other too much. Major reorganization combines the most far-reaching *maintaining* and *employing* proposals: (1) establishment of a body of national military advisers (NMA) to replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (2) elimination of service secretaries. The studies advance these measures as possibilities and specifically reject them. The defense community comments overwhelmingly criticize them. Consequently, the analyses in chapters 4 and 5 dismiss both components of the major reorganization alternative. Attempted adoption of either would incur the probability of a political controversy comparable to those of the 1950s. Although some causes might be worth this turmoil the major reorganization alternative is decidedly not of this geni. Political and organizational considerations coincide: attempted implementation of these proposals would be as harmful to DOD organization as it would be dangerous to its political standing.

The first alternative, continuation of the present structure, would trust the gradual evolution which every complex organization experiences to overcome the problems identified by the DOS 77-80. Even though this may be the most likely alternative, it is nevertheless troubling. The DOS 77-80 mounts a convincing critique of the present structure which is summarized in the opening pages of chapter 1 and documented in chapter 3. Chapter 3 also demonstrates the parallel findings of other studies of DOD organization over the last two decades. The studies find that the secretary of defense/OSD and the services unduly dominate the Department. The secretary/OSD tend to slight what should be the central substantive concerns of top management with ultimate purposes and general processes; are overly preoccupied with second order activities better left to lower levels; and almost completely abdicate the continuing organizational responsibility for designing and redesigning the structure for allocating decisions. As a result, the services, through their grip on the JCS, Joint Staff, and component commands, exercise preponderant control over the joint structure. Despite the formal organization represented by the basic organization model shown in figure 7-1, the informal, and operative, organization of the Department of Defense more closely resembles the bipolar model also depicted in the figure. In the informal, bipolar model, the relationship between the secretary/OSD and the services is the anvil on which the major decisions concerning both *maintaining* and *employing* functions are hammered out in DOD.*

The indictment of the present DOD organization by the DOS 77-80 can be cast in terms of the precepts concerning the requirements for higher control and decentralization from chapter 6 (pages 213-232). The present structure imperfectly mobilizes significant interests whose perspectives are germane to major Departmental decisions—integrated theater requirements, a genuine joint perspective, the civilian and politically accountable outlook in the military departments, and in some areas, the comprehensive perspective of central management. As a result, it is not possible at present to structure conflict so that decisions are informed and contested by the several interests with perspectives germane to a given issue. Examples of these differing perspectives include the essentially military conflict between service "input" and joint military "output" requirements; the military service/JCS "client" and the defense

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*Figure 7-1 repeats figures 2-1 and 3-2.

BASIC ORGANIZATION
AND PRESENT STRUCTURE MODELS

BASIC ORGANIZATION MODEL
(From Chapter 2)

PRESENT STRUCTURE
(From Chapter 3)

FIGURE 7-1: COMPARISION OF THE BASIC ORGANIZATION AND CRITIQUE
(PRESENT STRUCTURE) MODELS OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

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agency "supplier"; and considerations deriving from political accountability and those based on military service interests. Several important interests in the Department of Defense are either weak and unorganized or have been co-opted by the four services and central management.

The resulting organizational balance of power system in DOD is unsatisfactory. It structures significant conflict vertically in the Department between central management and one or more of the services. With appropriate interests mobilized, many issues could be contested horizontally between military perspectives, or otherwise resolved without involving central management directly. The present pattern discourages voluntary cooperation motivated by sensitivity to overall national security objectives, teamwork and cohesion. Moreover, negotiated cooperation inevitably yields flawed DOD decisions because it represents the interests of the four services and central management and omits other significant concerns.

Chapter 3 concluded that despite these deficiencies, the Department of Defense is a going concern which does work, however imperfectly. The question suggested by the critique is whether convincing alternative organizations that would improve DOD performance are available. The two remaining alternatives suggest there are.

FINE-TUNING THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION: CORRECTIVE MEASURES WITHOUT RESTRUCTURING

The least unsettling of the two remaining alternative DOD structures would undertake to fine-tune the present organization, to achieve limited-to-moderate objectives in correcting identified problems within the present institutional setting. Organizational improvements would be realized primarily by building upon the actions and counterproposals which constitute the defense community response to the recommendations of the component DOS 77-80 studies.

Limited Objectives

Actions Taken or Underway. Secretary Brown took several actions consistent with the study proposals. He established the under secretary for policy in 1977, a position which is emerging as

the focal point for the formulation and integration of DOD-wide plans and policy. Corresponding with several DOS 77-80 recommendations, the under secretary now heads a new planning office, prepares Defense Policy Guidance, and is responsible for policy oversight of military plans. His position and authority afford OSD access to military advice by the joint elements on national defense policy. In addition, the chairman of the JCS (CJCS) has been made a member of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) and the new Defense Resources Board (DRB), despite JCS opposition expressed in its response to the DOS 77-80.

Although ample opportunities to build on these measures exist, the DOD approach to date gives little reason for optimism. The actions taken, and comments from OSD officials, suggest (1) agreement with the study findings that there is a need for a more substantial joint military voice in resource allocation and other policy decisions; (2) willingness to alter *internal* OSD organization and procedures for this purpose; (3) support, in principle, for institutionalizing a CJCS-CINC axis to provide a genuine joint perspective; (4) support for service secretaries; (5) mixed support for the service secretariats; and (6) great reluctance to incur the disruption, criticism for unwarranted interference, and decline in cooperation which it is anticipated would result if the secretary/OSD undertook to sponsor change in the principal elements of the DOD structure. In sum, although latent support for fuller implementation of the DOS 77-80 proposals exists in the Department bureaucracy, the central management confined its actions to changes in its own organization and left any additional changes to the discretion of the other elements.* To achieve the most modest objectives, this approach will have to be discarded.

Acceptance of Defense Community Counterproposals to the Study Recommendations. A very modest second step would be qualified acceptance of many of the JCS/service counterproposals to the DOS 77-80 recommendations for correcting problems and weaknesses of the *employing* arm identified in the study effort. (Chapter 6 indicates there are no viable counterproposals for the *maintaining* arm recommendations.) In commenting on the DOS 77-80, the JCS agrees with several important study findings: (1) the quality of military advice should be improved and it should be

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*These comments are confined to the tenure of Secretary Brown.

integrated more fully into the policy considerations of senior DOD decisionmakers; (2) OSD oversight of military plans and operations may need to be increased to assure consistency with national policy; and (3) chain of command relationships may need to be streamlined.

To achieve those improvements, the JCS and services advance a number of proposals as a counter to the study recommendations. (See appendix A.) They suggest that the corporate body of the JCS, rather than an independent chairman, shoulder increased responsibilities, particularly with respect to resource allocation decisions. Representatives of the JCS, but not the chairman, should become members of senior OSD decisionmaking and advisory bodies. Although roles of the CINCs and Joint Staff should remain unchanged, improvements in readiness evaluation and JCS guidance of the Joint Staff should be forthcoming. JCS information briefings would increase top civilian officials' oversight of military plans. Increasing the chairman's role in the chain of command may be necessary, although he would continue to act only as the JCS spokesman.

Intermediate Objectives

Incorporating the management and organization precepts developed in chapter 6 designed to improve higher control and increase decentralized operations adds a further dimension to the fine-tuning alternative. Because this option is limited to measures short of reorganization, it accommodates only two of the three precepts. First, these measures implicitly suppose greater central management attention to the external environment and the ultimate purposes and general processes of DOD. Second, they favor more emphasis on ensuring DOD internal activities are successfully accomplished and less on accomplishing them—strengthening and expanding activities which OSD is uniquely capable of performing for DOD; asserting the centralization proposition that no DOD activity is sacrosanct from central management scrutiny; and accepting the decentralization proposition, placing high priority on delegation and decentralization.

As a starting point, the secretary would build on the consensus concerning the joint elements recorded in the DOS 77-80 studies

and responses, as well as previous studies. They agree that the quality of military advice and other aspects of the performance of the JCS and the *employing* arm, including its integration into senior policy deliberations, need to be improved. *Central management* would assess the progress of the joint elements in correcting these deficiencies.

In the case of the most limited objectives, the secretary/OSD need not "interfere" by advancing recommended changes; the JCS counterproposals, summarized above, provide the menu of corrective actions. The central management role would be to correlate JCS assessments of its progress in correcting the *employing* arm weaknesses with those of JCS clients and, ultimately, the secretary of defense. Thus periodic JCS evaluations of the effectiveness of its counterproposals—formal recognition of the chairman's chain-of-command role (albeit as JCS spokesman), modified Joint Staff procedures, participation by JCS representatives on senior OSD advisory bodies, revision of the readiness system, study of creating a staff for the chairman—would be compared with the assessments of those whom the joint military arm serves, both within and external to the Department. Although central management would be intimately involved, the onus for improving the performance of the *employing* arm would remain delegated to the *employing* elements. The key is a commitment by the secretary/OSD to evaluate organizational performance continuously and accept responsibility for its improvement.

More Ambitious Objectives

Beyond initiating oversight of measures proposed by the JCS, however, the secretary/OSD, in undertaking any commitment to improve DOD organization, would probably find it necessary to sponsor actions requiring reallocation of responsibilities within the elements of the Department. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that the military departments and JCS (as well as the several OSD offices) advanced no counterproposals to change their present organization. Moreover, although Secretary Brown rejected JCS arguments opposing the chairman's membership on the DSARC and DRB—that is, with respect to OSD interface with the *employing* arm—he took no actions which might be construed as central management intrusion into the internal organization of the elements. If further

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"fine-tuning" is to eventuate, DOD top management will have to overcome its timidity.

Following are the most significant measures in the "fine-tuning" category drawn from the preceding chapters. Parenthetical comments accompany the proposals, where appropriate, comparing and contrasting them with opposing positions, or otherwise explaining them. At some point in the list central management's acceptance of these DOS 77-80 proposals would signify objectives more accurately characterized as moderate than limited. Nevertheless, these measures fall short of the relative discontinuity with the present structure which the limited reorganization alternative portends.

Employing Arm

- Formal recognition of the chairman as a source of military advice in his own right, as well as in his usual role as spokesman for the JCS. (This would reject the JCS/services position opposing a separate status for the chairman as a military adviser.)

  — At the secretary's discretion, the scope of the chairman's independent military advice might be unrestricted or, alternatively, limited to resource allocation issues in general as well as prioritization of service and defense agency program proposals above a certain minimum, as specifically recommended by the studies.

- Initiation of routinized OSD oversight of all major JCS plans for conventional, tactical, and strategic warfare, crises, and other contingencies to ensure they are consistent with national security policy and objectives. (This is in contrast to JCS-proposed information briefings on request.)

- Strengthening the unified and specified commanders (CINCs).

  — Ensuring that a revised readiness evaluation system embodies systematic theater-wide assessments by the CINCs of their warfighting capability and recommendations on how it should be improved, as well as the more narrow assessments of the component commanders.

(The JCS indicated in its comments that studies under-way in 1979 would yield a "total force" readiness evaluation concept; but the JCS did not suggest what, if any, role the CINCs would play.)

— Lessening the identification of each CINC position with a given service by making CINC selection more contingent on qualification for joint command and less on service affiliation.

● Acceptance of the NMCS Study recommendations to improve crisis management. (Despite overwhelming agreement expressed in the comments on the study from throughout DOD, no action has been taken on these proposals.)

Maintaining Arm

● Enhancement of the position of service secretaries.

— Renewed emphasis on the qualifications of appointees, their commitment to extended tenure, and their understanding of the roles of service secretaries as well as their relationship to the secretary of defense and the military services.

— Intensified efforts on the part of the secretary of defense and his political cadre to delegate activities to the military departments and hold the service secretaries accountable for decentralized performance.

(The above service secretary items would accept the status quo alternative discussed in chapter 6, retaining service secretaries and their secretariats, while incorporating the usual nostrums about strengthening the position.)

● Expanded oversight of the defense agencies.

— Increased OSD attention to defense agency supervision and more stringent scrutiny of program proposals in the PPBS.

— Adoption of procedures for clients to monitor and evaluate the performance of defense agencies which support operational forces: development of OSD policy guidance for agencies with prior coordination by the JCS; CJCS prioritization of agency programs and budget proposals;

a policy council for each agency with representatives of OSD, the JCS, and the services; review of agency charters and plans by joint elements to ensure their adequacy in time of war; periodic readiness tests and increased participation in joint exercises.

(Despite general agreement on these proposals, expressed in the comments on the Defense Agency Review from throughout DOD, no action has been taken.)

Fine-Tuning—An Insufficient Remedy

If the most far-reaching fine-tuning measures above were accepted, the institutional configuration of the Department of Defense depicted in figure 7-1 would nevertheless remain essentially unchanged. This alternative, even at its outer limits, is an intermediate position closer to the status quo than to limited reorganization.

On the positive side, DOD would probably benefit from legitimizing the chairman as an independent source of military advice, a more balanced readiness evaluation system, and increased scrutiny of the defense agencies by their clients. The Department would also profit from more confident assertiveness on the part of central management in establishing, maintaining, and strengthening relationships with the remainder of DOD which are clearly within its province and in which the potential OSD contribution is obvious and unambiguous. In short, the discussion in previous chapters supports the conclusion these changes would improve the performance of the present structure.

But the improvement would be modest at best. From what vantage point would the chairman provide his independent assessment? His institutional source would remain the same as that of the JCS, a Joint Staff system strongly influenced by the services. Absent some touchstone embodying a genuine joint perspective, the chairman's independent views on military issues would amount to little more than another opinion (although, admittedly, an educated and experienced judgment less constrained by service considerations).

Likewise, the measures proposed for strengthening the CINCs

fall far short of qualifying them as the source of a joint military perspective which rivals, much less equals, the influence of the service components in the theater commands. Even if the CINCs were somehow capable of developing a theater-wide readiness assessment, deriving intermediate and long-range objectives and requirements therefrom, and finally translating these into recommendations, the effort would probably be futile. No institutional mechanism would exist in Washington to assign priorities to the individual submissions of the seven combatant commanders and develop an integrated, coherent joint program. Consequently, the fine-tuning alternative would create no counterpoise to the service programs, developed in conjunction with the component commands, vigorously pursued through JCS, Joint Staff, and the military department channels. An overburdened secretary of defense would continue to receive individual CINC appraisals, as at present, and somehow balance them against service proposals.

The proposals which would maintain the status quo with respect to the positions of service secretaries and their secretariats while calling for improved selection, tenure, and utilization amount to hortatory preachments. They have been advanced continually, with little effect, throughout the quarter century since service secretaries lost their institutional foundation in the reorganizations of the 1950s. No doubt a secretary of defense who undertook to recruit (with his administration's support), train, and constructively employ highly qualified and motivated service secretaries, could do so. But experience suggests that secretaries of defense make use of several available avenues (OSD, the military chiefs, and the JCS structure, as well as the service secretaries/secretariats) rather than expend the considerable effort necessary to manage the military departments as now configured principally through the institutionally isolated service secretaries. As a result, the service secretaries' sporadic contributions, though of value, are best characterized as dividends superimposed on the underlying managerial apparatus of the Department. The exhortations of the proponents of this alternative will have no effect on this situation.

Finally, this alternative would accommodate only two of the three precepts concerning organization and management of the Department from chapter 6, and these only partially. As a consequence, it would result in a quantum increase in central manage-

ment activities without establishing any corresponding rationale for delegation and decentralization. By stopping short of any reorganization activity, it would preclude most measures designed to reshape the patterns of conflict and cooperation in the Department (the third precept) and thereby justify delegation and decentralization. At the same time, it would encourage increased central management involvement. The centralizing measures which the second precept implies, such as those which would enhance central management ability to challenge the status quo and to perform activities the other elements cannot accomplish, in themselves are worthwhile. As shown in chapter 6, given the organizational circumstances of DOD, those are rational secretary/OSD measures. But in the absence of the corresponding acceptance of some of the decentralizing measures also implied by the precepts, the net result would be to further the trend toward centralization.

In conclusion, the second alternative, even though it addresses some of the deficiencies of DOD, and would possibly improve performance marginally, would not substantially alter the present organization. The secretary/OSD and the services would remain the only meaningful protagonists.

RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE: LIMITED REORGANIZATION

One of the purposes stated for chapter 6 was to demonstrate that the burden of leading the Department may overwhelm a secretary of defense and his associates "who lack an adequate, systematic approach which defines and continuously maintains, reinforces, and strengthens the relationships" among the several organizational elements of DOD. This was accomplished by delineating the breadth and scope of the organizational and managerial tasks imposed by the Department of Defense. Much of chapter 6 was devoted to developing the framework of an "adequate, systematic approach" based on the DOS 77-80. This framework consists of several basic relationships of the secretary/OSD to the remainder of the Department and a number of precepts for organizing and managing the Department.

The remaining DOD alternative, limited reorganization, incorporates proposals which result from this framework and the viable alternatives from chapters 4 and 5 which contemplate incremental

changes in the *employing* and *maintaining* arms of the Department. In addition, because many "fine-tuning" measures included in the previous alternative are consistent with limited reorganization, they are included in this alternative.

Overview

Figure 7-2 depicts the principal aspects of the limited reorganization alternative. The restructured organization features a streamlined *maintaining* arm, stronger *employing* arm, explicit delineation of the roles of central management (the secretary of defense *and* OSD), and increased emphasis on higher administration by the secretary. Thus, each service secretary strengthens his cognizance of the *maintaining* functions by consolidating his relatively small secretariat with the large military headquarters staff and assuming control, in tandem with the service chief, of the resulting integrated headquarters staff. The unified and specified commands appear closer to the other joint elements; together with the chairman, they form the nucleus of a joint institution within the *employing* arm. The chairman is more independent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but nevertheless maintains his corporate identity as a member of the JCS. The Joint Staff is less dependent on service staff influence. Depicting the secretary of defense not only within the element containing the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but also outside of it indicates added emphasis on senior level administration—concern with the performance of the Department of Defense as an organization—as well as the usual attention, as the principal OSD executive, to substantive policy issues. Taken together, the changes would remove the bipolar axis depicted in the critique model on the left, replacing it with an organization balanced on the basis of the interplay between *employing* and *maintaining* considerations and interests.

Secretary of Defense

Concern with Administration. All defense secretaries would agree their major concern should be the objectives and purposes of national defense and the means to achieve those ends. What they may not recognize is that, to avoid being distracted by relatively minor issues and inundated with details, they must devote a significant part of their attention outside the realm of substantive defense

PRESENT AND LIMITED REORGANIZATION MODELS

PRESENT STRUCTURE
(FROM CHAPTER 3)

LIMITED REORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

FIGURE 7-2: PRESENT AND LIMITED REORGANIZATION MODELS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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issues to *administration* in the broadest sense of that word. Top management administrative responsibilities cannot—and therefore will not—be accomplished elsewhere in the organization. Those responsibilities involve designing, evaluating, and redesigning the allocation of decisions (i.e., the relationships) among the constituent elements of the organization in a continuing effort to adjust to changing conditions and improve organizational performance.[1] If the thrust of the DOS 77-80 has been correctly interpreted in chapter 6, the studies sound an unmistakable call for greater emphasis on administrative responsibilities by top management—a lasting commitment to refine the manner in which decisions are made and thereby continuously improve the Department of Defense as an organization.

The rationale for such an effort is not altruistic. It is an enlightened understanding of the limits of the capacity of central management to "do" things. And it is a corresponding appreciation of the potential for improved performance of Departmental activities if central management accords greater priority to ensuring that the decisions which determine "how" things will be accomplished are as optimally allocated among the "doers" as possible.

Shouldering these administrative/organizational responsibilities would require that the secretary simultaneously play the part of an observer of, and a participant in, DOD activities. In figure 7-2 he appears separate from DOD and again as a part of the central management element because he must be capable of disengaging from day-to-day concerns to examine the organization from a detached vantage point; consider changes designed to improve the substantive, issue-oriented, day-to-day performance; and devise strategies to effect the changes he determines necessary. Most of these modifications would involve adjustments to processes (such as the PPBS), procedures, and functions for the purpose of correcting relatively minor deficiencies or effecting second order improvements. At much less frequent intervals, they might involve structural realignment, the chief concern of this volume.

Whether or not the rest of this limited reorganization alternative is accepted, increased top management emphasis on administration would yield one immediate benefit initiation of a serious continuing attempt to grapple with longstanding criticisms of DOD

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organization. Organizational adjustment would no longer be con-
sidered a one-time rearrangement of the topmost positions in OSD
to meet the predispositions of an incoming secretary. That sort of
cursory treatment leaves unattended the organizational weaknesses
repeatedly rediscovered by succeeding studies of the Department—
studies which deserve the presumption of credibility, if for no other
reason, because they are based in large part on hundreds of candid
confidential interviews with both current and former officials of the
Department.

The Rudiments of an Administrative Strategy. The limited reor-
ganization alternative ties the proposal for recognition of the signif-
icance of his administrative responsibilities by the secretary to a
specific administrative approach. If the secretary is to place greater
emphasis on administration, the allocation of decisions, it follows
he must have (1) an operative concept of the organization, and
(2) the rudiments of a strategy for realizing and continually adjust-
ing the concept. The DOD structure which most nearly accommo-
dates the DOS 77-80 findings and recommendations, the limited
reorganization alternative, constitutes the operative concept in this
case. The three precepts for managing and organizing the Depart-
ment, derived from the conclusions in chapter 6 concerning how to
achieve higher control and increased delegation, constitute the
rudiments of a strategy for achieving the operative concept.

Those precepts are summarized at the end of chapter 6. Briefly,
the first precept recognizes the increasingly important requirement
for top management to devote more time to the manner in which the
Department of Defense perceives and responds to the external
environment. The second precept emphasizes the need for central
management to place greater priority on ensuring activities are
successfully accomplished and less on accomplishing them; it
would impose a general decentralization bias on DOD activities, but
not at the expense of centralization in individual cases where cir-
cumstances warrant. Finally, the third precept endorses measures
which would configure the inherent patterns of conflict and coop-
eration within the Department in ways which focus activities on the
attainment of overall defense objectives.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chapter 6 documents the gulf between the general consensus

that central management should confine itself to policy direction and the empirical results which emerge from examining DOS 77-80 findings and recommendations. The studies reveal a number of relationships between the secretary/OSD and the other elements which must flourish if the Department is to function satisfactorily. The limited reorganization alternative includes the study recommendations discussed in chapter 6 which would afford a secretary of defense concerned with administration the opportunity to strengthen each of those relationships. Appendix B summarizes the chapter 6 proposals. They address the following central management relationships to the remainder of the Department.

- Source of Policy Direction

- Complement to Other Elements. Whatever the shortcomings of the other elements, it is expected that they somehow be balanced or offset by central management. Three types of complementary relationships are identifiable. They portray the Secretary/OSD—

    — Challenging the status quo

    — Performing activities which the other elements are incapable of accomplishing

    — Offsetting parochial interests of the other elements

- Principal Source of DOD Organizational Integration. The DOS 77-80 recommendations propose that the secretary/OSD—

    — Sponsor "systems" analogous to the PPBS in other areas

    — Consciously relate input to output, and vice versa, across DOD organizations

    — Coordinate the efforts of the diverse subordinate elements

    — Foster cooperation

- Line Manager. e.g., OSD supervision of the defense agencies and dependent health care program.

- Source of Authority

Maintaining Arm—the Military Departments

The service secretaries pose a dilemma. If the positions were

abolished, their costly service secretariats (combined payroll approximately $50 million a year) and a cumbersome administrative layer would be eliminated. However, the Department of Defense would also lose the potential they represent for improved management as well as their valuable, if intermittent, present contributions. The following recommendation avoids both horns of the dilemma and places the secretaries in an organizational context that encourages realization of their potential.

> Streamline the *maintaining* arm by integrating the military department headquarters staffs. Provide each service secretary and service chief with a small, generalist personal staff (40-60 individuals). Below the service secretary/chief level, consolidate the existing service secretariats and military staffs into a single staff for each department headquarters with major functional areas headed by appointive assistant service secretaries and their military deputies (the present deputy chiefs of staff).

In addition, this alternative includes the fine-tuning recommendations regarding the *maintaining* arm: (1) select more qualified service secretary appointees, increase delegation of responsibilities by the secretary of defense, and place added emphasis on tenure and accountability; and (2) expand oversight of defense agencies.

Employing Arm—The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commands

Through a separately instituted US Army, the present DOD organization ensures national security problems are examined from the standpoint of their implications for land warfare. An effective way to ensure promotion of a cause is to create an institution which recognizes that cause as an organizational interest. The principal purpose of the following recommendations is to establish a joint military institution *within* the present *employing* arm, at its core consisting of the JCS chairman and the CINCs, with an organizational interest in propounding and seeking acceptance of joint military positions. Such an institution would act as a counterpoise to service military viewpoints. Other recommendations would create a more independent Joint Staff. Finally, several *employing* arm recommendations from the fine-tuning alternative are consistent with institutionalizing the joint interest and are included herein: lessening the identification of each CINC position with a given

service; routinized OSD óversight of all major JCS plans; and improved crisis management procedures. Although leaving the responsibilities of the JCS unchanged, except with respect to the chain of command, the realigned *employing* arm would increase the challenge within the JCS to service-oriented policy positions.

Strengthen the Chairman, JCS. Increasing the chairman's independence and influence is the key element in establishing an institutional proponent for the unified, or joint, interest. The chairman would assume additional responsibilities for military advice, the chain of command, and joint interface with the secretary/OSD and the CINCs.

- By direction of the secretary of defense, formally designate the chairman an independent source of military advice (without prejudice to his traditional duties as JCS spokesman). In particular, make the chairman responsible for review of service and defense agency budget proposals and submission of his recommended priorities to the secretary of defense.

- Enhance the chairman's role as the joint military link to the Office of the Secretary of Defense through memberships on senior advisory bodies such as the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), ties with the under secretary for policy and his planning office, and formal participation in developing defense policy guidance.*

- Establish the chairman as the principal military link between the secretary of defense and the commanders in chief of unified and specified commands (CINCs), to include replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command (see related CINC recommendations below).

- Assign a dedicated staff to assist the chairman in the performance of his additional responsibilities.

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*The chairman has become a member of the DRB and the DSARC since the publication of the studies.

Strengthen the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and Their Command Structures. Increase the influence of the joint military perspective within each unified and specified command, and in Washington.

- Designate the chairman as the single military superior of the CINCs, responsible for acting as their supervisor under the aegis of the secretary of defense, and as their spokesman at the seat of government.

- Assign the CINCs a coordinate role with that of their component commanders in a revised readiness evaluation system. CINC assessments would be integrated by the chairman into a consolidated joint position that would challenge or complement the proposals which emerge from component-to-parent-service channels.

- Assign the responsibility for joint training and doctrine to the Readiness Command.

- Give strong consideration to consolidating theater support at the unified command level.

Increase the Independence of the Joint Staff. Eliminate practices that subordinate the Joint Staff to the service staffs.

- Terminate procedures that require service coordination and thereby give service military staffs predominant influence over the content of Joint Staff position papers—and consequently, the substance of JCS advice.

- Ensure the JCS provides initial high-level guidance on contentious issues to the Joint Staff; require that the formal position papers conveying military advice to civilian authorities include alternatives developed by the Joint Staff and considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- Revise Joint Staff personnel procedures to ensure assignment of the best qualified officers by creating a referral system under the direction of the chairman which is sensitive to legitimate service and joint personnel considerations.

WHAT REMAINS

This chapter has outlined four alternative organizational con-figurations for the Department of Defense. Three have been rejected for various reasons. By a process of elimination, then, limited reorganization acquired the status of the elected alternative. Although this procedure has the advantage of highlighting the flaws of the rejected alternatives, it fails to provide sufficient information about the prospects for a reorganized DOD. The final chapter ana-lyzes these prospects and presents a favorable assessment.

Chapter 8

Prospects for a Moderately Restructured Department of Defense

This inquiry, having patiently sampled the wares of numerous organization proposals along the way, has selected those which appear most likely to satisfy present defense requirements. They are summarized in the following prescription for a limited reorganization of the Department of Defense.

- *Secretary of Defense.* Devote attention to higher level administration—*designing,* evaluating, and redesigning the allocation of decisions among the constituent elements of DOD. Impose both a decentralizing bias and a centralizing imperative, each controlled by the circumstances surrounding a given activity. Configure the inherent patterns of conflict and cooperation to achieve overall DOD objectives.

- *Office of the Secretary of Defense.* Build strong central management relationships with subordinate DOD organizations in which OSD is the source of policy direction, complement to other elements, source of organizational integration, line manager, and source of authority.

- *Maintaining Arm—the Military Departments and Defense Agencies.* Strengthen the service secretaries by integrating the service secretariat with the military headquarters staff in each military department. Improve service secretary selection, tenure, responsibilities, and accountability. Expand oversight of defense agencies.

- *Employing Arm—the JCS Complex and Combatant Com-*

mands. Establish a joint military institution *within* the present employing *arm,* at its core consisting of the chairman of the JCS and the CINCs, with an organizational interest in advancing joint military positions. Strengthen the chairman and CINCs. Increase the independence of the Joint Staff. Leave the JCS essentially unchanged.

This final chapter considers how a Department of Defense realigned and managed according to these proposals might function, what improvements over the present organization might be realized, and at what price in political currency such a transformation might be purchased.

Compared to the sweeping proposals usually the norm for DOD organization studies, the limited reorganization alternative, with its most notable features being integrated military department headquarters staffs and a closer chairman—CINC institutional affiliation, is *unimposing.* Yet, the analyses of the preceding chapters suggest the incremental approach may be at once politically acceptable and sufficiently potent to prepare the *Department of Defense to* meet the challenges of the 1980s without experiencing the disruptions and uncertainties attendant to major structural changes.

Although the most promising, the limited reorganization alternative delineated in the last chapter may be insufficient. This volume has *confined its inquiry to* the recommendations contained in the DOS 77-80 materials to this point. This final chapter ranges somewhat farther afield than the DOS 77-80 recommendations and, where necessary, discusses additional measures.

Nevertheless, without exception, the specific recommendations *included in* the limited reorganization alternatives are "steps in the right direction." That is, they could be accepted as initial measures with the implicit understanding that further action in certain areas might be required. This incremental approach accepts as a premise the inherent value of the present Department as a functioning organization, despite its *flaws. It offers a* restrained alternative in opposition to reformers who might be tempted to go further immediately, radically restructuring the Department by creating, for example, a general staff.

INSTITUTIONALIZED JOINT PERSPECTIVE

Creation of strong chairman-CINC ties would provide the joint military perspective with an institutional base. The chairman-CINC axis would defend joint interests just as the Army now defends land-warfare interests. Freeing the Joint Staff from inordinate service influence would allow it to serve a more dispassionate, integrative role, assisting the JCS in synthesizing the service and emergent chairman-CINC joint military positions, where possible, and clearly delineating differences, when necessary. Maintaining the chairman as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would recast its terms of reference without changing the nature of the JCS as a conflict arena; the joint military perspective would gain an institutional proponent and compete with service viewpoints. But the JCS would also act as a device for conflict resolution, the outcome being more biased in favor of joint perspectives than at present. The changed circumstances would contribute to revitalizing the JCS, a point further discussed later. Where irreconcilable differences emerged from JCS deliberations, the civilian leadership would be better served by advice from two *military* viewpoints. That outcome would alleviate the present unhealthy tendency of the DOD structure to transform all controversies, even those based upon essentially military differences, into rifts between military and civilian authorities. Thus limited reorganization would vest a legitimate, but presently impotent, joint interest in accordance with the precept which calls for mobilizing all relevant viewpoints, bringing them to bear on decisions, and providing means for conflict resolution.

If the analysis in chapter 4 is correct, however, establishing a strong joint interest will require additional measures. Although the proposals for strengthening the chairman and the Joint Staff would be sufficient, those involving the commanders in chiefs of unified and specified commands (CINCs) would hardly leave them capable of rivaling the service components. At a minimum, CINC staffs would require augmentation to assess integrated theater readiness. Other measures should be considered in terms of their contribution to shifting the balance of influence toward the CINCs as well as on their merits. These include consolidating theater support at the unified command level; reorganizing the unified commands by integrating the component and unified headquarters into one command unit headed by land, sea, and air deputies, as approp-

riate, reporting to the CINC; and creating a unified strategic command consisting of land, sea, and air components.

INTEGRATED MILITARY DEPARTMENT STAFFS

Merging the two headquarters staffs in each military department would provide an opportunity for the service secretaries to become authentic managers of their departments. Secretariats, by simply existing, create a separate institutional status for service secretaries that has the unfortunate effect of isolating them from their departments. Ending structural isolation by integrating the secretariat and military staff would place the secretary at the center of military department action.

Thus integration would overcome the principal organizational causes of weak service secretaries. First, they do not enjoy sufficient firsthand access to balanced, accurate, thorough, comprehensive, and timely information crucial to civilian participation in defense policy decisions.[1] Second, service secretaries are unable to participate significantly in the initial stages of departmental military policy formulation which establish the framework, and in large part, the substance of the final product—and which are necessarily conducted by the service staffs.[2] A resolute service secretary, in establishing a genuine civil-military managerial partnership with the service chief through integration of the headquarters staffs, would end the present structural isolation. That would terminate the tailoring of issues before they reach him and guarantee his ascendancy over the channels of access between the service(s) and the secretary of defense/OSD.

Revitalizing the service secretary position in this fashion could yield greater delegation and decentralization of DOD activities. Provided they roughly agree on objectives and means, a secretary of defense could reasonably place greater reliance on service secretaries who in fact (as well as by law) manage their military departments. With integrated military department staffs, the secretary of defense could depend on the service secretary, acting as an intermediary, to bring the secretary of defense's appreciation of broad diplomatic, political, economic, and defense policy factors to bear when military staffs first consider an issue. By the same token, the secretary of defense could be more confident that a service secre-

tary, acting as an intermediary in behalf of his department, represented a position developed with his personal involvement by staff members cognizant of its broader implications. In addition to his roles as manager and intermediary, this type of service secretary would serve as a unique counselor to the secretary of defense. With his "hands on" knowledge of the activities, strengths, problems, and peculiar requirements of his service, the service secretary would be a valuable source of advice as changing internal and external conditions caused modifications in the broader aspects of policy.

In sum, a strong service secretary with an integrated staff would increase, rather than decrease, DOD central management's ultimate control of his military department, thus offering an attractive alternative to centralization.

But integration of the two military department staffs would result in a stronger service secretary *position*, not necessarily in stronger service secretaries. Staff integration would merely increase the available opportunities for highly qualified and motivated civilians to contribute. That in itself would possibly encourage recruitment of talented individuals and dissuade less endowed persons from accepting. In any case, the performance of weak secretaries would not be appreciably worse with integrated staffs and the opportunities for strong managers would expand significantly. Consequently, in organizational terms, the case for integrating the military department headquarters staffs is very strong.

OTHER EFFECTS ON THE EMPLOYING AND MAINTAINING ARMS

Altered Status of the Service Chiefs

The major changes in the *employing* and *maintaining* arms would leave the service chiefs' *formal* status almost completely intact. This result would have the advantage of avoiding some of the *acrimony which inevitably attends* reshuffling the organizational accouterments of a powerful position. Nevertheless, the chiefs' *de facto* status would change as a result of vesting the chairman and CINCs as an institution, distancing the Joint Staff from the service staffs, and the more favorable positioning of service secretaries. Although a service chief's status might not diminish, his standing

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would depend less on the authority of his office and more on his ability to perform in an increasingly complex, competitive, and challenging environment. The cogency of his positions, his skill in building coalitions, and the coincidence of his objectives with those of the politically accountable service secretary would figure more prominently in determining his stature.

Reordered Priorities of the Military Departments. These changed circumstances would undoubtedly influence the evolution of the JCS and military departments. The outcome is unpredictable, but the directions in which they would be influenced are discernible. If the service secretaries were sufficiently demanding, the changes might force the service chiefs to shift their focus, to a degree, away from military operations, the principal joint mission, to the relatively unattended principal military department responsibilities: recruiting, training, equipping, and supporting the forces to be employed by the joint commands. In addition to strengthening the CINCs' positi   and making it more attractive, this eventuality would incre... e emphasis on defense problems which are at once the most significant facing the nation and the least glamorous. The resource management weaknesses identified in the DOS 77-80, and certified in recent defense history, confirm the need for unremitting, high-level attention to the problems of securing and retaining manpower; providing effective, yet economical, military training; acquiring high-quality, affordable, reliable, and maintainable weapon systems in sufficient quantity; and transporting and supporting forces throughout the world on short notice. A reordering of priorities to ensure military department leaders, both military and civilian, concentrate on these principal concerns of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps would constitute an achievement well worth adopting the reorganization proposals.

Revivified JCS. The emergence of this pattern in the military departments would favor, perhaps decisively, revivification of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transforming it from a body criticized for its lethargy and cumbersomeness to a valued source of military advice which gives effective expression to conflicting military viewpoints. The chiefs would be freed of the responsibility of equably representing conflicting, sometimes contradictory, service and joint/national interests. Reflecting service "input" concerns as the framework for the positions they favor in the JCS, the chiefs would face the posi-

tions of the military commanders in the field as synthesized by the chairman.

Thus the JCS, as a conflict arena, would foster more straight-forward competition of a broader spectrum of *military* interests arising from both the *maintaining* and *employing* arms of the Department of Defense. Irreconcilable differences would be elevated to the secretary of defense. But a number of factors, including the formidable influence of a united military position in Washington, would bias the JCS toward conflict resolution which accommodates joint as well as service military perspectives. And the broad prior experience of all participants at this level in both the services and joint commands would add the leavening that makes compromise and cooperation palatable. Not only would this method of arriving at military positions be more balanced, it would more nearly coincide with the expectations of the framers of the National Security Act.

Reduced Operations-Oriented Staffs in the Service Headquarters

If the *maintaining* and *employing* institutions evolved as conjectured above, reductions might be possible in the large planning, operations, and intelligence components of the service headquarters staffs. In the four services the combined total of personnel assigned to those functions numbers in the thousands. Staff contingents of such size are not justifiable if the services are in fact *maintaining, or input,* organizations. Reducing these operations-oriented parts of the service staffs could supply the personnel needed to man a dedicated staff for the chairman, increase Joint Staff operations, planning, and command and control capabilities, and provide the unified commands with the wherewithal to assume new operational readiness evaluation responsibilities.

Legitimized Interest of the Services in the Employing Functions

Elimination of the operations-oriented parts of service staffs, however, would not be prudent. True, the National Security Act, as amended through 1958, appears to make a rigid distinction between *employing* and *maintaining* organizations. The law directs that military missions be performed by the combatant commands, "under the full operational command" of the unified and specified com-

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
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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

manders. The military departments are to assign forces to the combatant commands as determined by the president and are thereafter only responsible for administration and support. But the services are also responsible beforehand for organizing, training, equipping, and otherwise preparing forces for their combatant assignments.[3] Obviously, these latter responsibilities require intimate knowledge of the intended ultimate employment of the forces. Just as important, they provide the services a valid perspective, from the standpoint of resource input, for contributing to operational concepts. That is, the services have a legitimate interest in the entire spectrum of operations-oriented military activities. A large part of their quest for *de facto* predominance over the employing elements might be explained in terms of the absence of a legally recognized interest in military operations.

As opposed to the rigorous, and unrealistic, separation between *maintaining* and *employing* arms apparently intended by the National Security Act, on the one hand, and the alleged present dominance of both arms by the services, on the other, the limited reorganization alternative reflects the view that each arm of the DOD organization has a vital concern with the activities of the other. That proposition requires (1) a genuinely joint institution within the *employing* arm, (2) preponderant attention by each arm to its principal responsibilities, and (3) interaction of each arm with the other from the perspective of its assigned responsibilities. Consequently, although the limited reorganization alternative would be intended to end "extra-legal" service co-option of the *employing* arm, it would also favor, in principle, modification of the National Security Act to recognize the legitimate interests of the services in operational matters. As a result, the military departments could openly resume a role they lost, legally, in the 1950s but have never in fact relinquished, that of warfare advisers authorized to think and speak institutionally on the entire range of military issues from support to tactics to strategy.

SECRETARY/OSD FOCUS ON ALLOCATING DECISIONS

Unlike the *maintaining* and *employing* arms of the Department of Defense, the central management would not change structurally. But central management's approach to its responsibilities, including structural change, would alter significantly. The *form* of the

decisionmaking processes would become more important to top managers. Although they would by no means relinquish interest in the *substance* of decisions, they would eschew, where possible, devoting their limited resources to supplying that substance. Rather, senior executives would concentrate on developing and maintaining well-ordered decision structures and relying on the substantive products they yield.

The nature of those decision structures would be tailored to DOD organizational circumstances through vigorous development of all of the central management-subordinate element relationships and administration in accordance with the management and organization precepts derived in chapter 6. The fine-tuning alternative was criticized for the centralizing bias which would stem from concentration on central management as a complement or offset to the other elements. The limited reorganization alternative would offset this tendency by giving equal attention to the integrative and authority relationships of the secretary/OSD which facilitate decentralization. Developing these three *relationships as a group would* require strong military department management and mobilization of important, but presently weak, interests. Consequently, the secretary of defense would undertake to strengthen service secretaries by integrating the military headquarters staffs and the joint interest by institutionalizing the chairman-CINC relationship and increasing Joint Staff independence.

How would those changes alter—and improve—the way in which DOD goes about its business? The two cases which follow illustrate the intended effect of limited reorganization on the handling of substantive issues. The first deals with resource allocation among the services; the second, with resource management.

Resource Allocation after Limited Reorganization: Revisiting the 1980 Army Budget Controversy

Service posturing at critical junctures of the budget process is not unusual. The 1980 Army dissent, however, considerably exceeded routine posturing in its virulence and timing. It erupted during a period in which, as one commentator observed, "the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps today are all in the midst of the biggest peacetime modernization program ever funded."[4]

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The Facts. On October 14th, Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer, in a speech to the Association of the United States Army, publicly criticized the proposed fiscal year 1982 defense budget, then in the final stages of preparation by the secretary of defense. His remarks followed earlier congressional testimony in which he had characterized his service as a "hollow army." Press accounts reported two principal Army criticisms: (1) the proposed Army share of the budget was far smaller than that of the other services, "the lowest in 16 years"; and (2) the excessive proportion of funds allocated to readiness would shrink the Army procurement accounts making it impossible to acquire sufficient new weapons and equipment in the coming years.[5]

Subsequently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense responded through Thomas B. Ross, the assistant secretary for public affairs. Attempting to place the dispute in perspective, Ross made the following points: the projected Army share of the budget would drop less than 1 percent; over the last 5 years the Army share had varied less than 1 percent; and, contrary to General Meyer's claim, the 1982 Army share would in fact be marginally larger than in 1977.[6] With the one exception of a leaked secret letter in which Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., joined General Meyer in criticizing the budget proposals, the *public* issue throughout was structured as a conflict between the Army chief of staff and the secretary of defense.[7]

Rewriting History. If the limited reorganization alternative were adopted and achieved its objectives, it would change the structure of controversies such as this in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, what are in the first instance two military issues would be addressed initially from different military perspectives at levels below the secretary of defense.

The first issue, the trade-off between readiness and modernization, concerns combatant commanders as much as the service chiefs. With stronger unified and specified commanders (CINCs) participating in a revised readiness evaluation system, the CINC and his component commanders in each combatant command would first consider the issue. Any differences which endured would subsequently appear as discrepancies between the service program proposals and a consolidated joint position prepared and defended by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS would serve as a second forum for considering the issue. Although opposing military perspectives would continue to dominate, the terms of reference would change at this level in at least two ways. The question would presumably be more general, involving readiness versus modernization in all of the services. Moreover, politico-military factors would become more important as a result of the linkages between the undersecretary for policy and the JCS and the more influential role of the service secretaries in charting the course of their departments.

This in turn would involve the JCS in the second issue, the relative size of the budget to be allocated to each service. The CINCs' assessments would tend to broaden consideration of this question from a simple comparison of service defense budget percentages to assessments of present and future national security requirements. As contrasted with the present organization, the existence of fully mobilized interests in this forum would tend to dissuade any one chief from a unilateral attempt to enlarge his share of the budget simply on the grounds of parity.

A second difference in the handling of this controversy in a reorganized Department of Defense would be the Army secretary's involvement. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this incident to an observer unfamiliar with the workings of the US defense establishment but cognizant of its dedication to civilian control would be General Meyer's independence. The Army chief of staff arrayed himself publicly in opposition to the civilian secretary of defense while the chief's immediate civilian superior, who represents political accountability to the electorate and supposedly exercises complete authority over the Department of the Army, played almost no part in the dispute. The Army secretary was either ignored by the chief who acted on his own in making the controversy public or else the secretary, having been consulted by the chief, chose to remain detached.

It is inconceivable that a service secretary at the helm of a reorganized, integrated military department headquarters, working perhaps as a partner, but nevertheless as primus inter pares with his chief of staff, could avoid a controversy such as this. He would undoubtedly work initially within the system to resolve the issues. If that approach failed, he could publicly side with the chief, con-

verting what in the present organization was a civil-military conflict into a less dangerous and more easily resolved intra-administration conflict. Or he could side with the secretary of defense, severely undermining the military protest. In either case, an active Army secretary would prove to be a benefit which the present organization badly needs.

Finally, a reorganized DOD would transform the nature of the controversy, if and when it finally reached the secretary of defense, making it less difficult to decide and the result easier to implement. The lower conflict arenas, structured with competing interests as well as a built-in bias toward conflict resolution, would discourage the Army-chief-versus-secretary-of-defense type of confrontation. The surviving issues would be broader. A prudent secretary would, if at all possible, accept a united military position evolved through this process. Where differences survived the JCS, the opposing views would provide the civilian secretary viable alternatives, each commanding support from at least a portion of the military.

Gains from Reorganization. Examination of the Army budget controversy succinctly illustrates several advantages of limited reorganization. Many controversies now inaccurately couched in terms of "vertical" civil-military conflicts would assume their genuine dimensions as disagreements between competing military perspectives. The reorganized DOD would resolve a large proportion of those issues at levels below the secretary of defense, or at least transform them into broad questions more suitable for his attention.

The structural realignments would also enhance the capability to resolve issues the present organization avoids. The Army budget controversy involves resource allocation, an area the National Military Command Structure (NMCS) Study Report finds particularly troublesome for the present Joint Chiefs of Staff.

> The nature of the organization virtually precludes effective addressal of those issues involving allocation of resources among the services, such as budget levels, force structures, and procurement of new weapons systems—except to agree that they should be increased without consideration of resource constraints.[8]

Mobilized joint interests would ensure the revised organization

directs its attention to crucial resource allocation issues. Moreover, pursuit of joint objectives in the new organization would also tend to correct the additional NMCS Study criticism of the JCS on this subject.

> Other contentious issues in which important service interests or prerogatives are at stake tend to be resolved only slowly, if at all. These include basic approaches to strategy, roles and missions of the services, the organization of Unified Commands, joint doctrine, and JCS decisionmaking procedures and documents.[9]

The secretary of defense's position would be strengthened in several ways. He could remain detached from many controversies, particularly in their initial stages, confident the service secretaries and JCS chairman in the realigned organization would factor his concerns into the lower level deliberations. He could be certain of a modicum of support when he chose a course of action from among the alternatives provided by the organization, thus enhancing his ability to achieve acceptance of his policies within the military establishment and by Congress. Finally, as a result of his confidence that the internal organization would automatically produce substantive approaches to issues consistent with his objectives, the secretary could devote more time to the usual concerns of top managers, planning ways to adjust departmental activities to the challenges posed by an evolving external environment. Thus, the secretary would be in a better position to lead the Department in defining national defense objectives and selecting the means to achieve them. Attention to administration, allocating decisions to ensure all relevant interests are represented, would have the effect of improving the substance of departmental activities.

Resource Management after Limited Reorganization: A Hypothetical DOD-wide Health Care System

An examination of the way in which DOD health care direction might be revised illustrates the intended change in the approach of the secretary/OSD to resource management under the limited reorganization alternative.

Current Organization. The DOD medical "community" currently consists of a medical corps in each service and an umbrella

office in OSD headed by the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs. The Defense Resource Management (DRM) Study clearly indicates that this configuration can at most be characterized as a *loose confederation of entities concerned with aspects of medical care.* The OSD office aggregates the service programs into a composite DOD program for presentation to Congress; its principal concern, however, is that portion of dependent health care provided in civilian medical facilities through the CHAMPUS program.* The service medical corps provide both military and dependent health care in military facilities.

The DRM Study severely criticizes the performance of the present medical organization.** Significantly, despite traditional service autonomy in the medical area, the DRM Study faults the secretary of defense and his assistant secretary for health affairs for *countenancing health care inadequacies and calls for "stronger leadership and more aggressive management"* as well as immediate attention by OSD and the JCS.[10]

A New Medical Care System. A hypothetical DOD medical care *system* designed to attend these problems would consist of at least four elements. First, the service medical corps would continue

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*CHAMPUS—Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.

**To recapitulate, the services independently employ fundamentally different approaches, methods, and planning factors which result in striking discrepancies: Air Force projected wounded-in-action rates which exceed those of Army combat divisions; requirements for fewer theater hospital beds but twice as many physicians for the Air Force as for the Army; a Navy requirement for one anesthesiologist for every two physicians although the Air Force requires only one for every nineteen; allowance for physician attrition in wartime by the Air Force but not by the Army and Navy; a widely accepted service claim of a military physician shortage which can only be sustained by the assumption that all military patients returned to the United States in wartime would be treated by military physicians with no help from other government and civilian facilities; relegation by the services of dependent and retired health care to a secondary status which is contrary to law and has contributed to such widespread dissatisfaction on the part of military personnel and their families that recruitment, retention, morale, and espirit de corps have been adversely affected.

unchanged. Second, the assistant secretary for health affairs would broaden the scope of his concerns to cognizance of the results, both present and projected, of the performance of health care activities in the Department. He would devise ways to measure, across the services, present performance in terms of its quality, adequacy, consistency, resource costs, and other relevant measures. He would evaluate the results of previous policy and program decisions as a method of determining needed adjustments. He would be concerned with the future wartime and peacetime demands on medical care, and the adequacy of current plans and programs to meet these challenges.

The third element of the medical system would consist of the users of medical output and other relevant interests; a representative of the combatant commanders from the office of the JCS chairman; representatives of OSD offices concerned with contingency planning, manpower, reserve affairs, logistics support, and program evaluation; representatives of uniformed military personnel (e.g., the senior noncommissioned officers of each service); and representatives of dependents and retirees. The final element would be one or more collegial bodies which would structure the conflicts among the services, OSD, and client interests; for example, a medical readiness council and a dependent health care council.

The resulting DOD medical system would act as a counterpoise to the relatively autonomous activities of the present service medical corps *without* losing the benefits of decentralized performance of their functions. Measures such as the average cost per patient, occupancy rate of hospital beds, ratio of doctors to patients, proportions of medical specialties in each service, as well as those suggested by the criticisms of the present organization in chapter 3, would provide the basis for developing criteria and evaluating various aspects of performance across services. Representatives of the interests of various medical clients would provide feedback which not only identified weaknesses, but mobilized demand for their correction. Projections of future requirements by the combatant commands as well as the services would provide the basis for wartime and peacetime planning. The councils which mobilized the various interests would be employed to structure conflict as well as secure agreement and cooperation. To avoid the usual criticisms of committees, the councils would meet under the auspices of the

assistant secretary for health affairs. He would encourage and be ready to accept agreements which emerged from deliberations of the competing interests (remembering that OSD officials are among those interests), but equally ready to exercise the secretary of defense's authority to decide an issue if an agreed course of action was not forthcoming.

Gains from Reorganization. Such a medical system would afford resource management advantages similar to the resource allocation improvements attributed to realigning the *employing* and *maintaining* arms in the Army budget controversy. It would recast present "vertical" controversies as differences among legitimate interests. Many issues would tend to be resolved at lower levels without the involvement of the secretary of defense. A degree of support for decisions would be available whatever course was chosen on an issue. The secretary would be more free to concentrate on broad issues. Most important, DOD health care would be improved as a result of the more comprehensive assessment of strengths and weaknesses, and subsequent actions, continuously monitored by interested clients, to correct problems. Finally, the resulting consolidated medical program would be more internally consistent than the present composite, and thus more readily defensible before Congress.

Many other DOD resource management activities would appear to be equally amenable to system approaches patterned along lines similar to those described for the hypothetical medical system but tailored to meet the particular technical and other circumstances of each function. Candidate systems include recruiting, training, manpower, logistics (both equipment maintenance and personnel support), communications, space activities, command and control, planning, reserve affairs, data processing and studies, analysis, and war gaming. In addition, a similar approach could be applied to the defense agencies which support combat forces.

The key to improved resource management is a shift in the secretary of defense's priorities to emphasize the management and organization precepts and cultivate the complementary, integrative, and authority relationships of central management to the remainder of the Department. Under the secretary's leadership central management would focus on evaluation of performance, continually

devising, revising, and applying new measures to ascertain the results of implementing policies and guide their revision when necessary.

THE POLITICAL QUESTION

Having concluded limited reorganization would benefit the Department of Defense, questions posed at the outset of this volume concerning the political ramifications of attempts to reorganize the Department remain. Although the provisions of the limited reorganization alternative are by no means as far-reaching as proposals of past studies which have so exceeded the bounds of political acceptability that they received little serious consideration, are they nevertheless beyond the pale? The conclusions in chapters 4, 5, and 6 indicate the answer to that question hinges on two proposals. A determined secretary of defense could accept and implement all of the others internally. He would enjoy support on each measure from at least some DOD interests which could be employed to offset opposition. But the two proposals which do not fit this category are central to limited reorganization: designating the chairman as the agent of the secretary for supervising the activities of the unified and specified commanders; and merging each service secretariat and service military headquarters staff into a single integrated military department staff.

Should the Limited Reorganization Proposal Be Submitted to Congress?

Could a secretary of defense unilaterally implement even those proposals? The discussion in chapter 4 notes the National Security Act does not include the JCS in the chain of command. A policy decision, initially made by Secretary Neil McElroy and accepted by every succeeding secretary, places the JCS in the chain of command under conditions carefully defined in DOD Regulation 5100.1. No legal obstacle prevents changing the policy, replacing the JCS in the DOD regulation with the chairman.

Similarly, the authority of both the secretary of defense and service secretaries appears to be sufficiently comprehensive to effect the integration of military department headquarters staffs. For example, the law specifies that the Air Force secretary, "as he

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considers appropriate, may assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of the members of the Air Force and civilian personnel of the Department of the Air Force."[11] The assistant secretaries established by law could not be eliminated, and arrangements must assure that a civilian official, not his military deputy, assumes the authority of an assistant secretary when he is absent. But these provisions are consistent with the integration proposal elaborated in chapter 5.

Regardless of the technical feasibility of an in-house DOD reorganization, it would probably not be politically feasible—and even if it were, not politically advisable. These controversial measures do enjoy some support within the Department—and a great deal more could be marshalled, particularly at the outset of an administration, if service secretary and other political appointees were selected who support limited reorganization. Nevertheless, the opposition to reorganization, centered in the military department secretariats and service staffs, would be formidable. And it would not hesitate to appeal for assistance to external supporters, particularly in Congress. Merited or not, the secretary of defense would be criticized for circumventing the spirit, if not the letter, of the National Security Act which provides that the chairman "may not exercise military command over...any of the armed forces."[32]

Similarly, the legality of an organization featuring assistant service secretaries with military deputies would be questioned. These and other charges could be employed to make it appear the secretary of defense was wrongly usurping congressional authority. Consequently, undertaking a reorganization as significant as the one considered here without congressional approval would jeopardize the secretary's standing; it would not be politically advisable, even if both technically and politically feasible.

Although recourse to Congress would subject the proposed reorganization to legislative tinkering and possible dilution, it would provide a number of advantages. Any sentiment that Congress was being circumvented would be avoided. Legislators who support the reorganization would be activated to overcome the opposition. If Congress accepted the reorganization on the basis of the strong case outlined later, the secretary would reinforce his political standing. The opposition of the services and their chiefs could be signifi-

cantly muted if the proposed legislation included, in effect as a *quid pro quo*, recognition of their valid interest in the employment of military forces and the corresponding legitimacy of their role as warfare advisers. Finally, and most important, an open discussion of the organizational problems faced by a structure as complex as the Department of Defense would benefit the nation.

Prospects for Congressional Approval

Would the proposed reorganization be approved by Congress? Yes, probably. The outcome would depend on the circumstances at the time, of course. But as this volume is being completed early in the 1980s, the situation appears to be more favorable to change than usual for several reasons. A new President elected with an overwhelming electoral margin occupies the White House. His secretary of defense enjoys broad congressional support as a result of the strong national security posture advocated by President Reagan during his winning campaign. Those factors reinforce an underlying tendency of Congress to defer to a secretary on organization matters, particularly when its prerogatives are not threatened and the specific proposals call for moderate, incremental change as in the case of the limited reorganization alternative.

An equally important, if less apparent, circumstance is the increasing realization, in the public at large as well as among legislators, that organizational reform may be necessary. Congress might be receptive to proposals which reflect a growing public sentiment favoring institutional change. Meg Greenfield, a *Washington Post* columnist, is representative of this opinion. "The real military issue," in her view, involves problems in the defense establishment which "are demonstrably worse than the kind money can fix." Forcing her readers to experience once again the bitter memories of an almost unbroken string of mediocre or disastrous military operations in the 1970s culminating in the aborted Iranian hostage rescue, Ms. Greenfield writes that in "episode after episode, the big talk of the planners and the...scenarios they project have turned out to be smoke." Refusing to be drawn into the debate over the adequacy of the size of the defense budget, she notes that "what there is isn't working very well," and criticizes both those who urge a strong military buildup and their opponents for "looking away from the evidence of things gone wrong that do not fit into

either political argument." The problem is institutional, she asserts.

> No slur is meant on the military people who are willing to risk
> their lives for the rest of us. But the bravery and dedication of the
> individual soldier is no answer to the gross inefficiencies of the
> institutions he serves.[13]

Public statements by prominent defense-oriented congressmen as well as published accounts of the views of some eminent defense analysts suggest Ms. Greenfield may have struck a responsive chord.[14]

Presenting the Case for Reorganization to Congress

The circumstances favoring acceptance of limited reorganization by Congress also include the strong case the secretary of defense can present favoring limited reorganization. First, serious deficiencies in the present organization, the major elements of which have been recognized and reiterated in studies for over two decades, argue for change. In essence the present organization pits the military services against the civilian secretary of defense, thus obviating a whole host of other relevant points of view while fostering continuing civil-military discord. A corollary argument, of course, links flawed organizational structure with questionable performance, as Ms. Greenfield has done. Anyone who accepts the criticism of the present structure is at least compelled to ask whether improvements are possible.

The second part of the case for reorganization before Congress would be an explanation of how the recommended measures would overcome the weaknesses of the present organization. That analysis has been the burden of this volume. At this juncture, it is merely necessary to note Congress should be impressed by a comparison of its intended organization for the Department, set out in the Reorganization Act of 1958, with the present organization and the proposed limited reorganization.

Figure 8-1 facilitates the comparison by repeating earlier interpretations of the legislative, present, and proposed DOD organizations. By permitting the services and central management to dominate the Department of Defense, the present organization grossly distorts the legislative intent. The proposed organization, however,

PRESENT, PROPOSED, AND LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE MODELS

PRESENT STRUCTURE
(From Chapter 3)

LIMITED REORGANIZATION
STRUCTURE
(From Chapter 7)

LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE
(From Chapter 2)

FIGURE 8-1: COMPARISON OF PRESENT, PROPOSED, AND LEGISLATIVE MODELS OF
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

approximates the legislative model; and the principal difference between the two clearly favors the proposal. The limited reorganization alternative recognizes the services have a significant and valid interest in employment matters; therefore, the model portrays a strong two-way relationship between the component commands and the services. On the other hand, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the legislative model unrealistically relegates the services to support functions portrayed by the two-way interrupted link in the model.

Finally, the third part of the case for reorganization would explore other courses of action. The severe criticisms of the present organization question the prudence of maintaining the status quo or merely "fine-tuning." Both organizational and political considerations reject the major reorganization alternative, establishing a body of National Military Advisers to replace the JCS and eliminating the service secretaries. However, a third measure, establishing a US general staff, has sufficient intellectual support that it must be considered—and rejected, if the precepts derived from the DOS 77-80 at the beginning of this chapter are accepted as valid.

In effect, creation of a general staff would be an attempt to make the *employing* arm as dominant in the future as the services now are. If successful, the joint interest would tend to subsume all other interests. The valid, and valuable, perspectives of the services (and the defense agencies) would be subordinated to a joint interest which has no more underlying claim to military verisimilitude than the services do today. In short, monolithic influence by either arm of the structure violates the organizational circumstances of the Department of Defense in which a number of competing, conflicting, sometimes contradictory, but no less valid, interests must find mutual accommodation to achieve an effective national defense. Congress has prudently avoided a general staff in the past and in all likelihood would favor reinforcing pluralism in the Department through limited reorganization over this approach.

THE INTEREST OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

As discussed in chapter 2, a large part of the behavior of organizations can be explained in terms of their interests. The focus at that point was on the elements of the Department of Defense—in partic-

ular, the services, but also the Office of the Secretary of Defense bureaucracy. The DOS 77-80 can be interpreted to recommend that the secretary of defense discover and assert his organizational interests. The most significant implication of the limited reorganization alternative is that through its acceptance the secretary of defense would recognize his interest in executive level *administration*—the allocation of decisions throughout the Department of Defense.

An emergent chairman–CINC axis, if it developed a strong institutional identification, would probably pursue joint interests. Likewise, a resolute service secretary heading an integrated staff would ensure the positions taken by his military department reflect his policy interests. Unfortunately, no basis exists for a corresponding expectation that DOD central management will undertake improved higher level administration as an interest. After all, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has no inherent interest in administration as conceived here. Except for the high-ranking officials who compose the secretary's political cadre, OSD is a continuing bureaucracy. The permanent element of OSD would be as likely as any other DOD element to reallocate decisions in favor of its particular organizational interests. Good administration, then, in the sense of continually refining the allocation of decisions in the organization as a whole, is the unique interest of the secretary of defense. The key to improving the organization of the Department of Defense is, first, the secretary of defense's appreciation of his interest in administration, and second, his success in imparting this interest as a matter of policy throughout the Department.

With the notable exception of Robert McNamara, most recent secretaries have been inactive as administrators, passively accepting the existing DOD structure, processes, and functional assignments while devoting their attention to the substance of issues. Does this behavior indicate that, although a particular interest of the secretary of defense, higher level administration does not warrant the priority traditionally reserved for substantive issues? The answer suggested by the DOS 77-80 is that the substance of an adequate national security posture, the ultimate concern of a secretary of defense, is directly related to, and can be little better than, the organization responsible for designing it.

If the organization is unbalanced—giving too much influence to

some interests and little or none to others, inundating top managers with inordinate detailed responsibilities while leaving military department managers weak and largely ineffective, and devoting consummate attention to some activities while leaving others relatively unattended—the resulting defense posture will inevitably reflect these imbalances and imperfections.

Administration of the Department of Defense deserves to be embraced as a matter of unsurpassed concern by the secretary of defense.

Appendix A

Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Counterproposals to Defense Organization Study 1977–1980 Recommendations

The following is a summary (based on the material in chapter 4) of the recommendations by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the Secretary of Defense to correct the problems identified by the *Defense Organization Study* component studies* but avoid their reorganization recommendations.

- The JCS should place greater emphasis on military advice concerning resource allocation issues and the chairman should be a more active participant in programming and budget decisions. But the present joint structure should remain unchanged; the chairman should continue to act only as the spokesman for the JCS.
  —Representatives of the JCS from the Joint Staff, but not the chairman, should (1) be members of senior decisionmaking or advisory bodies on resource allocation such as the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC); (2) interface with the new Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) planning office; (3) participate in OSD Development of the new Defense Policy Guidance document; and (4) become members of a senior advisory group to coordinate the Department of Defense (DOD) study program.
  —The current roles of the commanders in chief of unified and specified commands (CINCs) should remain unchanged. They already participate sufficiently in determining the requirements for the forces they command. The primary determinant of these forces

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*The component studies are the Departmental Headquarters Study, the National Military Command Structure Study, the Defense Resource Management Study, the Defense Agency Review, and the Combat Effective Training Management Study.

should continue to be the service component commanders.

—Readiness evaluation needs to be improved but this will result from JCS studies which are developing methodologies to assess total force capabilities.

—The chairman. representing the JCS and CINCs, not his own independent position, should provide military advice on the programs and budgets of the defense agencies.

—Whether a dedicated staff for the chairman is required is subject to further study.

- Increased OSD oversight of JCS military plans should be accomplished through information briefings provided by the JCS upon request to a limited number of OSD officials with a need to know.

- Joint Staff procedures should be changed (internally by the JCS) by partially adopting the DOS 77-80 recommendations, but close dependency ties of the Joint Staff to the military service staffs should continue.

  — The JCS will increase the initial high-level guidance provided to the Joint Staff as the basis of developing formal positions.

  — The Joint Staff will include a discussion of alternatives considered by the JCS, where appropriate, in formal position papers which provide military advice to higher authorities.

  — There should be no change to current Joint Staff personnel procedures and the requirements for joint duty should not be changed by the secretary of defense.

- The chain of command may need to be streamlined.

  —It may be necessary to formalize the chairman's role in transmitting orders and instructions of the secretary of defense to the CINCs. The chairman should continue to act only as the spokesman for the JCS, however.

  — The DOS 77-79 proposals concerning crisis management should be accepted. They recommend specifying the chain of command at the outset of any crisis, recording all decisions in writing, and increasing participation of senior officials in exercises to familiarize them with command and control capabilities and procedures.

Appendix B

Defense Organization Study 1977–1980 Proposals for Strengthening the Relations**h**ips Between Central Management and the Remainder of the Department of Defense

The following is a summary (based on the material in chapter 6) of the recommendations in the Defense Organization Study 1977–1980 to the secretary of defense which would strengthen the relationships between the secretary of defense/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and subordinate elements, i.e., the military departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, and defense agencies.

- Source of policy direction. The secretary would further elaborate the position of the under secretary for policy: increase linkage with the joint elements in developing long-range and contingency planning, Defense Policy Guidance, review of military plans, and coordination of the DOD studies, analysis, and gaming programs.
- Complement (or balance, or offset) to other Department of Defense (DOD) elements.
  —Challenger of the status quo. The secretary would expand the OSD resource analysis capability; strengthen central management leadership in the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS); establish routine review procedures for all major military plans; sponsor consideration of alternative concepts for performing defense activities in logistics, manpower, and life cycle equipment support costing.
  —Executor of activities which the other elements are incapable of performing. The secretary would expand capabilities to collect, process, and analyze DOD-wide information in a variety of areas, e.g., career mix data, management information systems, research relevant to two or more services or other agencies, and resource analysis; allocate shortages among DOD elements, e.g., hospital beds, physicians, support specialists; represent DOD elements in negotiations with other agencies; challenge the *modus operandi* in DOD (see preceding item).

—Offset to contra-organizational proclivities of the military depart-
ments and agencies. The secretary would increase the predisposi-
tion of OSD to become involved in readily identifiable DOD prob-
lems, violating established mores concerning the domain of
constituent elements, if necessary. Applicable areas include mil-
itary plans (including medical care in wartime), training, weapons
testing and acquisition, weapon support, and defense agency
policy.

- Integrator of DOD constituent organizations.
  —Source and sponsor of DOD-wide systems. The secretary/OSD
  would create additional systems similar to the PPBS in other func-
  tional areas such as training, medical care, studies and analysis,
  readiness evaluation, manpower, and logistics to provide an
  integrated DOD-wide perspective and evaluation of performance
  as a complement to the present decentralized, disaggregated, and
  loosely coordinated *modus operandi*.
  —Architect of input/output relationships. Central management would
  foster multiple relationships between output and input elements
  which allow continual assessment and adjustment of *overall* DOD
  performance. Appropriate areas include: creation of a joint readi-
  ness evaluation and reporting system which would allow compari-
  son of output capability to service weapons and support input;
  establishment of defense agency policy councils in which clients
  (the JCS and services) have an opportunity to relate agency output
  to input; chairman of the JCS prioritization of service and defense
  budget proposals; participation by "input" defense agencies in
  joint exercises; evaluation of service military training in terms of
  its contribution to combat unit readiness.
  —Locus of DOD coordination. Central management would concen-
  trate on fulfilling the enormously difficult requirements for achiev-
  ing united action in an organization as large and complex as DOD.
  Particular emphasis would be placed on collecting, transmitting,
  verifying receipt of, and ensuring correct interpretation of informa-
  tion concerning objectives, activities of various elements, the
  technical data base, studies and analyses, and positions and activi-
  ties of external agencies. DOD would capitalize on the utility of
  corporate bodies—the Armed Forces Policy Council and the
  Defense Resources Board, for example—as coordination
  mechanisms
  —Paramount influence on cooperation in DOD. Encourage a climate
  of teamwork in DOD based on an appreciation of mutually shared
  objectives as the framework within which differences are addressed
  and reconciled. Capitalize on the utility of corporate bodies, as in
  the case of coordination, as facilitative mechanisms of cooperation.

- Line manager. Central management would exercise closer supervision of some activities, such as CHAMPUS and the defense agencies, for which it has assumed direct responsibility.
- Source of authority. While affording full opportunity for other constructive relationships to resolve conflicts, the secretary would stand ready to make and enforce decisions unilaterally by virtue of his constituted authority when other avenues fail.

Endnotes to Chapters

CHAPTER 1

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2. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, *Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970).

3. Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 384–85.

4. John C. Ries, *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the US Armed Services* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 208.

5. US, Executive Office of the President, Memorandum from President Jimmy Carter to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Washington, DC, 20 September 1977.

6. Paul R. Ignatius, Department of Defense Reorganization Study Project, *Departmental Headquarters Study, A Report to the Secretary of Defense*, 1 June 1978.

7. Richard C. Steadman, *Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978).

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9. Theodore Antonelli, *Report to the Secretary of Defense of the Defense Agency Review*, March 1979.

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2. Lawrence S. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 12–13.

3. US, Department of Defense Historical Office, *Documents*, "Section 136, Title 10, US Code, As Amended by Section 404 (a), Public Law 91-121," p. 249.

4. Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework," in Halperin and Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 3–5, 9–10. Halperin's work, although broader in scope, is particularly relevant to this enquiry. With Arnold Kanter, he develops a theory—or a set of working hypotheses—which explains the national security policy process in terms of the perspectives of participant domestic bureaucratic organizations. This technique contrasts with the more traditional approaches: "international relations" which emphasizes interactions among nation-states; and "foreign policy" which attempts to discern national interests based on the inherent attributes of a given nation or the pronouncements of its leaders (pp. 1–2). Halperin's thesis, employed throughout the discussion of organizational characteristics and interests, is summarized in the following excerpts.

> The international environment permits a state to pursue a wide variety of goals.
>
> In the postwar period a widely shared set of images of the functioning of the international system and the US role in the world shaped the prevailing consensus on the requirements of American security.
>
> The set of shared images which has prevailed since World War II has established only very broad limits for policy deliberations.
>
> Each participant is relatively free to give operational meaning to [the common conceptions of national security interest], and, at any one time, there is a wide divergence among the members of the national security bureaucracy regarding what, in specific cases, the national security requires.
>
> Since national security interests per se are essentially non-operational and therefore inadequate guides for action, most participants in the national security policy process turn to other sources for clues to requirements of security and the best means to protect and enhance it. Other concerns and other interests become synonymous with the national security interest. These other interests may stem from the participant's organizational affiliation, his personal ambitions, and/or his evalua-

tion of the domestic po..*ical climate.

The predominant sources of a nation's behavior in the international arena are the organizations and individuals in the executive branch who are responding to opportunities for, and threats to, the maximization of their diverse interests and objectives.

Bureaucrats will examine any policy proposal, at least in part, to determine whether it will increase the effectiveness with which the mission of their particular organization can be carried out; their organizational responsibilities will help to define the face of the issue they see.

5. Carl Joachim Friedrich, *Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 132.

6. Halperin and Kanter, "Bureaucratic Perspective," pp. 10–11.

7. US, Department of Defense, Historical Office, *Documents*, "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958—6 August 1958 (72 Stat. 514)" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 208.

8. Halperin and Kanter, "Bureaucratic Perspective," p. 5.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., pp. 8–12.

11. Ibid., p. 10.

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13. *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969*, pp. 16, 17, cited by Morton H. Halperin, "The Role of the Military in the Formation and Execution of National Security Policy," University Programs Modular Studies (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1974), p. 5.

14. George C. Wilson, "Carter Budget Envisions a Force for Quick, Long-Distance Reaction," *Washington Post*, 27 November 1979, p. A8.

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16. Perry McCoy Smith, *Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 19.

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18. William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, *The Organizational Politics of Defense* (Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1974), pp. 113-114.

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20. Halperin and Kanter, "Bureaucratic Perspective," p. 11.

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University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 5.

23. Ibid., p. 4.

24. See, for example, President Truman's message to Congress, 19 December 1945, reproduced in US, Department of Defense Historical Office, *Documents,* pp. 7–17. See especially p. 13.

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26. US, Department of Defense, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,* pp. 3, 5, 32, and 33.

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2. Paul R. Ignatius, Department of Defense Reorganization Study Project, *Department Headquarters Study. A Report to the Secretary of Defense,* 1 June 1978, cover letter and p. 28.

3. Steadman, *Report,* p. 2.

4. Ibid., p. 1.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Ibid., pp. 1, 33, 37–39, 49–69.

7. Ibid., pp. 48–49.

8. Ibid., p. 53.

9. Ibid., p. 55.

10. Ibid., p. 52; also see pp. 53, 65.

11. Ibid., pp. 36, 52.

12. Ibid., p. 53.

13. Ibid., p. 37.

14. Ibid., p. 52.

15. Ibid., pp. 50–51.

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17. Ibid., p. 51.

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19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 67.

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23. Ibid., p. 35.

24. Ibid., p. 34.

25. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

26. Ibid., p. 43.

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28. Ibid., p. 41.
29. Ibid., pp. 29, 42.
30. Ibid., p. 8.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., pp. 18–21.
33. Ibid., p. 7.
34. Ibid., p. 44.
35. Ibid., pp. 67, 68.
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37. Ibid., pp. 23, 26, 32, 34.
38. Ibid., pp. 34, 35, 39.
39. Ibid., Cover Letter and pp. 23, 51, 52, 54, 55, 72.
40. Ibid.
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49. Ibid., p. 27.
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51. Ibid., p. 80.
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56. Ibid., p. 34.
57. Ibid., p. 112.
58. Ibid., pp. 79, 89, 93.
59. Ibid., pp. 80, 91.
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79. Ibid., p. 17.
80. Ibid., p. 4.
81. Ibid., p. 35.
82. US, Department of Defense, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979*, p. 352.
83. Antonelli, *Report*, p. 36.
84. Ibid., p. 38.
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86. Ibid., p. 42.
87. Ibid., p. 87.
88. Ibid., pp. 38-40, 44, 45.
89. Ibid., pp. 30-34.
90. Ibid., pp. 49, 54.
91. Ibid., p. 39.
92. Ibid., p. 54.
93. Ibid., pp. 2, 3.
94. Ibid., pp. 23-28.
95. Ibid., pp. 26, 27, 44.
96. Steadman, *Report*, p. 33.

CHAPTER 4

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3. Ibid., pp. 34, 35, 65-69.
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5 Ibid., p. 36.

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8. Theodore Antonelli, *Report to the Secretary of Defense of the Defense Agency Review*, March 1979, p. 64.

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10. Ibid., p. 69.

11. Ibid.

12. Rice, *Report*, p. 21.

13. Ibid., p. 69.

14. *Comments, vol. 1*, Navy, chief of naval operations, encl., p. 10.

15. Comments, vol. 1, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (Administration), atch 2, p. 3.

16. Comments, vol. 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. A, p. 30.

17. Comments, vol. 1, Army, atch 2, p. 9.

18. Comments, vol. 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. A, p. 30.

19. Ibid., p. 22.

20. Comments, vol. 3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app., p. 7.

21. Comments, vol. 1, Army, atch 2, p. 6.

22. Comments, vol. 1, Navy, chief of naval operations, encl., p. 10.

23. Comments, vol. 1, Air Force, atch 2, p. 3.

24. Comments, vol. 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. A, p. 31.

25. Comments, vol. 1, Navy, chief of naval operations, encl., p. 14.

26. Comments, vol. 1, Army, atch 2, p. 9; Navy, chief of naval operations, encl., p. 14; Navy, commandant of the marine corps, encl. 2, p. 15; Air Force, atch. 2, p. 4.

27. Comments, vol. 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. A, p. 32.

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30. Comments, vol. 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. A, p. 17.

31. Steadman, *Report*, p. 33.

32. Ibid., p. 70.

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38. Comments, vol. 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. A, p. 28; Army, atch. 2, p. 8; Navy, commandant of the Marine Corps, encl. 2, p. 13; Air Force, atch 2, p. 4.

39. Comments, vol. 1, Air Force, atch 2, p. 4.

40. Comments, vol. 1, Navy, commandant of the Marine Corps, encl. 2, p. 13.

41. Comments, vol. 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. A, p. 28.

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42. Comments, vol. 1, Navy, chief of naval operations, encl., p. 13; also, Army, atch. 2, p. 9; Air Force, atch. 2, p. 5; Navy, commandant of the Marine Corps, p. 14.

43. Comments, vol. 1, Navy, chief of naval operations, encl., p. 13; Joint Chiefs of Staff, app. 2, pp. 29–30.

44. Comments, vol. 1, Army, atch. 2, p. 9; Navy, commandant of the Marine Corps, encl. 2, p. 14; also, Navy, chief of naval operations, encl., p. 13.

45. Comments, vol. 1, deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration, atch. 2, p. 51.

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Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms

ABM	antiballistic missile
AFPC	Armed Forces Policy Council
ASA(RDA)	assistant secretary of the Army for research, development, and acquisition
ASD	assistant secretary of defense
ASD(HA)	assistant secretary of defense for health affairs
ASD(ISP)	assistant secretary of defense for international security policy
ASD(PA&E)	assistant secretary of defense for program analysis and evaluation
CETM Study	Combat Effective Training Management Study
CG	commanding general
Chairman	chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman/ CINCs	denotes proposed institutional linkage between the JCS chairman and the commanders of unified and specified commands
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
CINC	Literally means "commander-in-chief." In this book CINC refers to the commander of a unified or specified command
CJCS	chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNO	chief of naval operations
combatant commands	The unified and specified commands. Also termed joint commands
DA Review	Defense Agency Review
DH Study	Departmental Headquarters Study
DASD	deputy assistant secretary of defense
DASD(A)	deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS 77-80	Defense Organization Study, 1977–1980
DPG	defense planning guidance
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DRM Study	Defense Resource Management Study
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
EUCOM	European Command
ITRO	Interservice Training Review Organization

Glossary

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Commands	The unified and specified commands. Also termed combatant commands
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
MAC	Military Airlift Command
NCA	national command authorities
NMA	national military advisors
NMCS Study	National Military Command Structure Study
NSC	National Security Council
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation (office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense)
PACOM	Pacific Command
PPBS	planning, programming, and budgeting system
R&D	research and development
R&E	research and engineering
REDCOM	Readiness Command
SAC	Strategic Air Command
Secretary/ OSD	depicts the secretary of defense and his staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as an entity
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USAFE	US Air Force, Europe
USAREUR	US Army, Europe
USD	under secretary of defense
USD(P)	under secretary of defense for policy
USD(R&E)	under secretary of defense for research and engineering

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